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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation study tested the hypothesis that greater political fragmentation in 
a metropolitan area increases the degree of residential segregation between non-Hispanic 
whites and non-Hispanic blacks.  The questions posed in this study is: (1) Do boundaries 
capture segregation because they are drawn and redrawn over time to reflect shifts in 
population distribution or do boundaries capture segregation because they represent social 
and physical barriers that prevent groups from entering?  (2) Do administrative and 
political boundaries capture segregation better than similarly sized arbitrarily aggregated 
areas? 
I begin examining the relationship between political fragmentation and residential 
segregation at the aggregate level across U.S. metropolitan areas by calculating measures 
of fragmentation and segregation for each city and then examining their covariation across 
metropolitan areas.   I follow this with fractional logit regression analyses comparing the 
results using alternative measures of fragmentation and segregation.  
I contribute to and extend the literature on this topic by examining the relationship 
more closely using methods of decomposition.  First, I decompose segregation over 
multiple nested spatial levels - specifically, census blocks within block groups, block 
groups within census tracts, and census tracts within places and examine their between 
and within component variation.  Utilizing the contribution to the segregation score at 
each level, I regress the results with measures of fragmentation to determine whether the 
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geographic unit used in assessing segregation affects the extent to which the two are 
related.  
Lastly, I compare segregation scores captured using arbitrarily drawn places with 
segregation scores captured using observed places.  I conclude that a relationship does 
exist between political fragmentation and residential segregation.  I also find that political 
fragmentation’s impact is greatest at the largest and most meaningful cities in the U.S.  
The multiple analyses implemented in this dissertation allow the findings to be deemed 
robust and to conclude with confidence that this relationship is real. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my late father Manuel and my mother Jael, as well as my 
siblings, Sylvia, Monica, Carlos, and Lisa for supporting me all these years. 
I would also like to thank my Chair Dr. Mark Fossett.  Dr. Fossett mentored me 
while I participated in the Texas A&M N.S.F. Research Experience for Undergraduates 
Program, Summer of 2009.  He continued to mentor me while working towards my Master 
of Science degree and finally mentored me while working towards my Doctor of 
Philosophy degree.  Without his patience and support I would not have successfully 
completed the graduate program. 
Finally, a special thanks to my dearest friends whose laughs and emotional support 
kept me sane through the years.  Thank you to Belem Lopez, Fabian Romero, Jesus 
Gregorio Smith, and Stephen Hirashima. 
v 
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES 
Contributors 
This work was supported by a dissertation committee consisting of my Chair Dr. 
Mark Fossett, Professor of the Department of Sociology, Dr. Dudley Poston and Dr. Alex 
McIntosh, Professors of the Department of Sociology, and Dr. Shannon Van Zandt, 
Professor of the Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning. 
The work conducted for the dissertation was completed by the student 
independently.  Chapter VI was developed with the help of Dr. Mark Fossett utilizing his 
clarification work on decomposing segregation.  Work on decomposing segregation was 
developed during ‘Segregation Group’ meetings held by Dr. Mark Fossett between Spring 
2014 and Summer 2016 in the Department of Sociology at Texas A&M University - 
College Station.  Segregation Group meetings are an opportunity to discuss issues in 
residential segregation and segregation measurement not covered in currently available 
scientific research. 
Funding 
This dissertation study was partially supported by a scholarship from the 
Department of Sociology Student Research Fund. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. iv 
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES .............................................................. v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xiii 
CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER II  SEGREGATION RESEARCH - HISTORICAL REVIEW ...................... 5 
1850 - 1899 - Segregation before the Formation of Urban Ghettos ............................... 5 
1900 - 1939 - Emerging Discrimination and Formation of Ghettos .............................. 6 
1940 - 1967 - Stabilizing Segregation and Consolidation of the Ghetto ....................... 7 
1968 - Present - Resistant Decline of Segregation ......................................................... 8 
CHAPTER III  THE ROLE OF POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION - REVIEW AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISCRIMINATION ................................................................ 13 
Cities and Municipalities .............................................................................................. 14 
School Districts ............................................................................................................ 18 
Taxation ........................................................................................................................ 21 
Zoning Regulation and Land Use................................................................................. 22 
Dynamics of Areal Units .............................................................................................. 28 
Issues and Motivation for Research ............................................................................. 34 
Research Hypotheses.................................................................................................... 36 
CHAPTER IV  DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS ............................................... 38 
Data and Methods......................................................................................................... 38 
Sample and Units of Analysis ...................................................................................... 40 
Measures of Segregation .............................................................................................. 44 
CHAPTER V  METROPOLITAN LEVEL ANALYSIS ................................................ 52 
vii 
 
Page 
 
Aggregate Level Measures: Uneven Distribution ........................................................ 54 
Aggregate Level Measures: Political Fragmentation ................................................... 55 
Aggregate Level Analyses ........................................................................................... 64 
Results .......................................................................................................................... 70 
Discussion .................................................................................................................... 79 
CHAPTER VI  FORMAL AND SIMPLE METHODS FOR DECOMPOSING 
SEGREGATION .............................................................................................................. 89 
Methodological Decomposable Properties................................................................... 89 
Decomposable Measures of Segregation - The Detailed Formal Calculations ............ 90 
Decomposable Measures of Segregation - A Simpler Option for Calculation ............ 92 
Formal versus Simple Calculation of Decomposition Components - Working 
Example ........................................................................................................................ 95 
CHAPTER VII  ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FRAGMENTATION AND SEGREGATION WITHIN INDIVIDUAL 
METROPOLITAN AREAS ........................................................................................... 107 
Decomposition Analyses Measures ........................................................................... 107 
Decomposition Analyses - Close Analysis of Selected Cases ................................... 109 
Analyses of Nested Units ........................................................................................... 113 
Regression Analyses .................................................................................................. 149 
Decomposing Macro and Micro Place Segregation ................................................... 167 
Discussion .................................................................................................................. 176 
CHAPTER VIII ANALYSIS COMPARING SEGREGATION FROM OBSERVED 
AND ARBITRARY FRAGMENTS .............................................................................. 178 
Arbitrary Fragment Data, Methods, and Measures .................................................... 178 
Arbitrary Fragment Analyses ..................................................................................... 179 
Discussion .................................................................................................................. 186 
Chapter IV  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ........................................................... 187 
Summary .................................................................................................................... 187 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 188 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 190 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................ 200 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Segregation, Political Fragmentation, and Control 
Variables - MSAs w/Minimum 1k NH Black Population ................................. 53 
Table 2. Place Fragmentation and Residential Segregation Covariation ......................... 68 
Table 3. School District Fragmentation and Residential Segregation Covariation .......... 68 
Table 4. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities with a Minimum 
10,000+ Population per 1 Million MSA Residents - Summary Findings .......... 83 
Table 5. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 
Million MSA Residents - Summary of Effects - Instantaneous Slope - 
Evaluated at y = 0.50 ......................................................................................... 84 
Table 6. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 
Million MSA Residents - Summary of Effects - Instantaneous Slope - 
Evaluated at y = 0.80 ......................................................................................... 85 
Table 7. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 
Million MSA Residents - Predictions Based on High, Observed, and 
Low Profiles ....................................................................................................... 87 
Table 8. Formal vs Simple  Decomposition Case Study Illustration I ............................. 97 
Table 9. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration II ............................. 97 
Table 10. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - Segregation 
Scores ................................................................................................................. 98 
Table 11. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - Block within 
Block Group Segregation - Parts ..................................................................... 100 
Table 12. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - within Block 
Group Segregation - Calculated Weighted Sum of Block Level 
Segregation within Block Group Clusters ....................................................... 101 
Table 13. Formal vs. Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - within Tract 
Segregation ...................................................................................................... 103 
 
ix 
 
Page 
Table 14. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - within Tract 
Segregation - Calculated Weighted Sum of Block Group Segregation 
within Tract Clusters ........................................................................................ 104 
Table 15. Selected Areas for Decomposition Analyses ................................................. 110 
Table 16. Descriptive Statistics: Political Fragmentation, Residential Segregation 
(Unit Contribution) and Controls ..................................................................... 152 
Table 17. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation I - 
Separation ........................................................................................................ 155 
Table 18. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation II - 
Separation ........................................................................................................ 156 
Table 19. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation III - 
Separation ........................................................................................................ 157 
Table 20. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation I - 
Theil ................................................................................................................. 159 
Table 21.  Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation II - 
Theil ................................................................................................................. 160 
Table 22. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation III - 
Theil ................................................................................................................. 161 
Table 23. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation I - 
Hutchens .......................................................................................................... 163 
Table 24. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation II - 
Hutchens .......................................................................................................... 164 
Table 25. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation III - 
Hutchens .......................................................................................................... 165 
Table 26. Decomposed Segregation for 30 Selected Metropolitan Areas - 
Separation ........................................................................................................ 169 
Table 27. Decomposed Segregation for 30 Selected Metropolitan Areas - Theil .......... 173 
Table 28. Decomposed Segregation for 30 Selected Metropolitan Areas - 
Hutchens .......................................................................................................... 174 
x 
 
Page 
Table 29. Summary Statistics - Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Scores ................ 180 
Table 30. Summary Statistics - Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Score 
Differences ....................................................................................................... 182 
Table 31. Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Correlation - Dissimilarity .................. 184 
Table 32. Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Correlation - Theil ............................... 184 
Table 33. Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Correlation - Separation ...................... 185 
Table 34. Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Correlation - Hutchens ........................ 185 
Table 35. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA 
Population - Separation .................................................................................... 201 
Table 36. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 
Million MSA Population - Separation ............................................................. 203 
Table 37. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 
Million MSA Population - Separation ............................................................. 205 
Table 38. Residential Segregation and Total Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City - Separation ................................................................................. 207 
Table 39. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration of Fragmentation - 
Separation ........................................................................................................ 209 
Table 40. Residential Segregation and the Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA 
Attending Different School Districts - Separation ........................................... 211 
Table 41. Residential Segregation and Total Number of School Districts per 1 
Million MSA Students Enrolled - Separation .................................................. 213 
Table 42. Residential Segregation and Share of Population Residing Outside 
Largest School District - Separation ................................................................ 215 
Table 43. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA 
Population - Dissimilarity ................................................................................ 217 
Table 44. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2,500+ per 1 
Million MSA Population - Dissimilarity ......................................................... 219 
 
xi 
 
Page 
Table 45. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10k per 1 Million 
MSA Population - Dissimilarity ...................................................................... 221 
Table 46. Residential Segregation and Total Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City - Dissimilarity ............................................................................. 223 
Table 47. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration of Fragmentation - 
Dissimilarity ..................................................................................................... 225 
Table 48. Residential Segregation and the Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA 
Attending Different School Districts - Dissimilarity ....................................... 227 
Table 49. Residential Segregation and Total Number of School Districts Relative 
to MSA Enrollment - Dissimilarity.................................................................. 229 
Table 50. Residential Segregation and Share of Population Residing Outside 
Largest School District - Dissimilarity ............................................................ 231 
Table 51. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA 
Population - Theil ............................................................................................ 233 
Table 52. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2,500+ per 1 
Million MSA Population - Theil ...................................................................... 235 
Table 53. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10k+ per 1 Million 
MSA Population - Theil ................................................................................... 237 
Table 54. Residential Segregation and Total Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City - Theil .......................................................................................... 239 
Table 55. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration of Fragmentation - 
Theil ................................................................................................................. 241 
Table 56. Residential Segregation and the Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA 
Attending Different School Districts - Theil ................................................... 243 
Table 57. Residential Segregation and Total Number of School Districts Relative 
to MSA Enrollment - Theil .............................................................................. 245 
Table 58. Residential Segregation and Share of Population Residing Outside 
Largest School District - Theil ......................................................................... 247 
Table 59. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA 
Population - Hutchens ...................................................................................... 249 
xii 
 
Page 
Table 60. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2,500+ per 1 
Million MSA Population - Hutchens ............................................................... 251 
Table 61. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10k+ per 1 Million 
MSA Population - Hutchens ............................................................................ 253 
Table 62. Residential Segregation and Total Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City - Hutchens ................................................................................... 255 
Table 63. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration of Fragmentation - 
Hutchens .......................................................................................................... 257 
Table 64. Residential Segregation and the Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA 
Attending Different School Districts - Hutchens ............................................. 259 
Table 65. Residential Segregation and Total Number of School Districts Relative 
to MSA Enrollment - Hutchens ....................................................................... 261 
Table 66. Residential Segregation and Share of Population Residing Outside 
Largest School District - Hutchens .................................................................. 263 
 
xiii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1. Covariation Matrix: Place Fragmentation and Residential Segregation 
for MSAs with a Minimum 1,000 non-Hispanic Black Population................... 65 
Figure 2. Covariation Matrix: School District Fragmentation and Residential 
Segregation for MSAs with a Minimum 1,000 non-Hispanic Black 
Population .......................................................................................................... 66 
Figure 3. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Small MSAs - 
Dissimilarity ..................................................................................................... 115 
Figure 4. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - 
Dissimilarity ..................................................................................................... 116 
Figure 5. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Large MSAs - 
Dissimilarity ..................................................................................................... 117 
Figure 6. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Small MSAs - 
Separation ........................................................................................................ 118 
Figure 7. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - 
Separation ........................................................................................................ 119 
Figure 8. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Large MSAs - 
Separation ........................................................................................................ 120 
Figure 9. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Small MSAs - 
Hutchens .......................................................................................................... 121 
Figure 10. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - 
Hutchens .......................................................................................................... 122 
Figure 11. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Large MSAs - 
Hutchens .......................................................................................................... 123 
Figure 12. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Small MSAs - Theil ...... 124 
Figure 13. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - 
Theil ................................................................................................................. 125 
Figure 14. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Large MSAs - Theil ...... 126 
xiv 
 
Page 
Figure 15. McAllen, TX MSA Black & White Population - 2000 ................................ 129 
Figure 16. McAllen, TX MSA Black & White Population Distribution - 2000 ............ 130 
Figure 17. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Small MSAs - 
Separation - Unit Contribution......................................................................... 132 
Figure 18. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Small MSAs - Theil - 
Unit Contribution ............................................................................................. 133 
Figure 19. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Small MSAs - 
Hutchens - Unit Contribution........................................................................... 134 
Figure 20. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - 
Separation - Unit Contribution......................................................................... 135 
Figure 21. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - Theil 
- Unit Contribution ........................................................................................... 136 
Figure 22. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - 
Hutchens - Unit Contribution........................................................................... 137 
Figure 23. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Large MSAs - 
Separation - Unit Contribution......................................................................... 138 
Figure 24. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Large MSAs - Theil - 
Unit Contribution ............................................................................................. 139 
Figure 25. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Large MSAs - 
Hutchens - Unit Contribution........................................................................... 140 
Figure 26. McAllen, TX MSA Black & White Population Distribution with Place 
Boundaries - 2000 ............................................................................................ 145 
Figure 27. Gary, IN MSA Black & White Population Distribution with Place 
Boundaries - 2000 ............................................................................................ 147 
Figure 28. Detroit, MI MSA Black & White Population Distribution with Place 
Boundaries - 2000 ............................................................................................ 148 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation investigates the relationship between the fragmenting of 
populations across various political, governmental, and social boundaries and racial and 
ethnic residential segregation within metropolitan areas the United States.  Using Census 
2000 data, I perform three related analyses to better understand the relationship political 
fragmentation has on residential segregation of U.S. minority groups.  In the first set of 
analyses I document the relationship between political fragmentation and residential 
segregation in a national aggregate level analysis of cities.  I assess the relationship by 
examining the covariation among measures of fragmentation and segregation across the 
U.S.  In addition, using the measures of fragmentation I conduct fractional logit regression 
analyses predicting segregation including controls for a set of population characteristics 
commonly used in segregation research.   
Second, I quantitatively examine how population distributions align with political 
boundaries and how these distributions contribute to segregation.  I accomplish this by 
decomposing segregation across nested spatial units into within- and between-area 
components reflecting micro-segregation, meso-segregation, and macro-segregation.  I 
conclude with an analysis that examines the covariation between segregation scores 
calculated using observed units and arbitrarily drawn units. 
Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature on residential segregation within the U.S.  I 
review the history of residential segregation in the U.S. and how it has evolved to how we 
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see segregation today.  I review relevant literature that argues discrimination has persisted 
in the post-Civil Rights Era and continues to shape communities in the U.S. (Ellen 2000; 
Glaeser Vigdor 2001; Massey and Denton 1993; Turner, Ross, Galster, Yinger, Godfrey, 
Bednarz, Herbig, Lee, Hossain, and Zhao 2002) 
In Chapter 3, I review relevant literature pertaining to political fragmentation and 
review the role it may have in creating opportunities for discrimination.  In this section, I 
review research that has been conducted and note its limitations.  Here is where I review 
the inability of past research to conclude whether any relationship found between political 
fragmentation and residential segregation is real or spurious (Bischoff 2008; Byun and 
Esparza 2005; Weiher 1991).  In this section, I adopt the definition of municipal 
fragmentation, sometimes referred to as fragmentation, political fragmentation, or 
jurisdictions, as boundaries that have regulatory authority over land use, land 
development, and social and political processes of areas within its boundary (Bischoff 
2008:182; Byun and Esparza 2005:253).  I also review measures of fragmentation used by 
past researchers in an attempt to identify which measures are best able to capture the 
degree to which an area is fragmented (Morgan and Mareschal 1999; Weiher 1991).  I 
conclude this chapter with a detailed review of the hypotheses and research questions of 
the dissertation. 
Chapter 4 reviews the data, measures, and methods used in this dissertation.  The 
data, measures, and methods are similar to each other in the national aggregate level of 
analysis of cities and the decomposition analyses, so I review them together instead of 
reintroducing the same information in each separate analysis.  In this chapter, I also 
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include an in depth discussion of commonly used measures of segregation as well as touch 
upon a discussion on aspatial and spatial methods in segregation research. 
Chapter 5 covers the national aggregate level analysis of cities.  I measure the 
effect political fragmentation has on residential segregation using methods more 
commonly used in previous research.  Previous research studies have used OLS regression 
analyses where I implement a fractional logit regression analysis due to the bounded 
nature of the dependent variable.   
Chapter 6 is a more thorough discussion of methods of decomposing segregation 
by spatial level.  Here I review methods of decomposing segregation that I term ‘formal’ 
which were developed and popularized by Reardon and Firebaugh (2002).  I also review 
an alternative method for decomposing segregation by spatial level noted by Fossett 
(2016b) that I term ‘simple’.  I draw on the simple decomposition approach to measure 
the extent to which population distributions align with larger spatial units and political 
boundaries.   
Chapter 7 covers the quantitative examination of how population distributions 
align with political boundaries and how these distributions contribute to segregation.  Here 
I review the decomposition analysis of segregation from a variety of observed nested 
spatial units such as census blocks and tracts.  In addition to decomposing segregation into 
nested within- and between-area components, I also decompose segregation within larger 
areas such as places to assess micro-segregation, meso-segregation, and macro-
segregation. 
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Chapter 8 presents analyses in which I assess whether segregation coalesces more 
around areas coinciding with observed boundaries in comparison with areas of similar 
population size created by arbitrary aggregations of smaller units.  Here I calculate 
segregation using larger units constructed from arbitrary aggregations of smaller units.  I 
then compare the segregation scores with segregation scores calculated for larger units 
based on observed boundaries. 
In Chapter 9, I review and combine the discussion from each of the analyses in the 
dissertation.  I revisit why researchers should opt to use census blocks instead of the more 
commonly used Census tract.  I discuss the consistent relationship political fragmentation 
has with residential segregation and the increasing importance place boundaries have on 
the residential segregation between non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks in larger 
metropolitan areas.  I then conclude with a discussion on the importance of political 
fragmentation on residential segregation in the U.S.  
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CHAPTER II  
SEGREGATION RESEARCH - HISTORICAL REVIEW 
 
Residential segregation within the U.S. has been well-documented utilizing 
various methods and measures available to researchers (Fossett 2016a; Iceland, Weinberg, 
and Steinmetz 2002; Massey and Denton 1993; Reardon, Farrell, Matthews, O’Sullivan, 
Bischoff, and Firebaugh 2009; Wong 1997).  Because segregation has proven to be a 
complex social phenomenon it has required both quantitative and qualitative analyses, as 
well as historical investigations, in order to understand its development and persistence in 
contemporary society.  These investigations have found contemporary residential 
segregation to have a deep rooted history that is the result of social, economic, and 
discriminatory practices (Hershberg, Burstein, Ericksen, Greenberg, and Yancey 1979; 
Massey and Denton 1993; Lieberson 1981).  In this chapter, I briefly review the history of 
residential segregation from 1850 to the present focusing on four historical time periods 
over this span of time. 
1850 - 1899 - Segregation before the Formation of Urban Ghettos 
Around 1870, five years after slavery was abolished in the U.S., blacks were highly 
concentrated in rural areas of the South while newly arriving European immigrants were 
concentrating in urban parts of the North (Lieberson 1981:38).  At this time the relatively 
small portion of the U.S. black population that resided in large urban areas resided in 
wards where “well over 90 percent of the population was not black” resulting in low 
segregation scores at the city level (Lieberson (1981:258).  By 1890, the proportion of 
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blacks residing in large cities, while growing, remained small at approximately three 
percent with segregation increasing only slightly (Lieberson 1981:258).   
In this era, white-black segregation in large urban areas was not characterized by 
large ghetto formations that would emerge in later eras.  The black population often was 
dispersed widely across wards and segregation often involved patterns of differential 
group distribution across avenues and primary streets versus side streets and alleyways.  
The black population also lived in patterns of “carriage-house” segregation where blacks 
lived in close proximity to whites in quarters for domestic service workers, yard workers, 
and other household laborers.  
1900 - 1939 - Emerging Discrimination and Formation of Ghettos 
In the early 1900s, industrialization in the North created several changes in the 
way of life that it promoted segregation all the while millions of European immigrants and 
black migrants from the South continued to flow into urban metropolitan areas in search 
of work (Massey and Denton 1993:26-30).  During this time, Charles (2003:167) notes 
that the color line separating black and white neighborhoods developed and took 
contemporary form with the result that the two groups increasingly saw the worst in the 
other. 
Lieberson (1981:258) notes that from 1900 to 1930, segregation between blacks 
and whites rose steadily with black isolation rising rapidly and beyond levels that could 
be attributed to the increases in black population size and proportion in major cities.  
Hershberg et al. (1979:72) note that, by 1930, blacks increasingly came to be located in 
highly concentrated black communities, usually the urban core, and new black migrants 
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from the South increasingly were directed into neighborhoods with a high concentration 
of blacks.   
During this era, high levels of segregation of blacks, and other minorities, emerged, 
produced primarily by the combination of informal discrimination frequently involving 
intimidation, extra-legal violence, and widespread practices of formal discrimination such 
as local segregation ordinances or federally sanctioned practices such as “redlining” 
(Massey and Denton 1993:51).  Redlining restricted housing loans to white neighborhoods 
while those deemed black or minority neighborhoods were redlined and denied home 
loans (Massey and Denton 1993:51).  Collectively these efforts were aimed at restricting 
blacks to certain regions within the city and it worked.  In Philadelphia, for example, 
white-black segregation as measured by the dissimilarity index rose markedly from 47 in 
1850 to 68 in 1940 (Hershberg et al. 1979:60-63). 
1940 - 1967 - Stabilizing Segregation and Consolidation of the Ghetto 
The 1940s, and the post-World War II era saw further increases in, and 
consolidation and maintenance of, white-black segregation.  Resources were diverted 
towards winning the war and, thus housing construction had stopped, leaving the supply 
of housing limited (Massey and Denton 1993:43).  New housing was available to whites 
who could afford them while blacks, with the economic means to afford a new home, were 
restricted to older housing stock in the urban core.  By the mid- to late-1960s, unrest in 
urban ghettos brought this entrenched racial inequality to the public’s attention 
highlighting the enduring consequences of “separate and unequal” (Charles 2003:168). 
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As the culmination of many decades of incrementally successful legal challenges 
and increasing social resistance and political protest born out of built-up frustration, the 
Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964 and then the subsequent Fair Housing Act (FHA) in 
1968.  The Fair Housing Act of 1968 outlawed the refusal to rent or sell a property to 
someone because of their race, color, sex, national origin, or religion.  Communities across 
the U.S. were characterized by very well-established, high levels of white-black 
segregation by the time of the passage of the FHA.  Although discrimination in housing 
was formally outlawed, segregation remained at high levels as communities initially 
resisted integration both in overt and formal ways and also in a variety of informal ways.  
Accordingly, Glaeser and Vigdor (2001-14) reported that the degree of segregation in 
communities has fallen only slowly, and remained at levels much higher than if the FHA 
had truly removed barriers to housing access. 
1968 - Present - Resistant Decline of Segregation 
Post-FHA, researchers have found that several factors may exist which continue 
to perpetuate and maintain segregated communities across the U.S. (Charles 2003; Ellen 
2000; Glaeser and Vigdor 2001; Massey and Denton 1993; Rothwell and Massey 2010; 
Silver 1997).  Massey and Denton (1993:96) note that “discrimination with a smile”, that 
is discrimination not legally sanctioned or on paper, became more pervasive post-FHA.  It 
was during this time that discrimination increasingly became less overt and more informal 
because formal, overt discrimination had been outlawed formally by the Civil Rights Act.   
At the local level, differential treatment of people of color contributed to 
neighborhood disrepair and decline at a faster rate for minorities than whites.  Silver 
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(1997:61) found that federal funding made available for urban development was 
distributed disproportionately across American neighborhoods.  Local communities in 
charge of distributing funds allocated funding to areas not deemed black or immigrant 
neighborhoods.  Turner, Ross, Galster, Yinger, Godfrey, Bednarz, Herbig, Lee, Hossain, 
and Zhao (2002) found that the real estate industry had been practicing racial “steering” - 
a process where real estate agents steer potential buyers to different areas of the city based 
on the race or ethnicity of the buyer.  Steering and related practices maintained existing 
segregation and adversely affected home values in minority neighborhoods. 
Blacks and other minorities increasingly faced “discrimination with a smile”.  
“Instead of being greeted with a derisive rejection” minorities were greeted by hiring 
managers, realtors, and mortgage consultants with smiling faces, who, “through a series 
of ruses, lies, and deceptions,” made it harder for them to gain employment, earn 
respectable wages, and purchase or rent housing units (Massey and Denton 1993:97). 
Researchers also find that population groups differ on household and locational 
preferences (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Charles 2003; Clark 1986; Ellen 2000; 
Massey and Denton 1993).  Charles (2003:191) argues that “active racial prejudice is a 
critical component of preferences for integration and the persistence of racially segregated 
communities.  In a study examining the extent and causes of residential segregation, Clark 
(1986:108-110) notes that whites have a neighborhood composition preference of 0-30% 
black and 70-100% white while blacks have a neighborhood composition preference of 
50% white 50% black.  In a study examining neighborhood composition turnover, Ellen 
(2000:124) finds that if the black population increases in a neighborhood by ten percentage 
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points the probability of a white homeowner relocating out of the neighborhood increases 
by 2.75 percentage points.  On the other hand, Alesina et al. (1999:1260) find that the type 
and number of public services offered by a community entice certain groups more than 
others.  Racial and ethnic minorities were found to be likelier to move to an area that spent 
greater amounts of funding in healthcare, welfare, and education (Alesina et al. 
1999:1260-1263). 
Another factor studied in segregation research is the proliferation of fragmented 
population groups by government, social, and political boundaries which this dissertation 
is most concerned with (Amaro 2013; Baird and Landon 1972; Bischoff 2008; Byun and 
Esparza 2005; Rothwell and Massey 2010).  The factor in discussion, sometimes referred 
to as political fragmentation or municipal fragmentation, is conceptualized as legal and 
administrative boundaries associated with regulatory authority over land use, land 
development, and social and political processes of areas within said boundary (Bischoff 
2008:182; Byun and Esparza 2005:253). 
Researchers have found that “political boundaries support the recruitment that is 
the complement to exclusion in urban sorting” (Weiher 1991:166).  Morgan and 
Mareschal (1999:579) argue that a proliferation of government, social, and political 
boundaries contribute to urban problems such as residential segregation.  In their study, 
Morgan and Mareschal (1999:589) find that a single suburb increase in a metropolitan 
area was associated with an average increase of 2.01 units, on a scale of 100, in black 
racial isolation.  Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004:391) find that increases in white ethnic 
heterogeneity leads to an increase in the number of political fragments within an area.  
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Utilizing various measures of fragmentation, Amaro (2013:126-127) finds that as the 
number of fragments within a metropolitan area increase so does the degree of residential 
segregation between non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks. 
Research has also studied the effects of zoning ordinances on the distribution of 
population groups in an area (Burgess 1996; Orfield 1999; Weiher 1991).  Zoning is 
defined as “the separation of land use according to each area’s impact and neighborhood 
relevance” (Maltz 2006:49).  Some researchers have argued that zoning regulations and 
jurisdictional fragments work together in excluding certain population groups from 
entering specific areas (Burgess 1996; Orfield 1999; Weiher 1991).  As communities and 
fragments develop on the outskirts of a metropolitan area they use their jurisdictional 
power to enact low-density and restrictive zoning regulations that would prevent minority 
populations in the urban core from moving in (Bassett 1936; Orfield 1999:34-36; Papke 
2009:14).  Researchers argue that zoning regulations perpetuate segregated communities 
by utilizing legal exclusionary practices that limit housing supply, monopolize public 
goods and services, and encouraging land speculation (Plotkin 1987:20-23; Popper 
1981:11; Silver 1997). 
However, while acknowledging the statistical association of fragmentation and 
zoning with residential segregation, some researchers suggest that these relationships can 
be spurious (Bischoff 2008; Rothwell and Massey 2010; Weiher 1991).  Rothwell and 
Massey (2010:1131) note that the various types of fragments in an area may have been 
drawn after neighborhood patterns were already well-established and thus the association 
reflects pre-existing patterns of segregation rather than a causal role of fragmentation in 
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creating residential segregation.  In addition, researchers note that, although their 
correspondence with segregation is clear, these various fragments sometimes may need to 
exist because local neighborhoods require specialized monitoring for social services 
(Bischoff 2008:207).  In regards to zoning, Weiher (1991:87 & 162) also points out that 
the association with segregation can be observed but we usually are unable to fully know 
the intentions of officials when enacting zoning ordinances that are found to be 
disproportionately exclusionary of certain population groups. 
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CHAPTER III  
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION - REVIEW AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISCRIMINATION 
 
Many researchers have advanced the hypothesis that political fragments cause 
and/or maintain segregation in neighborhoods across the U.S. (Alesina et al. 2004; Amaro 
2013; Baird and Landon 1972; Bischoff 2008; Byun and Esparza 2005; Morgan and 
Mareschal 1999; Rothwell and Massey 2010; Weiher 1991).  The mere existence of 
boundaries formally creating a quilt of separate and distinct areas makes it more feasible 
for people to choose a “suitable location” that is satisfying by race and class (Weiher 
1991:xi).  Weiher (1991:166) argues that a proliferation of political boundaries 
complement exclusion in urban sorting under the guise of a lower tax base and public 
services tailored to its citizens.   The result is that rather than becoming a mechanism that 
efficiently governs with a lower tax base, political boundaries and fragments become 
social fractures in society (Weiher 1991).   
Researchers also argue that a proliferation of government, social, and political 
boundaries foster and exacerbate urban problems such as residential segregation (Morgan 
and Mareschal 1999:579).  In their study, Morgan and Mareschal (1999:589) find that a 
larger number of suburbs in an area is associated with higher levels of black racial 
isolation.  Alesina et al. (2004:394) find that not only do political fragments increase in 
the presence of racial heterogeneity, they increase while sacrificing economies of scale 
meaning that populations are willing to create less efficient local economies in order to 
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avoid racial heterogeneity.  Finally, in a precursor for this dissertation, I undertook 
research analyzing political fragmentation and residential segregation and found that as 
the number of fragments increased in an area so did the degree of segregation (Amaro 
2013:126-127). 
Although researchers have hypothesized that political fragments contribute to 
segregation the arguments that political fragmentation contributes to segregation is 
countered by concerns that it is difficult to establish whether an observed empirical 
relationship is causal or spurious.  This section discusses several hypothesized 
mechanisms through which political fragments may contribute to residential segregation 
in a metropolitan area as well as concerns regarding the possibility that associations 
between fragmentation and segregation could be spurious rather than causal.  I first 
review, cities, school districts, and the process of taxation.  The second part of this section 
discusses issues and processes related to political fragmentation.  In the second part of this 
section, I discuss the processes of zoning and land use regulations, the dynamics of areal 
units, and then conclude by summarizing the limitations of previous research. 
Cities and Municipalities 
Cities are local municipal governments with the power to define who is a citizen 
and which has a complex system to govern those within its boundary by regulating such 
things as utilities, housing, and transportation (Marsh, Parnell, and Joyner 2010; Galster 
2001).  Cities vary greatly in population size and spatial size.  Marsh et al. (2001:692) 
argue that cities use obscure processes to discriminate against minorities by utilizing the 
power afforded to them to exercise annexations and the implementation of restrictive 
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zoning and land use regulations.  The following section will review city processes, such 
as annexation, neighborhoods, underbounding, and public services and resources, all of 
which can shape its population composition. 
Annexation 
Annexation is the “altering of an urban settlement’s boundary” which would define 
local citizenship (Marsh et al. 2010:693).  As the population density of a city increases, or 
sprawls outward, the city boundary line may be redrawn in an effort to govern those who 
would reside within.  Marsh et al. (2010:693) find that annexing or refusing to annex 
neighborhoods can “significantly affect the political power” of population groups in an 
area.  The researchers argue that today municipalities segregate minority neighborhoods 
through “subtle acts of omission” as opposed to the more obvious instances such as the 
Tuskegee, Alabama case in 1960 where the city attempted to remove almost all of the 
black voters by redrawing the municipal boundaries (Marsh et al. 2010:693).   
Neighborhoods 
The concept of a neighborhood is more complicated than it may seem on first 
consideration (Galster 2001).  Galster (2001:2112) defines a neighborhood as a bundle of 
spatially based attributes associated with clusters of residences, sometimes in conjunction 
with other land uses.  These spatially based attributes includes structural characteristics of 
the buildings, infrastructural characteristics, demographic characteristics, taxing 
characteristics, environmental characteristics, proximity to employment and entertainment 
characteristics, political characteristics, social-interactive characteristics, and sentimental 
characteristics (Galster 2001:2112).   
16 
 
Galster (2001:2116) argues that neighborhoods come to exist because of a complex 
process of interaction between consumers and producers where “consumers” of a 
neighborhood are also the “producers” of the neighborhood.  Galster (2001:2116) notes 
that “households consume a neighborhood by choosing to occupy it, thereby producing an 
attribute of that location related to that household’s demographic characteristics, status, 
civil behaviors, participation in local association, and social networks”.   
It is through these spatial processes that neighborhoods change.  Demand by 
households looking to relocate are influenced by the availability of the supply of housing 
in a sub-market nearest their own (Galster 2001:2117).  The least competitive 
neighborhoods are then subject to an in-migration of “lower means” households than 
neighborhoods whose households have the ability to relocate (Galster 2001:2117).  
Another way neighborhoods can change, or in this case resist change, is via a collective 
socialization.  In these situations, “decision-makers live in a community where some of 
their neighbors exhibit non-normative behaviors, they will be more likely to adopt these 
behaviors themselves” (Galster 2001:2119).  Galster (2001:2121) notes that this can 
sometimes lead to an artificially inflated or deflated home value which in turn would 
enable the in-migration of less financially capable households or restrict them. 
Underbounding 
Underbounding is a form of racial exclusion by a municipal government in 
avoiding annexation of minority areas.  Marsh et al. (2010:692) define underbounding as 
the “delimitation of municipal boundaries to keep minority neighborhoods outside” of the 
city limits effectively reducing their political influence in city governance.  In a case study 
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of North Carolina, Marsh et al. (2010:694) found that 8 out of 10 cities had only annexed 
majority white neighborhoods which had effectively “neutralized” the natural growth of 
minority populations already existing within the city limits.  
Marsh et al. (2010:706) note that attention has been paid to voting districts to 
prevent gerrymandering but little has been paid to municipalities excluding minority 
neighborhoods.  Minority neighborhoods kept outside as a result of underbounding are 
without a “political voice” leaving them unable to have their interests considered during 
political processes such as rezoning and redevelopment (Marsh et al 2010:706).  Lichter, 
Parisi, Grice, and Taquino (2007:67) find that underbounding is an issue that plagues 
communities across the U.S. although it is less widespread than one would think.  
Underbounding is still a persistent issue for certain areas and not all.  Lichter et al. 
(2007:65) find that underbounding is likelier to occur in areas on the fringe or ETJ where 
the proportion of blacks is greater than the proportion of blacks within the City.  In 
addition, cities with a large proportion of whites were least likely to annex predominantly 
black neighborhoods regardless of the neighborhood size relative to the City (Lichter et 
al. 2007:67). 
Public Services and Resources 
Researchers also note that small-town, rural, communities are more likely to lack 
public services, such as water and sewer services, that a city would need to start providing 
in the event of an annexation (Lichter et al. 2007).  Although excluded communities, such 
as those affected by underbounding, will find it difficult to obtain public services such as 
water and sewer, Marsh et al. (2010:706) find that the greatest complaint these residents 
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have is a lack of voice in the political spectrum.  In many cases, these communities on the 
fringe of annexation are still within an extraterritorial jurisdiction of the city, which can 
be under municipal control for zoning regulations, but without political representation.  
Residents can watch their neighborhood be rezoned commercial and industrial without 
any clout (Marsh et al. 2010:706). 
School Districts 
School districts are an administrative component of the American educational 
system that is shaped by pressures from parents, community groups, state governments, 
and the federal government (Meyer, Scott, and Strang 1987:186).  School districts have 
experienced significant changes throughout the years.  Over the past century, school 
district funding has gone from mostly local sources to mostly state and federal funding 
(Meyer, Scott, and Strang 1987:86).  As part of the Great Society reforms in the early 
1960s, school districts went from being shielded from federal oversight to becoming 
directly involved with support and management by the federal government (Meyer, Scott, 
and Strang 1987:190-191).  Since the 1940s, school districts have increased in overall 
student enrollment even as the number of school districts is declining based the 
consolidation of many adjacent, usually smaller, districts (Meyer, Scott, and Strang 
1987:189). 
School district choice has been thought to be a matter of access to quality public 
goods and services (Bischoff 2008:188).  School district boundaries play a unique role in 
segregation because, unlike Census boundaries such as blocks, block groups, and tracts, 
people pay attention to whether they are inside or outside of a school district boundary 
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(Bischoff 2008:189).  School district characteristics are thus “heavily weighted” in 
residential locational decisions as opposed to residential locational decisions being 
decided on which Census block or Census tract a household will reside in (Bischoff 
2008:189). 
Between-School Districts 
Bischoff (2008:205) notes that metropolitan fragmentation may play a role in 
between-school district segregation.  In a study analyzing the social construction of 
political boundaries, Bischoff (2008:205) finds that greater amounts of fragmentation 
increases between-school district segregation supporting the idea that households use 
information of variation across fragments and districts “but are not as concerned with their 
exact locale once inside.”  It should be noted that Bischoff (2008) utilized segregation 
measures that were calculated using tracts which have been found to have a limited ability 
of capturing segregation in less densely populated areas as opposed to using Census blocks 
(Lee, Reardon, Firebaugh, Farrell, Matthews, and O’Sullivan 2008:779).  Similarly, 
Clotfelter (1998:14) finds that in the larger school districts, a majority of observed 
segregation is due to between-school district segregation. 
Within-School Districts 
School districts may also have within-district segregation which can be 
perpetuated by local school officials (Clotfelter 1998:19).  Using 1994-1995 data from the 
National Center for Education Statistics, Clotfelter (1998:19) found that as school districts 
increased in size so did the district’s degree of segregation.  In addition, as the school 
district’s share of MSA population increased so did the district’s degree of segregation 
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(Clotfelter 1998:19).  On the other hand, Bischoff (2008:205) finds that greater amounts 
of fragmentation decrease within-school district segregation.   
Although the within-school district findings are informative and important, both 
Clotfelter (1998) and Bischoff (2008) note that segregation within-districts is not as high 
as segregation between-districts.  It can be argued that between-district segregation is 
more important because desegregation orders usually are limited to a single school district 
(Clotfelter 1998:21).  Thus, regions with greater degrees of segregation, between-school 
district segregation is more important due to the inability of court-ordered school 
desegregation to address it.  Desegregation orders are therefore “limited” in potential since 
it can only address within-school district segregation (Clotfelter 1998:21).  
Private and Charter Schools 
Enrollment in private, charter, and magnet schools has been debated as a potential 
factor in the racial and ethnic segregation of students in public schools within-school 
districts (Saporito and Sohoni 2006).  With the rise in availability of school vouchers, 
Saporito and Sohoni (2006) researched whether students’ enrollment in private schools 
alters the degree of segregation within the school district.  The researchers find that school 
segregation is higher relative to the neighborhood composition of the attendance zone 
catchment area when there are greater numbers of private, charter, and magnet schools in 
the district (Saporito and Sohoni 2006:94).  On the other hand, when school districts have 
specialty schools that enroll students outside of the catchment area, schools are likelier to 
have lower racial and ethnic segregation relative to the neighborhood composition of the 
attendance zone (Saporito and Sohoni 2006:94). 
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Taxation 
A discussion of taxes applies to cities and school districts since these two 
boundaries are the most common local taxing jurisdictions.  Researchers argue that 
residential locational decisions can be influenced by the appearance, or assumption, that 
communities furthest away from the urban core, or those less densely populated, may have 
lower tax bases (Orfield 1999; Baird and Landon 1972).  Common belief among the public 
is that local municipalities can ensure that tax expenditures are efficiently spent on social 
and public goods that would directly affect the interest of those residing within, effectively 
offering lower tax rates.  Baird and Landon (1972:182) investigate this relationship and 
find that the greater the degree to which an area is fragmented, the higher its total taxes, 
educational expenditures, and police expenditures (Baird and Landon 1972:183). 
Political fragments create the possibility for households with the available 
resources to exercise choice in their residential location. Orfield (1999:40) argues that this 
allows a population to take their tax base along with them to lesser populated 
municipalities.  Greater degrees of fragmentation create a double impact on urban 
problems in that not only is the total tax higher in municipalities with smaller populations, 
or in the municipalities in the outer ring of a metropolitan, they also take much needed tax 
resources from the inner-city, or the municipalities with higher population densities, which 
demonstrate a greater need for public goods (Orfield 1999:40). 
Lastly, communities and neighborhoods in the U.S. have the ability to enable 
segregation by implementing special district taxes (Le Goix 2005).  Neighborhoods across 
the U.S. accomplish this by adopting special district, community facility district, or Mello 
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Roos District status which enables them to levy taxes only applicable to residents within 
the district.  For example, a special district may form when a municipality transfers the 
responsibility to construct infrastructure to the developer, or homebuilder, instead of the 
local government having to develop the infrastructure.  The developer will then transfer 
those costs to the potential new residents by increasing the housing costs or adopting a 
special district (Le Groix 2005:330).  These communities may also have special district 
status to pay for school bonds which were used to construct schools in the neighborhood.  
Instances like these result in the neighborhood remaining unaffordable and out-of-reach 
to minorities since it is solely the district residents who incur costs that the general 
population would normally cover.   
Zoning Regulation and Land Use 
To reiterate, a political fragment is the “autonomous regulatory authority that every 
jurisdiction has over land use and land development decisions” (Byun and Esparza 
2005:253).  Given this autonomy, municipalities have the power and legal authority to set 
local tax rates, determine areas to be annexed, as well as define the local land use and 
development code known as zoning.  Burgess (1996:216) finds that “several municipalities 
within the same region, and metropolitan area, practiced zoning independently of one another 
and for their own purposes.”  Researchers argue that zoning regulations perpetuate 
segregated communities by utilizing legal exclusionary practices that limit housing 
supply, monopolize public goods and services, and encouraging land speculation (Plotkin 
1987:20-23; Popper 1981:11; Silver 1997).  Papke (2009:4) argues that suburbanites have 
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used zoning regulations to outlaw housing developments that keep out undesirable 
population groups from entering their cities and communities.   
In this dissertation I do not directly assess the role of zoning regulations in 
contributing to residential segregation.  Instead, I argue that zoning and land use 
regulations can be seen as an underlying mechanism through which the effects of political 
fragmentation are realized.  Thus the questions posed later in this research will emphasize 
the importance of segregation as a result of places as opposed to segregation as a direct 
result of zoning and land use regulations.  The following section will review some zoning 
and land use regulations that cities will practice and which may contribute to residential 
segregation.  Some zoning and land use regulations include requiring minimum size lots 
or floor space, the controlling of sprawl, and environmental protection to name a few.  
Minimum Lot Size and Minimum Square Footage 
One of the legal authorities that local municipalities have is to enact minimum-lot 
size and minimum square footage size zoning regulations.  Requiring homes to maintain 
large lots such as a minimum of 1 acre or for homes to maintain a minimum of 2,000 
square feet greatly decreases the number of available units for purchase and rent (Frieden 
1979:25-26).  These restrictions would then lead to an increase in the cost of living since 
the supply cannot meet the demand (Elliott 2003:116).  Since minorities tend to have lower 
incomes than whites they will less likely be able to move into these types of large lot and 
large home areas. 
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Growth Management and Smart Growth 
Growth management and ‘smart growth’ are initiatives and policies adopted by 
cities and local communities to manage the development, residential or commercial, 
within their boundaries. Growth management focuses on land use and development on the 
fringe of governmental boundaries (Pendall, Nelson, Dawkins, Knaap 2005:219).  Pendall 
(2000:125-126) defines smart growth as collaborative efforts by governmental and non-
governmental organizations to contain the spread of low density communities on the fringe 
and focus on streamlining the development process for the local and urban core 
communities. Smart growth has a goal of preserving open space and rehabilitating already 
developed communities to allow higher density housing (Pendall 2000:126).  Both 
initiatives seem to focus on the quality of life within the jurisdictional boundary but take 
opposing measures: one by focusing on the fringe; and the other by focusing on the urban 
core.   
Both initiatives also require the implementation of zoning and land use regulations.  
Zoning regulations can make housing unaffordable for low-income households but they 
can also increase the number of affordable units within an area.  These types of zoning 
regulations can require new developments to have inclusionary housing.  Inclusionary 
housing, sometimes referred to as inclusionary zoning, is the “citywide or countywide 
mandatory requirement or voluntary objective that assigns a percentage of housing units 
in all new residential developments with more than a specified minimum of units, to be 
sold or rented to lower- or moderate-income households at affordable rates” (Calavita and 
Grimes 1998:151).  
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Lastly, growth management initiatives can also have policies that pay greater mind 
to the fringe and relegate higher density developments and commercial and industrial 
developments to areas where low-income households may be located.  Evenson and 
Wheaton (2003:223) find that these low-income households are at greater risk of having 
their home values and quality of life decrease with the proliferation of zoning regulations 
such as these. 
Environmental Protection 
Researchers argue that zoning regulations enacted under the guise of protecting 
the environment are done by: special interest politicians and groups who are seeking 
restrictions for selfish reasons; or politicians and groups interested in the greater good of 
the public (Bates and Santerre 1994:253; Pendall et al 2005:219).  Environmental 
protection comes in forms such as sewage system requirements, wetland protections, and 
fresh water requirements, all of which limit housing supply, density of development, and 
increase the cost of living (Frieden 1979:19; Glaeser and Ward 2009:272).  These 
restrictions may be enacted in the best interest of the public as a whole but also may be 
supported by special interests.  It is difficult to ascertain whether a restrictive covenant 
was enacted for selfish reasons or for the greater public good.  Popper (1981:50) does find 
that in some cases the local governing board was made up of the local elite, or special 
interest groups, whose goals were to make money or who could afford the increase costs 
of living that restrictive covenants create.   
Restrictive covenants usually lead one to believe that inequality increases among 
population groups in the area when a regulation limits the number of new housing 
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developments.  Cheshire and Sheppard (2002:267) find that when special interest groups 
argued for restrictive zoning regulations which pushed for public open access to restricted 
land it led to a decrease in the amount of inequality in the area.  Cheshire and Sheppard 
(2002:267) also find that in the event that special interests groups argued for zoning 
regulations which prohibited public access to restricted land the amount of inequality within 
the area would increase. 
Zoning regulations have led spatial partitioning to be influenced by factors such as 
the distribution of wealth and power, pandering or influence of politicians, racism, 
religion, ideology, and demographic changes (Marcuse and Kempen 2002:258). Zoning 
and land use regulations can also aid in the integration of population groups by 
implementing requirements such as inclusionary housing practices.  Zoning may not be 
entirely detrimental but previous research is correct in that zoning is practiced 
independently by each municipality.  Generally, municipalities are likelier to opt for 
zoning and land use regulations that are restrictive rather than inclusive. 
Case Study 
To date the research literature has not undertaken comprehensive quantitative 
analyses to establish the relationship between zoning and land use regulations and 
residential segregation.  There are many reasons for this.  First among them is that a 
comprehensive zoning and land use dataset for the U.S. does not exist.  Thus researchers 
investigating this question have necessarily resorted to constructing specialized, study-
specific data sets for a small number of cities (Pendall, R., Robert Puentes, and Jonathan 
Martin, J. 2006).   
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The original proposal for this dissertation included the goal of conducting an 
intensive quantitative case study to examine how the segregation of racial groups in 
Houston and West University Place and in Boston and Cambridge align with land use and 
zoning regulations.   Unfortunately, the challenges associated with conducting a study of 
this type made the analysis infeasible within the scope of this dissertation.  The central, 
and insurmountable, obstacle was the problem of creating a data set with the essential 
qualities needed to conduct the desired quantitative analysis.  For these two areas, the 
analysis would have required successfully collating data from Central Appraisal Districts, 
Planning and Zoning Departments, Redevelopment Authority Departments, and Census 
summary files.   
The major problem I encountered and could not overcome was that each 
municipality and department has records and data that differ on variables covered, 
variables operationalization and coding schemes, reliability, and years of availability.  For 
example, Harris County Appraisal District could provide parcel data, which is parcel 
polygon boundary data, but nothing earlier than 2011.  Boston Redevelopment Authority 
could provide parcel, zoning, and land use regulation data but for 2004.  The Cambridge 
Central Appraisal District could provide parcel and land use regulation data but nothing 
earlier than 2013. 
In addition to these problems, the data reflected contemporary parcel boundaries 
and land use designations which are not necessarily those that were in place at the time 
the residential patterns were created.  Altogether, these problems undermined the 
feasibility of conducting analysis for this dissertation.  I note however that it might be 
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feasible to undertake a project like this in the future where a full dissertation would 
undertake the task of developing a longitudinal database for two or more cities to sustain 
a viable quantitative analysis of the impact of fragmentation in land use regulations and 
segregation.  
Dynamics of Areal Units 
Political fragments have been found to encourage people to selectively reside in 
one municipality over the other (i.e. school district preference) as well as sort people out 
by making housing unaffordable for low-income families and minorities via restrictive 
zoning regulations (Fischer, Stockmayer, Stiles, and Hout 2004:40).  The measurement of 
fragmentation and segregation incorporates municipal boundaries, which are the result of 
local political and social processes, as well as census boundaries such as tracts and blocks, 
which are drawn according to census guidelines and criteria that emphasize capturing 
social homogeneity while also respecting natural and built feature of the environment.  
This section will discuss two measurement dynamics of the arbitrary boundary units such 
as blocks and tracts: the modifiable areal unit problem and the meaningfulness of random 
versus arbitrarily generated boundaries.  In addition, this section will discuss two other 
concepts unrelated to the arbitrariness of the geographic boundaries rather more related to 
the spatial distribution of population groups: the scale effect and proximity. 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) 
Demographers and geographers have noted that geographic boundaries for 
constructs such as blocks and tracts are arbitrarily drawn (i.e., do not reflect legal or 
administrative domains) and thus are modifiable.  Modifiable areal units are artificially 
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drawn boundaries that can be, and/or are subject to being, changed from the point of view 
of the research question being addressed (Wong 2004:571).  The modifiable areal unit 
problem (MAUP) arises when the boundary can be changed thus changing its contents 
which, in this case, are population groups.  If Census place boundary data was taken at 
one point in time, only to have the place boundaries redrawn, the result would be two 
completely different datasets even though the population groups never altered their spatial 
locations.  Researchers note that this is a problem because it can impact even basic 
descriptive statistics (Wong 2004:571; Kramer, Cooper, Drews-Botsch, Waller, and 
Hogue 2010:2).   
Further statistical analysis of the same place area but with the two datasets from 
the modifiable boundaries can potentially return inconsistent results.  This type of problem 
is sometimes termed the “zoning effect” (Wong 2004:571; Taylor, Gorard, and Fitz 
2003:42).  The zoning effect occurs when the spatial units of an area are arbitrarily 
redrawn, all while remaining constant in size and number, potentially leading to 
“inconsistent analytical results” (Wong 2004:571).   
A second problem, known as the “scale effect”, is attempting to develop larger 
units from spatially insufficient smaller units (i.e. blocks to tracts) or smaller units from 
larger units (i.e. tracts to blocks) (Wong 2004:571; Taylor et al. 2003:42).  Theoretically, 
blocks can aggregate to tracts but there may be cases where the data may be missing at 
such a low level thus making the tract unreliable.  The scale effect can also occur in areas 
where low level units are reliable thus generating reliable higher level units, or nested 
geographies.  The issue with utilizing higher level units is that any variation in population 
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groups at the block level is “smoothed” out and lost when aggregated to the tract level 
(Wong 2004:573). 
Researchers have undertaken several approaches to address the MAUP but no 
single approach is universally accepted (Wong 2004:575).  Ultimately, when conducting 
statistical analyses where the MAUP may be a potential issue, the researcher must 
acknowledge that the problem is relevant and take into account the possibility that results 
obtained using one dataset are one instance of many possible results that could be obtained 
from other alternative datasets (Wong 2004:575).   
I take account of the MAUP in this dissertation by performing analyses where I 
reconstitute boundaries to aid in testing the relationship between political fragmentation 
and residential segregation.  More specifically, I reconstitute city boundaries based on 
arbitrary aggregation of lower-level spatial units and recalculate segregation scores to 
compare with scores calculated using the observed socially meaningful city boundaries.  
If I find that redrawn fragments consistently results in lower segregation levels it will 
suggest that the fragments drawn by political and government agencies are clearly 
associated with the separation of minorities from the majority. 
Scale Effect 
The measurement of unevenness in segregation research comes with several 
dimensions that researchers need to be aware of, one of which is the scale effect.  Scale 
effect occurs when the extent of segregation captured is affected by the scale of the 
measurement chosen (Reardon et al. 2009:56).  Lee et al. (2008:767) note that a majority 
of studies assume that a Census tract “constitutes an appropriately-sized spatial unit for 
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capturing segregation.”  Researchers also note that utilizing too low of a level of analyses 
in segregation, such as blocks, can result in a more homogenous area, whereas too large 
of a level of analyses in segregation, such as tracts, can obscure segregation patterns 
resulting in a heterogeneous population (Lee et al. 2008:779; Wong 1997:131).  
Ultimately, since residential segregation is inherently spatial, “a complete understanding 
of segregation must be attentive to its scale in addition to its magnitude” (Lee et al. 
2008:767).   
This dissertation will implement a decomposition analysis which will directly 
account for scale effect issues.  I will decompose segregation at various spatial units in 
order to determine the contribution that each spatial level has towards the segregation 
score.  I also calculate segregation at the first-order contiguity unit which records all of 
the neighbor units of an areal unit to form a new unit.  The first-order contiguity unit will 
utilized blocks, thus making them larger than a block, which will address concerns that 
blocks are too small for segregation measurement, and smaller than a tract, which will 
address concerns that tracts smooth out variation in population distribution. 
Proximity 
The most commonly used measures of segregation in empirical studies are aspatial 
in nature and are most commonly calculated at the spatial scale of the census tract.  
Although commonly used, it is a matter of convenience for computation and analysis as 
using an aspatial measure to investigate an “inherently spatial” research topic can produce 
misleading results as to the degree of segregation between groups within an area (Lee et 
al. 2008:767-770).  Lee et al. (2008:770) note that an aspatial measure is incapable of 
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taking into account proximity to one another.  That is, aspatial measures of segregation 
are unable to distinguish the proximity one spatial unit, such as tracts, has to another.  In 
segregation research, this is much noticeable in areas that have a population distribution 
in the shape of a checkerboard while another area will have a population distribution in 
the shape of clusters, yet their segregation scores would be identical.   
The issue of proximity also arises with the assumption that all people or 
households within the aspatial unit are equally distant from one another.  Lee et al. 
(2008:770) note that common segregation measures are incapable of distinguishing 
proximity among residents when it is possible that whites and people of color are 
occupying distinct pockets within the areal unit.  In addition, it is also assumed that these 
people, or households, are closer to those within the units, as opposed to populations in 
adjacent units.  People on opposite ends of the areal unit may be spatially distant from one 
another within the areal unit but are spatially near people on the periphery of the adjacent 
areal unit (Lee et al. 2008:770).  As Lee et al. (2008:770) point out, “people may literally 
live across the street from one another yet they are judged to be more distant than are 
individuals who live relatively far apart but within the same tract”. 
Egocentric Neighborhood 
Researchers address the proximity issue by developing a spatially relevant 
neighborhood in the form of various radii.  This is known as the “egocentric 
neighborhood”.  In an egocentric neighborhood, “every person is assumed to live at the 
center of a local environment whose population reflects the proximity-weighted average 
composition of each surrounding point in some larger geographic region of interest” (Lee 
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et al. 2008:770).  The egocentric neighborhood is beneficial in that it allows the scale to 
not only be representative of an individuals’ local environment but to be uniquely defined 
by the researcher so as not to be constrained by the scale of Census geography (Kramer et 
al. 2010:3).  Blocks, being the lowest level of geography available, can then be treated as 
individual homogeneous units in the construction of the egocentric neighborhood unit.  
Nearby populations, or blocks, can then be ruled to “contribute more to the local 
environment” than would a distant block thus allowing the researcher to delineate them as 
having greater weight than those at a greater distance (Lee et al. 2008:770). 
Nested Geographies and Decomposition 
Some of the units in the analysis here involve nested geographies.  A nested 
geography is a geographical unit that can completely aggregate up into a larger geographic 
unit (Lichter et al. 2007:2).  A perfect example of nested geographies are Census blocks 
which can aggregate up into block groups.  Block groups can then aggregate up into 
Census tracts.  Census tracts can aggregate up into county boundaries.  Although tracts are 
designed to follow larger boundaries such as place boundaries they may not always 
completely fall within city limits (U.S. Census Geographic Terms and Concepts 2010).  
But nesting can be achieved in these cases by subdividing tracts into tract-place parts for 
tracts that are split by place boundaries. 
Nested geographies are greatly beneficial for this dissertation since nested 
geographies can be used in decomposition analyses.  Decomposing segregation allows 
researchers to “identify the specific source of residential segregation between racial and 
ethnic minorities and non-Hispanic whites” (Lichter, Parisi, and Taquino 2015:844).  
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While residential segregation has been generally declining at the metropolitan level 
researchers have taken notice to the importance of the spatial partitioning of racial and 
ethnic groups at the community and place level as a result of decomposing segregation 
(Fischer et al. 2004; Lichter et al 2015).   
Issues and Motivation for Research 
This chapter covered topics related to the measurement of political fragmentation 
and segregation, as well as previous research analyzing the relationship between political 
fragments and residential segregation.  Although political boundaries have been 
hypothesized and found to have statistical associations with segregation, the nature of the 
relationship is yet to be fully understood.  The relationship between political fragmentation 
and residential segregation is greatly affected by the creation process and dynamics of the 
administrative and political boundaries being analyzed.  Administrative and statistical 
boundaries such as blocks, block groups, and tracts are a few boundaries developed by the 
Census.  These administrative and statistical boundaries are delineated by geographic 
characteristics such as streams or rivers, infrastructure such as streets and roads, and 
population and economic characteristics.  Census procedures develop tracts and block 
groups with the goal of capturing homogeneity, when it’s present, in contrast to arbitrary 
or grid drawn boundaries.  Political boundaries delineate school districts, city boundaries, 
and voting districts, to name a few.  These boundaries are shaped by political and social 
processes affected by local population manipulation. 
Previous research that has analyzed political fragments and their relationship with 
residential segregation have utilized qualitative as well as quantitative statistical 
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procedures such as OLS and other various types of linear regressions (Amaro 2013; 
Weiher 1991; Morgan and Mareschal 1999; Alesina et al. 2004).  Although these previous 
studies have found that a relationship may exist between political fragments and 
residential segregation they have several limitations.   
The nature of political fragments make them difficult candidates when testing their 
relationship with residential segregation because many of these fragments are subject to 
change over time due to a variety of political and population changes.  Previous studies 
are incapable of determining whether the political fragments represent social and physical 
barriers that prevent minorities from entering or whether the fragments are simply a 
reflection of capturing pre-existing population distribution.   
Previous research findings are also limited because the results cannot attest to 
whether political fragments capture segregation better than a similarly sized arbitrarily 
constituted boundaries.  Metropolitan areas with greater fragmentation will have 
boundaries that are smaller in scale and will thus capture segregation better than areas with 
less fragmentation which would have boundaries that are larger in scale.  Previous research 
also is limited in its ability to establish whether higher degrees of fragmentation is 
sociologically meaningful because they have not compared results obtained using 
observed boundaries with results obtained using units with arbitrarily constituted 
boundaries of similar number and scale.  For these limitations, researchers have been 
unable to conclude if the relationship between political fragmentation and residential 
segregation is real or spurious. 
36 
 
Research Hypotheses 
Given the historical backdrop of residential segregation and the causal dynamics 
of political fragmentation, it is plausible to hypothesize that residential segregation in the 
U.S. has persisted because of factors already accounted for, as well as for reasons we do 
not yet fully understand.  In an effort to contribute to the study of residential segregation 
and to determine whether any relationship is causal or spurious, this research study will 
examine the effect political fragments have on the residential segregation of minority 
groups within the U.S. 
Research Questions 
Both administrative and political boundaries are drawn and redrawn over time to 
reflect changes in the population.  For example, as the population in an area increases, 
town boundaries may grow and become incorporated.  Other boundaries, such as cities, 
grow and annex communities.  Because boundaries are created at a point in time, and may 
be subject to change, the question arises do boundaries capture segregation because they 
are drawn and redrawn to reflect shifts in population distribution or do boundaries capture 
segregation because they represent social and physical barriers that prevent groups from 
entering? 
The question also arises whether administrative and political boundaries capture 
segregation better than similarly sized arbitrarily drawn boundaries in space?  Similar to 
the scale effect and modifiable areal unit problem in segregation measurement, arbitrarily 
drawn boundaries will capture some degree of segregation as do political or administrative 
boundaries.  As an area is more fragmented, the smaller the scale is, and thus the greater 
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the chance of the boundary capturing more segregation.  This study will test the hypothesis 
that administrative and political boundaries have a greater sociological impact because of 
their ability to restrict population movement by various means such as enacting restrictive 
zoning regulations than would an arbitrary boundary. 
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CHAPTER IV  
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
 
This chapter reviews the data, measures, and methods used in metropolitan level 
analysis and the analysis of the relationship between and within macro and micro 
components of segregation.   
Data and Methods 
First, I calculate measures of segregation and fragmentation and examine their 
covariation using Census 2000 Decennial Summary File 1 data and 2010 Topologically 
Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) 2000 Line Files.  Decennial 
Summary File 1 tabulations are based on 100 percent, or “complete coverage”, of the U.S. 
population.   
Second, I conduct a fractional logit regression analyses using Census 2000 
Decennial Summary File 1 and Summary File 3 Data.  Decennial Summary File 3 
tabulations are based on a 1 in 6 sample which gathers social, economic, and household 
data in the U.S. 
Although Census 2010 decennial data is available, I use Census 2000 decennial 
data because of its larger sample for establishing social, economic, and household 
characteristics that are used in developing independent and control variables implemented 
in aggregate level regression analyses reported in later chapters.  In 2010, these 
characteristics are available in the American Community Survey which is about a 1% 
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sample for annual data releases.  But measures based on the ACS will be less reliable than 
measures based on the larger sample available in 2000.   
Although Census 2000 is not the most current, this is not a major concern for 
hypothesis testing because past research documents great stability in segregation index 
scores for metropolitan areas over time with trends of declining segregation being limited 
to small changes (approximately 2-4 points per decade in recent decades).  Previous 
research also documents that factors predicting variation in segregation across 
metropolitan areas have similar effects from decade to decade.  Accordingly, Census 2000 
decennial data are appropriate for testing the relationship between residential segregation 
and political fragmentation.  Levels of segregation and patterns of effects found using data 
for 2000 are valid in their own right and in addition will also be highly correlated with 
patterns found in 2010. 
Using cartographic Census 2010 TIGER Line 2000 shapefiles I develop first order 
contiguity units.  TIGER Line files are spatial extracts of legal and statistical geographic 
areas within the U.S.  This study uses 2010 TIGER shapefiles of 2000 boundaries.  The 
U.S. Census releases data as near its respective year as possible.  For example, year 2000 
files are released near year 2000.  Through the years, errors are found and updates are 
made.  The Census has rereleased 2000 TIGER boundary files several times with each 
release more accurate than the previous.  Census 2010 TIGER/Line file release of 2000 
boundaries are the most spatially accurate. 
The U.S. Census releases Summary File data and TIGER/Line shapefiles directly 
to the public.  This study incorporates data and shapefiles released by the National 
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Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) operated by the Minnesota 
Population Center.  The NHGIS is highly regarded in academia and is also referenced by 
the Census Bureau in several of their TIGER/Line file releases.  The shapefiles available 
from the NHGIS are identical to those released by the U.S. Census Bureau with the 
exception that the NHGIS erases all coastal water areas from the boundaries.  Retaining 
the coastal water areas can potentially cause the centroid (center) of a polygon to lie out 
in the ocean where populations do not exist. 
Sample and Units of Analysis 
The analysis sample consists of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) in the U.S. 
with a minimum 1,000 non-Hispanic black population.  The population of interest are non-
Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites.  The U.S. Census classifies non-Hispanic 
whites as persons having “origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle 
East, or North Africa” (SF1 Technical Documentation 2000:B-12).  Non-Hispanic blacks 
are persons “having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa (SF1 Technical 
Documentation 2000:B-12).   
Previous segregation research has most commonly drawn on census tracts as the 
unit of analysis.  I use Census blocks as the unit of analysis.  I calculate segregation at the 
Census block level for reasons more apparent in the chapter on decomposition analyses.  
Blocks are utilized in these analyses for several reasons: (1) blocks can aggregate to 
calculate segregation at the block group, tract, and county unit; (2) blocks can also 
aggregate to place, school district, and congressional district units; (3) blocks can be used 
to create first-order contiguity units; (4) and blocks have better capabilities to capture 
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segregation within and across areas.  Capturing segregation within and across areas is part 
of the decomposition analysis which analyzes the covariance of segregation scores 
calculated at various nested and non-nested levels in addition to determining the 
contribution to the segregation score at each of the nested geographies. 
In segregation research, utilizing Census blocks to measure segregation has some 
potential drawbacks.  One is that index calculations based on block data tend to be higher 
due to upward bias in scores obtained using units with small population counts, especially 
when the minority group is small in relative size (Winship 1977).  Blocks also can be 
criticized on conceptual grounds as failing to capture the notion of a neighborhoods. For 
example, blocks follow certain geographic markings such as roads which could result in 
the neighbor directly across your street not being considered in your neighborhood.   
This study will also utilize a higher-order contiguity unit in response to these 
critiques.  The first-order spatial contiguity is a neighbor defined unit where a block unit’s 
shared boundary with other blocks are compiled to form a new unit.  This neighbor defined 
unit can potentially be a better representation of a neighborhood because it will capture 
household characteristics across one’s street.  If results obtained using blocks and first-
order contiguity neighborhoods are the same, it will demonstrate that the possible concerns 
mentioned above do not have practical consequences for the analyses reported here. 
Geographic Definitions of Units 
The following section will cover the geographic definitions for the units used in 
the study.  The definitions are derived from the U.S. Census SF1 Technical Documentation 
2000 section A-1.  
42 
 
Census blocks are statistical areas bounded by features such as roads, streams, 
property lines, and municipal lines like city, school district, and county boundaries.  In 
urban areas, Census blocks tend to correspond to individual city blocks that are bounded 
by streets.  As the area becomes less dense with populations, such as in rural areas, blocks 
become larger and can comprise up to several square miles.   
Census block groups are larger than a block and are subdivisions of a census tract.  
Block groups have between 600 and 3,000 people and 240 and 1,200 housing units.  Most 
block groups are delineated by local officials.  Block group boundaries do not cross state, 
county, or tract boundaries.   
Census tracts are subdivisions within counties and generally have between 1,200 
and 8,000 people and about 4,000 people or 1,600 housing units.  Most tracts are 
comprised of multiple block groups.  Tract boundaries will follow county and state 
boundaries and also often follow place or other municipal boundaries but not always. 
Spatial contiguity unit is a form of spatial relationship developed using polygon 
shapefiles in GIS.  I use first-order contiguity units which is a neighbor unit derived from 
existing smaller units.  The process will take Census blocks as a central point and model 
a new unit comprised of the central block’s contiguous neighbors.  As noted above, 
researchers sometimes criticize blocks as not representing true neighborhoods.  A first-
order spatial contiguity neighborhood addresses this concern by generating a new unit that 
is larger than a block and smaller than a block group. 
A Census place is a concentration of a population meeting certain definitions of 
urban density and/or legal standing.  As used here, places are limited to incorporated 
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places, such as a city, which is legally recognized by the state that the place is located 
within.  Census data also include the concept of “census designated place” to refer to 
population concentrations that have urban characteristics, but are not incorporated.  I do 
not include designated places in fragmentation calculations because the logic of 
fragmentation theory is that the distribution of population is shaped by the policies and 
regulations of the area and unincorporated cities are incapable of enforcing policy and 
regulation.  Also, not all cities are legally incorporated because either the state considers 
them towns, boroughs, or villages.  For example, the State of Hawaii considers their cities 
as counties and, in the case of Honolulu, county-city. 
Counties are considered “the primary legal subdivision in most states.”  There can 
be some ambiguity among the interpretation and understanding of counties in the U.S.  As 
mentioned previously, some states do not recognize incorporated places rather they 
consider them counties.  In addition, the Census also considers boroughs and 
municipalities as counties.  For example, in the public eye, Anchorage, AK may be a city.  
To the State of Alaska, Anchorage is a municipality.  Because it is recognized as a 
municipality by the State, the U.S. Census considers it a County. 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) are county-based entities with an urban core 
of at least 50,000 in population.  MSAs are comprised of the primary urban core county 
as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic integration 
as determined by commuting patterns and related census criteria.  MSAs have been widely 
used in previous segregation research.  MSAs are appropriate units of analysis in 
comparison to cities because they include the full population that has a high degree of 
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social and economic integration with the central urban center for the metropolitan region.  
This is especially important for analyses here which assess the extent to which segregation 
takes place between places including the urban core, or central city, and suburban places.     
Measures of Segregation 
An important component of this study is the measure of residential segregation.  
Some of the most common measures of segregation are the dissimilarity index, Gini index, 
Theil index, and separation index, all of which are measures of evenness and in the vast 
majority of cases are used in an aspatial manner (White 1986; Massey and Denton 1988; 
Reardon and Firebaugh 2002).  Of these, the dissimilarity index (D) has been used most 
widely in empirical studies (Massey and Denton 1988:284). 
Researchers have classified five dimensions of spatial variation in residential 
segregation: evenness, exposure, concentrated, centralized, and clustered (Massey and 
Denton 1988).  Evenness is the “differential distribution of two social groups among areal 
units in a city” (Massey and Denton 1988:284).  Segregation measures of evenness are 
affected when the unit’s two-group proportion varies from the city as a whole.  Exposure 
is the “degree of potential contact between minority and majority group members within 
geographic areas of a city” (Massey and Denton 1988:288).  Segregation measures of 
exposure measure the experience of segregation felt by the average minority or majority 
member to determine the likelihood of their sharing the same neighborhood.  
Concentration is the “relative amount of physical space occupied by a minority group in 
the urban environment” (Massey and Denton 1988:290).   
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Cities where minority groups occupy a small share of the total area are said to be 
concentrated.  Centralization is “the degree to which a group is spatially located near the 
center of an urban area” (Massey and Denton 1988:291).  The difference between 
centralization and concentration is that groups can be concentrated on the outskirts of the 
city whereas their concentration in the center of the city would be considered 
centralization.  Lastly, clustering is the “extent to which areal units inhabited by minority 
members adjoin one another in space” (Massey and Denton 1988:293).  Clustering is 
distinct from the other dimensions because it focuses more on the distribution of minority 
areas with respect to each other as opposed to the distribution of minority areas with 
respect to majority areas. 
This dissertation study uses measures of segregation that capture evenness of the 
spatial distribution of a population.  The following section discusses the measures of 
evenness that this dissertation study incorporates:  dissimilarity, Theil, separation, and 
Hutchens square root index.  The Gini index is another measure of evenness that is 
commonly discussed in reviews of segregation measurement.  I exclude it from the 
analyses in this dissertation because it has close conceptual and empirical relationships 
with D (Duncan and Duncan 1955; Massey and Denton 1988) and so little is gained by 
examining both D and G in the same analysis.  
Separation Index 
The following formula highlights that S is the person-weighted average of squared 
area deviations of local racial composition from the racial composition of the city as a 
whole.  It is given by: 
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𝑆 =  
∑ [𝑡𝑖|𝑝𝑖 − 𝑃|]
2𝑛
𝑖=1
[2𝑇𝑃(1 − 𝑃)]
 
The correlation ratio, also known as the separation index, is also measured on a 
scale of 0 to 1.  The separation index (S) measures the extent to which minorities, group 
one, are exposed to majority members, group two.  Stearns and Logan (1986:127) note 
that the separation index “measures the difference in racial composition of various 
neighborhoods” by assessing the “variance in racial composition between neighborhoods 
to the total variance in racial composition.” 
This dissertation study will use the difference of means approach to calculating 
separation.  The difference of means approach is a mathematical equivalent formula of S 
above that reveals the correspondence between segregation and group differences in 
residential outcomes (Fossett 2016a).  Fossett (2016a) notes that S can be understood as 
the white-minority difference of means on contact with whites. 
𝑆 = 𝑌𝑊 − 𝑌𝑚 = (
1
𝑊
) ∗ ∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑦𝑖 − (
1
𝑀
) ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑖 
The formula looks identical to the difference of means formula for D with the sole 
difference being that residential outcomes (𝑦𝑖) are scored from area proportion white (𝑝𝑖) 
according to the simple identity function 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖” (Fossett 2016a).   
Dissimilarity Index 
The value of D can be obtained from a variety of mathematically equivalent 
computing formulas.  The following formula highlights that D is the person-weighted 
average of area deviations of racial composition from the racial composition of the city as 
a whole.  It is given by: 
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𝐷 =  
∑ [𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 |(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑃)|]
[2𝑇𝑃(1 − 𝑃)]
 
where 𝑛 is equal to the number of areas in the metropolitan; 𝑡𝑖 is equal to the total 
population of area 𝑖, 𝑝𝑖 is equal to the proportion of area 𝑖’s population that is minority; 𝑃 
is equal to the proportion of the metropolitan area’s population that is minority; 𝑇 is equal 
to the sum of all 𝑡𝑖, and 𝑡𝑖 is equal to the total population of area 𝑗. 
D also is related to the segregation curve (Duncan and Duncan 1955) and registers 
“the maximum vertical distance between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line of 
evenness” (Massey and Denton 1988:284).  D “captures the degree to which blacks and 
whites are evenly spread among neighborhoods in a city” and can be interpreted as the 
minimum proportion of one group that would need to change neighborhoods to bring 
about an even distribution (Massey and Denton 1988:284; Massey and Denton 1993:20; 
Iceland et al. 2002:8; Fossett 2016a; White 1986:202-203).  D varies on a scale of 0 to 1 
with 1 being complete segregation and 0 being complete integration. 
I also use an alternative “difference of means” approach to calculating dissimilarity 
introduced by Fossett (2016a).  The difference of means approach is mathematically 
equivalent to the formula for D given above and - thus yields the exact same value for D 
- and is useful for two reasons.  One is that it reveals the “correspondence between 
segregation and group differences in residential outcomes” and in doing so makes it clear 
that D registers white-black differences in the residential outcome of attaining parity-level 
contact with whites (Fossett 2016a).  The other reason the difference of means formula is 
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useful is that it is convenient to use in programming to obtain index scores.  The difference 
of means formula for D is given as follows: 
𝐷 = 𝑌𝑊 − 𝑌𝑚 = (
1
𝑊
) ∗ ∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑦𝑖 − (
1
𝑀
) ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑖 
where 𝑌𝑤 is the white group mean and 𝑌𝑚 is the minority group mean on 
segregation-relevant residential outcomes (𝑦𝑖) scored on the basis of area proportion white 
(𝑝𝑖).  Residential outcomes are determined where 𝑦𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑃   and 𝑦𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 <
𝑃 (Fossett 2016a).  Fossett (2016a) notes that the difference of means D can be understood 
as the white-minority difference in attaining parity on residential contact with whites.  The 
formula looks identical to the difference of means formula for S - as will be the case for 
all difference of means formulas. 
Theil Index 
The following familiar formula from Massey and Denton (1988) highlights H as 
the person-weighted average of area deviations of the “entropy” score for the racial 
composition in the local area (𝐸𝑖) from the entropy score for the racial composition of the 
city as a whole  (𝐸).  It is given by: 
𝐻 =  ∑ [
𝑡𝑖(𝐸 − 𝐸𝑖)
𝐸𝑇
]
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑖 =  𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
1
𝑝𝑖
) +  (1 −  𝑝𝑖)𝑙𝑛 (
1
1 −  𝑝𝑖
) 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸 = 𝑃𝑙𝑛 (
1
𝑃
) + (1 − 𝑃)𝑙𝑛 (
1
1 − 𝑃
) 
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Similarly to D, the Theil index (H) also varies on a scale of 0 to 1 like.  H measures 
a departure from evenness by assessing each unit’s departure from the racial, or ethnic, 
entropy of the whole city (Massey and Denton 1988:285).  A Theil index value can be 
thought of as a measure of the average difference between a unit’s group proportions and 
that of the system as a whole (Iceland et al. 2002). 
The difference of means formula for computing Theil is as follows: 
𝐻 = 𝑌𝑊 − 𝑌𝑚 = (
1
𝑊
) ∗ ∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑦𝑖 − (
1
𝑀
) ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑖 
The sole difference with this difference of means formula being that residential 
outcomes (𝑦𝑖) are scored from area proportion white (𝑦𝑖) on the basis of: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑄 + 1/[𝑝𝑖 𝑃⁄ − 𝑞𝑖 𝑄⁄ ] ∗ (𝐸 − 𝑒𝑖)/𝐸 
Hutchens Square Root Index 
The following formula for R is given in Hutchens (2001): 
𝑅 = 𝑂(𝑥) = 1 − ∑ √(𝑥1𝑖 𝑁1⁄ )(𝑥2𝑖 𝑁2⁄ )
𝑇
𝑖=1
 
One of the features of Hutchens square root index is that it is similar to D and G in 
terms of ranking segregation comparisons in a manner that is consistent with segregation 
curve analysis but also additively decomposable, a quality that does not apply to D and G 
(Hutchens 2001; Hutchens 2004).  In this regard, it is similar to the Theil index and the 
separation index which are also additively decomposable (Reardon and Firebaugh 
2002:53).  In addition, Hutchens (2001:24) notes that the square root index is superior to 
D on technical grounds because it registers relevant segregation altering residential 
transfers and exchanges between groups while D does not. 
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The difference of means formula for Hutchens square root is as follows: 
𝑅 =  𝑌𝑊 − 𝑌𝐵 =
1
𝑊
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑦𝑖 −
1
𝐵
∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑦𝑖 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑄 + (1 −  √𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖/𝑃𝑄/[(𝑝𝑖/𝑃) − (𝑞𝑖/𝑄)] 
This dissertation utilizes all of the previously discussed measures of segregation, 
with the exception of the Gini index, in an effort to ensure that the findings are consistent.  
Although the dissimilarity index is used more widely than other indices of uneven 
distribution no single measure of segregation is correct for all purposes (Lieberson 
1981:253).  Using multiple measures here thus addresses the question of whether results 
may vary depending on the choice of the index used to measure uneven distribution. 
Aspatial vs Spatial 
Researchers note that the dissimilarity index, Theil index, and separation index are 
typically implemented as aspatial measures for a topic that some may view as inherently 
spatial (Fossett 2016a; Lee, Reardon, Firebaugh, Farrell, Matthews, and O’Sullivan 
2008:768; Reardon et al. 2009:58).  Indices are aspatial when they assess segregation 
using bounded units (e.g. tracts) without regard for their spatial location in relation to other 
units.  This makes them susceptible to the criticism that they do not fully account for the 
spatial distribution of population groups by race and ethnicity especially with regard to 
the size and spatial scale of enclaves, ghettos, barrios, and other large spatial clusters 
within a city.  Aspatial implementation is not all together detrimental but it can come with 
drawbacks if the researcher is not already familiar with the population distribution of the 
area being studied (Wong 1997:131).  A common problem with aspatial measures is their 
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inability to capture segregation occurring at different geographic scales (Reardon et al. 
2009:58).   
Spatial measures of segregation register “neighborhood outcomes for households,” 
in terms of their “proximity to particular spatial locations” so that when an area differs in 
racial proportion, the variation in the spatial arrangement of neighborhoods can affect the 
index (Fossett: 2008:2-3).  Previously, I calculated segregation at a small spatial scale - 
specifically, using census blocks - and implemented the calculations both in conventional 
aspatial calculations and in spatial calculations using first-order contiguity neighborhoods 
(i.e., the block and the surrounding blocks).  I then compared the results to determine 
whether results obtained using aspatial calculations differ from the results obtained using 
spatial calculations at a similar spatial scale.  I found that the results were virtually 
indistinguishable.  Accordingly, I used the aspatial calculations for the analyses because 
they are much easier to implement.   
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CHAPTER V  
METROPOLITAN LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, I investigate the empirical relationship between residential 
segregation and political fragmentation at the aggregate level across U.S. metropolitan 
areas by first calculating measures of fragmentation and segregation for each city and then 
examining their covariation across metropolitan areas.  Standard conceptions of 
fragmentation focus on the number of municipality units in the metropolitan area taking 
account of their population size and relative density.  I develop a variety of fragmentation 
scores using both traditional approaches from previous research on fragmentation, and 
also new alternatives, and compare the results obtained to gain a better understanding of 
the association between fragmentation and segregation across metropolitan areas. 
The segregation scores that serve as dependent variables in the metropolitan level 
regression reported in this chapter vary within the bounded range of 0 to 1.  Using OLS 
regression is inappropriate because standard assumptions regarding the error term (e.g., 
that it is normally distributed with equal variance) are not met and because model-based 
predictions can be misleading and potentially outside of the range of 0-1 since effects are 
estimated as linear and additive when they inherently must be nonlinear and non-additive.  
Accordingly, I use the more statistically appropriate method of fractional logit regression 
to estimate effects (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). 
Table 1 includes summary statistics for all variables included in the aggregate level 
analyses where MSAs have a minimum 1,000 non-Hispanic Black population.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Segregation, Political Fragmentation, and Control Variables - MSAs w/Minimum 1k NH Black Population 
 Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Segregation 
Measures 
Dissimilarity (D) 311 0.71 0.08 0.41 0.90 
Separation (V) 311 0.39 0.19 0.04 0.82 
Hutchens (R) 311 0.70 0.07 0.45 0.88 
Theil (H) 311 0.46 0.13 0.20 0.80 
Fragmentation 
Measures 
# of Cities per 1M MSA Population 311 50.30 42.38 1.14 266.97 
# of Cities 2,500+ per 1M MSA Population 311 20.63 11.55 1.14 60.82 
# of Cities 10,000+ per 1M MSA Population 310 10.08 4.97 1.14 28.89 
MSA Pop. Share Residing Outside Largest City 311 66.05 19.04 0.00 97.95 
Gini Place Concentration 311 91.28 8.14 50.28 100.00 
Likelihood Two Students Attend Different Districts 311 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.25 
# of School Districts per 1M MSA Population 311 1373.91 279.63 550.80 2141.81 
Share of Pop. Residing Outside Largest District 311 53.23 24.97 0.00 95.76 
Control Variables 
% White 311 87.30 11.39 47.72 99.70 
% Vacant 311 8.27 4.64 2.17 35.03 
% of Labor Force in Armed Forces 311 1.34 3.83 0.01 38.07 
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 311 52.97 14.87 19.00 90.18 
% Suburbanization 311 38.81 20.88 0.00 87.78 
Total Population (Log) 311 12.66 1.00 10.81 15.66 
Age of the MSA 1900 & Earlier* 311 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940* 311 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960* 311 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Age of the MSA 1970 & Later* 311 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
% Foreign Born 311 7.47 7.41 0.85 50.94 
% of Labor Force in Public Administration 311 5.00 2.54 1.70 19.37 
% of Population with a Bachelor's Degree 311 23.71 7.42 11.05 52.38 
% of Population Enrolled in College 311 20.46 7.88 9.71 55.10 
% of School-Aged Children in Private School 311 10.33 3.76 2.48 24.82 
*Dummy Variable - Year Central City Reached 50k Population. Central cities that did not reach 50k is the reference category 
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Aggregate Level Measures: Uneven Distribution 
The dependent variables in the analyses are the scores for the dissimilarity index 
(D), separation index (S), Hutchens square root index (R), and Theil index (H).  I report 
results for the dissimilarity index because it is the most commonly used measure of 
segregation.  Dissimilarity has a mean of .71, a minimum of .41 (Jacksonville, NC), and a 
maximum of .90 (Gary, IN).  I also report results for analyses that use alternative measures 
to ensure that my findings are robust to the choice of which index is used. 
The first alternative to dissimilarity is the separation index (S) which is sometimes 
known as the correlation ratio, the variance ratio, and eta squared.  The separation index 
measures the extent to which whites and blacks differ in their average contact with whites.  
An alternative interpretation is that the separation index “measures the difference in racial 
composition of various neighborhoods” by assessing the “variance in racial composition 
between neighborhoods to the total variance in racial composition” (Stearns and Logan 
1986:127).  Separation has a mean of .39, a minimum of .04 (Provo Orem, UT), and a 
maximum of .82 (Gary, IN). 
The separation index is a good choice to ensure the findings are robust. One reason 
for this is that the dissimilarity and separation indices have both been widely used in 
previous segregation research.  Another reason is that Fossett (2016a) notes that D and S 
differ in how they respond to deviations from parity that are quantitatively small.  D 
responds equally to small and large deviations from parity; S responds minimal to small 
deviations from parity and strongly to large deviations from parity.  Other measures such 
as the Hutchens index (R) and the Theil index (H) fall in between D and S on this 
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continuum with R responding to small and large deviations from parity in a manner similar 
to D, and H responding in a manner more similar to S.  As a result, if results are the same 
for D and S, results will be similar for the other indices as well. 
I also examine results for the Hutchens (R) square root index because it has a close 
conceptual and empirical correlation with D (Hutchens 2004).  In addition, unlike D, the 
Hutchens square root index (R) is additively decomposable (Hutchens 2004) and can be 
used and compared with results for the Theil and separation indices both of which are also 
additively decomposable (Reardon and Firebaugh 2002:53).  Results for R are generally 
similar to D.  R has a mean of .70, a minimum of .45 (Jacksonville, NC), and a maximum 
of .88 (Gary, IN). 
I also report results for the Theil index (H) because it is used widely in segregation 
studies that perform decomposition analyses of segregation.  Scores for H are typically 
between scores for D and S.  Accordingly, Theil has a mean of .46, a minimum of .20 
(Lawrence, KS), and a maximum of .80 (Gary, IN).  The Theil index findings, as with the 
other measures of segregation in this chapter, will set the stage for the next chapter on 
decomposition analyses where the results between the two analyses will hopefully remain 
consistent, enabling a more robust conclusion. 
Aggregate Level Measures: Political Fragmentation 
Political fragments are conceptualized as boundaries that have regulatory authority 
over land use, land development, and social and political processes of areas within its 
boundary.  The independent variables used to capture political fragmentation are:  
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The total number of places per 1 million MSA residents.  Total number of places 
per 1 million MSA residents is a variation of more commonly used measures of 
fragmentation listed below.  Although used in the analyses, this measure of fragmentation 
may not be considered conceptually fruitful due to its inclusion of very small cities. For 
example, it will include cities such as Belleair Shore, FL and New Amsterdam, IN who 
populations were very small and did not exceed 1000 in the Census 2000.  Cities of such 
small size are unlikely to play a meaningful role in the residential segregation patterns of 
an MSA.  Total number of cities per 1 million MSA residents has a mean of 50.30, a 
minimum of 1.14 (Honolulu, HI), and a maximum of 266.97 (Joplin, MO). 
The total number of places with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA 
residents.  Total number of places with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA 
residents improves on the previous measure by placing a lower bound on the population 
size of places to help assure they will be potentially relevant for segregation patterns in 
the MSA.  Even so, some might view it as including cities with populations that may be 
too small to have important effects on residential segregation patterns in metropolitan 
areas.  Total number of places with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA 
residents has a mean of 20.63, a minimum of 1.14 (Honolulu, HI), and a maximum of 
60.82 (Scranton-Wilkes Barre-Hazleton, PA).   
The total number of places with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA 
residents.  This measure is one of the more common measures of fragmentation and has 
the quality of excluding areas that have small populations.  Total number of places with a 
minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents is also a potentially attractive 
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measure of fragmentation because it may serve as a proxy for other fragments in the form 
of special districts, such as school and utility districts since they are likelier to occur in 
larger populations.  Total number of places with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 
million MSA residents has a mean of 10.08, a minimum of 1.14 (Honolulu, HI), and a 
maximum of 28.89 (Abilene, TX). 
The MSA population share residing outside the largest city.  This measure of 
fragmentation is also one of the more widely used measures because it can be seen as 
capturing decentralization of population.  The presumption is that, when a greater share of 
the population resides outside of the primary urban core, special districts are needed to 
regulate utilities, schools, and land use.  The MSA population share residing outside the 
largest city has a mean of 66.05, a minimum of 0 (Anchorage, AK), and a maximum of 
97.95 (Nassau-Suffolk, NY). 
Place concentration.  This measure of fragmentation captures the degree to which 
the population is concentrated in places in the MSA.  Place concentration is measured 
using the Gini concentration index.  Place concentration has a mean of 91.28, a minimum 
of 50.28 (Odessa-Midland, TX), and several cities with a maximum of 100.00. 
The total number of school districts per 1 million MSA students enrolled.  This 
measure follows a similar construction and logic as previous measures of place 
fragmentation.  Total number of school districts relative to MSA enrollment has a mean 
of 1,374, a minimum of 551 (McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX), and a maximum of 2,142 
(Duluth-Superior, MN). 
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The total share of population residing outside the central school district.  This 
measure follows a similar construction and logic as a previous measure of place 
fragmentation.  The total share of population residing outside the central school district 
has a mean of 53.23, a minimum of 0 (Hagerstown, MD), and a maximum of 95.76 
(Nassau-Suffolk, NY). 
The likelihood of two students in an MSA attending different districts.  The 
likelihood of two students in an MSA attending different districts is a popular measure of 
fragmentation.  The likelihood of two students in an MSA attending different districts 
varies from 0, meaning no fragmentation, to 1, meaning complete fragmentation.  There 
would be complete fragmentation if every child attended their own district and complete 
incorporation if every child attended one school district.  This measure is defined as  
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑑(1 − 𝑃𝑑)
𝑘
𝑑=1
 
where P is the proportion of children in the metropolitan area enrolled in district 
d.  The primary independent variable is derived from total school district population counts 
within each metropolitan area.  The likelihood of two students in the MSA attending 
different districts has a mean of .08, a minimum of 0 (Hagerstown, PA), and a maximum 
of 0.25 (Sarasota-Bradenton, FL). 
  As discussed, the total number of places with a minimum 10,000 population per 
1 million MSA residents is one of the more common measures of fragmentation.  Total 
number of places with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million, total share of the 
population residing outside the largest city, and the likelihood of two students in an MSA 
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attending different districts are the most the fruitful measures of fragmentation since they 
each may capture decentralization and are focused on more heavily in this analysis.   
Measures of fragmentation that utilized places were calculated using data for 
incorporated places only.  The U.S. Census dataset includes incorporated places, 
unincorporated places, and the remainder as rural populations.  The presumption of the 
fragmentation hypothesis is that cities enact land use regulations that may restrict the 
movement of population groups.  Regulatory authority over land use applies only to 
incorporated cities and does not generally apply to unincorporated places and rural areas. 
Control Variables 
This study incorporates several control variables to account for any spurious 
effects that political fragmentation may have on residential segregation.  The data for the 
control variables listed come from Census 2000 Summary File 1 and Summary File 3 data 
releases.  The control variables are:  
The percentage of housing units built after the Fair Housing Act in 1968.  
According to previous research, housing built 1980+ should affect segregation outcomes 
because they are under “new housing rules” enacted in 1968 and 1974 (Denton 1999).  
The percentage of housing units built after the Fair Housing Act in 1968 has a mean of 
52.97, a minimum of 19 (New York, NY), and a maximum of 90.18 (Naples, FL). 
The percentage of housing units vacant.  Previous research has found relationships 
with residential segregation and the number of vacant housing units in an area (Stearns 
and Logan 1986; South and Crowder 1998).  It is argued that a greater surplus of housing 
has an effect on the ability for residents to relocate in the first place.  Stearns and Logan 
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(1986) find that a higher amount of vacant housing units relates to lower amounts of black-
white segregation.  Lastly, Berry (1976) found that neighborhood price levels affected the 
movement of blacks into white and integrated neighborhoods.  The percentage of housing 
units vacant has a mean of 8.27, a minimum of 2.17 (Nashua, NH), and a maximum of 
35.03 (Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA). 
The percentage of the civilian labor force employed in public administration. 
Previous research has used the percentage employed in public administration to analyze 
black-white segregation in metropolitan areas with a strong economic base in the 
government.  Iceland and Wilkes (2006) in their study analyzing socioeconomic status and 
its effect on residential segregation used several variations of occupational categories 
similar to that as public administration.  Percentage of the labor force in public 
administration has a mean of 5, a minimum of 1.70 (Elkhart-Goshen, IN), and a maximum 
of 19.37 (Springfield, IL). 
The percentage of the total labor force in the armed forces.  Farley (1991:281) 
found that black-white segregation may be influenced in a metropolitan that has strong 
economic ties to a military base.  Metropolitan areas with strong military ties are 
associated with decreased amounts of segregation between non-Hispanic whites and non-
Hispanic blacks (Logan, Stultz, and Farley 2004:14).  The percentage of the labor force in 
the armed forces has a mean of 1.34, a minimum of .01 (Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA), 
and a maximum of 38.07 (Jacksonville, NC). 
The percentage of the total population enrolled in undergraduate college.  The 
percentage of the population that is enrolled in college has also been considered a 
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characteristic that may have an effect on the degree of residential segregation (Logan et 
al. 2004:14).  This control, along with the percentage of the total labor force in the armed 
forces, the percentage of the total labor force in public administration, and the percentage 
of the total population retired are considered a part of a broader control, the functional or 
economic specialization of the metropolitan (Farley and Frey 1994; Logan et al. 2004).  
The percentage of the population enrolled in college has a mean of 20.46, a minimum of 
9.71 (Yakima, WA), and a maximum of 55.10 (Bryan-College Station, TX). 
Age of the MSA.  Previous segregation research has suggested that older 
metropolitan areas have higher levels of segregation between blacks and whites (Logan et 
al. 2004).  Older metropolitans contain neighborhoods that were likelier to have been 
developed during times of overt racist policies, as well as have developed through 
historical population patterns and economic hardships.  The Age of the MSA is determined 
by the decade (decennial Census) that the central city of the Metropolitan area reached a 
population of 50,000. Age of the MSA is then operationalized as a dummy variable and 
broken into four time periods:  
1900 and earlier (N = 69) 
1910-1940 (N = 82) 
1950-1960 (N = 38) 
1970 and later (N = 76) 
Age of the MSA is a multi-category variable represented by dummy variables.  
MSAs with a central city that never reached 50k remains as the reference group.  Since 
the choice of the reference category is arbitrary, one cannot definitively ascertain the 
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strength and significance of the individual dummy variables because their coefficients and 
t-ratios will vary depending on the arbitrary choice of the reference category. Thus, Age 
of the MSA should be tested as a set since the dummy variables are being used to assess 
the effect of a single conceptual variable (Kerlinger and Pedhazur 1973; Smith and Sasaki 
1979). For this reason, a Global F test was utilized to ascertain the statistical significance 
of Age of the MSA and to determine whether the variable improves the model predictions. 
The percentage white for the MSA.  Previous literature suggests a large population 
percentage of whites will have an effect on the in-migration of blacks into white 
communities (South and Crowder 1998).  Previous research studies have used different 
variations of measuring population size and have ultimately found that population and 
group size is linked to residential segregation (Logan et al. 2004; South and Crowder 
1998).  Percent white has a mean of 87.3, a minimum of 47.72 (Albany, GA), and a 
maximum of 99.70 (Provo-Orem, UT). 
Minority educational attainment.   Previous research has found non-Hispanic 
blacks with a higher education degree are less segregated than those without a college 
degree (Logan et al. 2004:3).  Educational attainment has a mean of 23.71, a minimum of 
11.05 (Merced, CA), and a maximum of 52.38 (Boulder-Longmont, CO). 
Nativity.  Nativity represents the percentage of the population that is foreign born 
for the year 2000.  Logan et al. (2004:16) note that rapid growth in immigration amongst 
certain minority groups may contribute to an increase in residential segregation.  Nativity 
has a mean of 7.47, a minimum of 0.85 (Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH), and a 
maximum of 50.94 (Miami, FL). 
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Percent of school-aged population in private school.  Researchers note that in 
neighborhoods with a similar aged population, and less of a need for private schools, 
residential segregation will be reflected in the demographic make-up of the schools 
(Denton 1996:813).  Areas with a larger number of private schools affords the opportunity 
for households of various ethnicities to live alongside each other while attending separate 
schools.  The percentage of school-aged children enrolled in private school has a mean of 
10.33, a minimum of 2.48 (McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX), and a maximum of 24.82 
(New Orleans, LA). 
Suburbanization.  Researchers note that suburbanization is capable of reducing 
black-white segregation but there is no consensus whether desegregation occurs or if 
suburbanization affords the opportunity for minorities to cluster outside the central city 
instead of clustering inside the central city (Logan et al. 2004:13).  Suburbanization is 
measured as the percentage of non-Hispanic blacks living within the metropolitan area but 
not in the central city.  Suburbanization has a mean of 38.81, a minimum of 0 (Anchorage, 
AK), and a maximum of 87.78 (Riverside-San Bernardino, CA). 
Natural log of the total MSA population.  The size of the population within the 
MSA has been found to be positively related to the amount of residential segregation 
(Logan et al. 2004:13). This research study measures size by the natural log of the total 
population. The natural log transformation is used to capture non-linearity in the effect of 
city size wherein increases in the absolute size (e.g. 100,000) take in less importance at 
higher levels of overall size.  The natural log of the population has a mean of 12.66, a 
minimum of 10.81 (Victoria, TX), and a maximum of 15.66 (Chicago, IL). 
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Aggregate Level Analyses 
I first begin by examining covariation amongst the measures of fragmentation and 
measures of segregation.  Figure 1 presents a scatterplot matrix depicting associations 
between measures of fragmentation based on data for places with measures of segregation.  
The associated correlation matrix is present in Table 2.  Figure 2 presents a similar 
scatterplot matrix depicting associations between measures of fragmentation based on data 
for school districts and measures of segregation.  The associated correlation matrix is 
presented in Table 3.  Both figures show that the alternative measures of fragmentation 
are correlated but only at modest levels (|r| ranges from 0.05 to 0.62) thus indicating that 
there are substantial differences between the alternative measures of fragmentation.  The 
figures similarly show that there is substantial variation in the nature of the relationship 
between different measures of fragmentation and different measures of residential 
segregation (|r| ranges from 0.02 to 0.42).   
The figures also show that there are similarities and differences among the 
segregation indices.  As expected, the correlation between the dissimilarity index (D) and 
the Hutchens index (R) is very strong (r=0.99) and the relationship between the Theil 
index (H) and the Separation index (S) also is strong (r=0.94) albeit not quite at the level 
observed between D and R.  Also as anticipated, the relationship between D and S is only 
moderate (r=0.49) because D can take high scores when scores for S are low since D 
responds equally to small and large departures from parity while S responds primarily to 
large departures from parity.   
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Figure 1. Covariation Matrix: Place Fragmentation and Residential Segregation for MSAs with a Minimum 1,000 non-Hispanic Black Population 
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Figure 2. Covariation Matrix: School District Fragmentation and Residential Segregation for MSAs with a Minimum 1,000 non-Hispanic Black 
Population 
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Review of the correlations reported in Tables 2 and 3 shows that most relationships 
differ from zero by an amount that is substantively interesting (i.e., |r| > 0.12) are in the 
expected direction and are statistically significant.  In most cases the expected correlation 
is positive.  The exceptions are the correlations involving the Gini concentration measure 
of fragmentation in Table 2 and correlations involving the likelihood of two students in an 
MSA attending different districts in Table 3.  These are explained by the fact that the 
values of these two measures of fragmentation inherently correlate inversely with the 
values of the other measures of fragmentation.  After allowing for this, the zero-order 
associations between measures of fragmentation and segregation are in the expected 
direction when they depart from zero, but |r| never exceeds 0.42 in Table 2 or 0.31 in Table 
3.   
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Table 2. Place Fragmentation and Residential Segregation Covariation 
  Frag1 Frag2 Frag3 Frag4 
Frag 
Gini (D) (S) (H) (R) 
          
Frag1 1.00         
Frag2 0.62 1.00        
Frag3 0.25 0.55 1.00       
Frag4 0.05 0.30 0.19 1.00      
Frag Gini 0.27 0.29 0.05 0.25 1.00     
(D) 0.27 0.40 0.14 0.32 0.28 1.00    
(S) -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.18 0.16 0.49 1.00   
(H) 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.26 0.23 0.76 0.94 1.00  
(R) 0.29 0.42 0.16 0.31 0.27 0.99 0.47 0.75 1.00 
N = 310; Correlations with absolute values above 0.12 are statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Frag1 is Total 
Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA Residents.  Frag2 is the Total Number of Cities with a minimum 2,500 
population per 1 Million MSA Residents.  Frag3 is Total Number of Cities with a minimum 10,000 population 
per 1 Million MSA Residents.  Frag4 is the Total Share of the Population Residing Outside the Largest City.  Frag 
Gini is the Place Concentration measure using the Gini Index. 
 
 
 
Table 3. School District Fragmentation and Residential Segregation Covariation 
  SDFrag1 SDFrag2 SDFrag3 (D) (S) (H) (R)   
         
SD Frag1 1.00        
SD Frag2 0.00 1.00       
SD Frag3 -0.11 -0.02 1.00      
(D) -0.08 0.28 0.31 1.00     
(S) -0.06 0.18 0.09 0.49 1.00    
(H) -0.09 0.25 0.19 0.76 0.94 1.00   
(R) -0.07 0.28 0.29 0.99 0.47 0.75 1.00   
N = 311; Correlations with absolute values above 0.12 are statistically significant at p < 0.05.  SD Frag1 is the 
Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA Attending Different Districts.  SD Frag2 is the Total Number of School 
Districts per 1 Million MSA Enrollment.  SD Frag3 is the Total Share of the Population Residing Outside the 
Largest School District. 
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I next turn to review fractional logit regression analyses that assess the strength 
and direction the effects of measures of fragmentation and relevant control variables have 
on the measures of segregation.  Following Papke and Wooldridge (1996), I use fractional 
logit regression analysis because it will ensure that model predictions fall between 0 and 
1 without requiring additional statistical procedures such as quadratic equations and 
special model constraints (Kumlin 2010:422). 
A fractional logit regression is modeled as follows: 
Ε(𝛾𝜄|𝜒𝜄) = 𝐺(𝜒𝜄𝛽) 
where 𝐺(. ) is the logistic cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.), 𝜒 is the values 
of the independent variables of individual 𝜄 , and 𝛽 is the parameters that indicate the effect 
of a given 𝜒 on the dependent variable, which in this case is residential segregation 
(Kumlin 2010:422).  The model is implemented in Stata by using the “fracreg” procedure 
or the generalized linear model (glm) routine with link function set to “logit” and the 
distribution family set to “binomial”.  Additionally, the robust estimation option is 
specified and under this specification the assumptions for statistical hypothesis testing are 
satisfied.  In contrast, OLS estimation of the same model would inappropriately yield 
linear, additive effects that are potentially nonsensical because effects of any given 
independent variable on a bounded dependent variable cannot remain constant when 
settings of other independent variables change and thus OLS can yield inaccurate and 
misleading predictions including predictions outside the logical 0-1 range of the dependent 
variable (Papke and Wooldridge 1996:619). 
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Results 
I report results for a series of fractional logit regression models designed to 
examine the impact political fragmentation has on residential segregation.  The regression 
models vary by including alternative measures of segregation and alternative measures of 
fragmentation to come to a more robust conclusion about the relationship between the two.  
In addition, the models also include several control variables that previous research has 
found as being a factor on residential segregation.   
The analyses I report here extend and enhance a previous study I conducted 
investigating this topic (Amaro 2013).  In my earlier study, I found an inconsistent and 
weak positive relationship between residential segregation and political fragmentation.  
Some measures of fragmentation I considered did not have consistent, significant effects.  
Two measures - namely, Total Number of Cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 
Million MSA Population and Share of the MSA Residing outside the Largest City - did 
yield suggestive results consistent with the fragmentation hypothesis.  Here I extend my 
earlier analysis by developing more refined measures of fragmentation.  In particular, I 
distinguish more carefully between the kinds of places identified by census geographic 
place codes and limit my focus to incorporated places (i.e. cities and equivalent units) 
since the legal standing of these entities coincides more appropriately with city limits and 
municipal boundaries that are most relevant to the fragmentation hypothesis. 
Lastly, the discussion that follows will summarize the findings of the aggregate 
analyses by each measure of segregation.  Detailed equation tables that include all 
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measures of fragmentation and control variables for each measure of segregation can be 
found in Appendix A of this dissertation. 1 
Separation Index 
Tables 35 thru 42 present the results for a sequence of equations where various 
measures of fragmentation are modeled with residential segregation which is measured 
using the separation index.  As anticipated, the relationship between fragmentation and 
residential segregation varies between the differing measures of fragmentation.  For 
example, when modeled with the total number of cities per 1 million MSA residents, 
models 10-12 have the only statistically significant relationships with residential 
segregation with coefficients that vary between 0.157 and 0.246 (Table 35).  These three 
models include the full set of control variables with the exception of excluding, in 
sequence, percentage of the housing units vacant, percentage of the population in the 
armed forces, and percentage of the housing built post-FHA. 
The relationship between fragmentation and residential segregation becomes 
stronger and more often statistically significant as the measures of fragmentation capture 
only places that have a minimum 2,500 or a minimum 10,000 population (Table 36 and 
Table 37).  Many of these statistically significant relationships appear in equations where 
the relationship is modeled along with several control variables.  For example, the total 
number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents has a 
                                                 
1 Regression models with all of the control variables are not entirely included in this discussion.  Several 
of the control variables, when included in the regression model with other controls, exhibited small and 
insignificant relationships with residential segregation and were excluded from the discussion when other 
factors may have displayed more statistically meaningful relationships with residential segregation. 
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statistically significant relationship in models 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16 with a coefficient that 
varies between 1.336 and 2.034.  
The relationship is statistically significant in almost all of the models when 
fragmentation is measured by the total MSA population share residing outside the largest 
city (Table 38).  In model 15, which includes all control variables except for Age of the 
MSA, fragmentation has an effect of 1.251.  The estimated effect is minimally larger in 
models where other control variables are excluded from the analysis.  So the effect 
observed in model 15 is robust to changes in the model specification.  The range for this 
measure of fragmentation is from a low of 0.274 to a high of 1.570.  Based on the first 
derivative calculation p(1-p)b where p is the initial level of segregation and b is the logit 
coefficient for the independent variable, the maximum slope for the effect of 
fragmentation on segregation in its natural metric is 0.313 (from 0.5(0.5)1.251).  The 
actual change of moving from low to high on fragmentation would depend on the expected 
level of segregation based on the values of the other independent variables.  Assessed 
purely in quantitative terms, this is not a large effect compared to the effects of some other 
variables in the model such as population size and MSA percent white but it is similar in 
magnitude to the effects of variables like suburbanization and post-FHA housing. 
The remaining analyses that implement Gini place concentration, the likelihood of 
two students in an MSA attending different school districts, the number of school districts 
per 1 million students enrolled, and the share of the population residing outside the largest 
school district tend to be much weaker and statistically insignificant than the previous 
place measures of fragmentation.  When modeled with larger sets of control of variables 
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(models 10 thru 16), Gini place concentration is statistically insignificant.  Of the school 
district measures of fragmentation, the total number of school districts per 1 million MSA 
students enrolled is the only fragmentation measure statistically significant in 9 out of 16 
models.  Its relationship with residential segregation is weak and never greater than 0.068, 
although this may be due to the measure of fragmentation having a large range (550.80 to 
2,141.81). 
Control Variables 
In general, the control variables have consistent, statistically significant effects in 
the expected direction across models.  Several control variables have effects on residential 
segregation that are clearly stronger than the effects of political fragmentation.  The effects 
of MSA percent white, Armed Forces presence, new housing, and suburbanization have 
negative effects on segregation.  City size and vacancy have positive effects.  The set of 
dummy variables for age of the MSA suggest that older cities tend to have higher degrees 
of segregation but its relationship is statistically insignificant in the global F-test.  Since 
older cities tend to be larger, age of the MSA is not important net of its association with 
city size. 
Best Model and Diagnostic Models 
Since the control variables generally have effects that are consistent, statistically 
significant, and in the directions expected, I view model 15 as perhaps the “best single 
model” to examine for an overall assessment of the effect of fragmentation.  This model 
includes all of the control variables except age of the MSA.  I view models 1 through 14 
as useful for diagnostic purposes to provide information about whether the effect of 
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fragmentation is robust across a range of model specifications involving different 
combinations of control variables. 
Overall the analyses assessing effects of the various measures of fragmentation on 
residential segregation measured by the separation index, produced mixed results.  Three 
measures of place fragmentation had positive, statistically significant effects on 
segregation in model 15 which includes the primary control variables.  The three measures 
were the total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA 
residents (Table 36), the total number of cities with a minimum of 10,000 population per 
1 million MSA residents (Table 37), and total population share residing outside of the 
primary central city (Table 38).  The effect of total population share comes through most 
clearly and consistently.  It is statistically significant in the expected direction across most 
models including model 15 which includes a full complement of controls.  It attains 
statistical significance more consistently and more clearly (i.e. at lower p values) than 
other measures of place fragmentation.  As noted earlier the effect is not as large as the 
effect of city size and MSA percent white, but it is similar in size to the effect of 
suburbanization and post-FHA housing.  Finally, the finding that the effect is present and 
robust provides support for the guiding hypothesis that fragmentation may have 
consequences for segregation. 
The results from analyses using measures of school district fragmentation 
produced few supportive results.  Measures of school district fragmentation mostly had 
weak and statistically insignificant effects on segregation.  
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Dissimilarity Index 
Tables 43 thru 50 present the results for a sequence of equations where various 
measures of fragmentation are modeled with residential segregation which is measured 
using the dissimilarity index.  The relationship between fragmentation and residential 
segregation also varies between the differing measures of fragmentation.  The total 
number of cities per 1 million MSA residents exhibited a weak and statistically significant 
relationship that ranged between 0.163 and 0.349 (Table 43).  This relationship continues 
to be statistically significant as the measures of fragmentation capture only places that 
have a minimum 2,500 or a minimum 10,000 population but becomes stronger with 
coefficients that ranged between 0.873 and 1.719 (Table 44 and Table 45).  The 
relationship mostly becomes weaker when modeled with total share of the MSA 
population residing outside the largest city and statistically insignificant when modeled 
with place concentration. 
The fragmentation measures using school districts continue to display patterns 
seen in the analysis with the separation index.  The total number of school districts relative 
to MSA student enrollment is the only fragmentation measure that has statistical 
significance in most models (Table 49).  The statistically significant models are weak 
although the relationship is similar in strength to that of other fragmentation measures due 
to total number of school districts per 1 million MSA students enrolled having a much 
wider range than other fragmentation measures. 
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Control Variables 
With the exception of age of the MSA and suburbanization, the control variables 
consistently have statistically significant effects in the expected direction across models.  
Age of the MSA is statistically insignificant in the global F-test when modeled with all 
measures of fragmentation.  MSA percent white, percent in the Armed Forces, and 
percentage of housing units built post-FHA have negative effects on residential 
segregation.  City size and percentage of the housing units vacant have positive effects 
across all models.  In model 15 and across the different measures of fragmentation, city 
size has the highest coefficient that ranges between 0.067 and 0.113 and statistically 
significant.   
Overall, the analyses assessing effects of the various measures fragmentation on 
residential segregation measured by the dissimilarity index, produced mixed results 
although much more stable than the results utilizing the separation index.  Five measures 
of fragmentation had positive, statistically significant effects on segregation in model 15 
which includes the primary control variables.  The measures were the total number of 
cities per 1 million MSA residents (Table 43), the total number of cities with a minimum 
2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents (Table 44), the total number of cities with 
a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents (Table 45), the total share of 
MSA population residing outside the largest city (Table 46), and the total share of the 
MSA population residing outside the largest school district (Table 50).  The clearest and 
strongest relationship occurs with the total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 
population per 1 million MSA residents which has a 1.307 coefficient that is statistically 
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significant at the 0.01 level.  These findings continue to display an effect that is present 
which supports the guiding hypothesis that fragmentation may have consequences for 
segregation. 
Theil 
Tables 51 thru 58 present the results for a sequence of equations where various 
measures of fragmentation are modeled with residential segregation which is measured 
using the Theil index.  The relationship between fragmentation and residential segregation 
using the Theil index is similar the findings using previous measures of segregation.  
Fragmentations relationship becomes stronger as fragmentation begins to capture only 
places that have a minimum 2,500 or a minimum 10,000 population.  In model 15, 
fragmentation is statistically significant except when measured as place concentration and 
except when measured using any of the school district fragmentation measures. 
Control Variables 
The control variables have consistent statistically significant effects in the 
expected direction across models.  As in previous analyses, the effects control variables 
have on residential segregation measured using the Theil index is stronger than the effect 
of fragmentation but the effects are similar in size to the effect of suburbanization and 
post-FHA housing.  In model 15, city size has the strongest relationship with residential 
segregation with a 0.182 coefficient that is statistically significant when modeled with the 
total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents 
(Table 53).  Percentage of housing units vacant also has statistically significant effects 
across all models. 
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Overall, the analyses assessing effects of the various measures of fragmentation 
on residential segregation, measured by the Theil index, also produced mixed results.  Four 
measures of place fragmentation had positive and statistically significant effects on 
residential segregation in model 15.  The four measures were the total number of cities per 
1 million MSA residents (Table 51), the total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 
population per 1 million MSA residents (Table 52), the total number of cities with a 
minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents (Table 53), and the total share 
of the MSA population residing outside the largest city (Table 54).  The total number of 
cities with a minimum 10,000 population had the greatest strength (1.354) statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level although the four fragmentation measures were generally 
consistent with each other ranging from 0.159 to 1.354 in model 15.  Although not 
displaying the greatest strength in model 15, total share of the MSA population residing 
outside the largest city has statistically significant effects at lower p values than other 
measures of fragmentation. 
Hutchens Square Root Index 
Tables 59 thru 66 present the results for a sequence of equations where various 
measures of fragmentation are modeled with residential segregation which is measured 
using the Hutchens index.  I do not discuss the findings in as depth as I have for the 
previous measures of segregation because the relationship between fragmentation and 
residential segregation using the Hutchens index are very similar.   
In sum, the analyses assessing the effects of the various measures of fragmentation 
on residential segregation, measured by the Hutchens index, produced encouraging 
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results.  Four measures of fragmentation had positive and statistically significant effects 
on segregation in model 15.  The four measures were the total number of cities per 1 
million MSA residents (Table 59), the total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 
population per 1 million MSA residents (Table 60), the total number of cities with a 
minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents (Table 61), and the total share 
of the MSA population residing outside the largest city (Table 62).  When modeled with 
the four fragmentation measures of fragmentation, Hutchens displayed a consistent 
statistically significant and positive effect with residential segregation but its greatest 
effect was with the total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million 
MSA residents. 
Discussion 
The aggregate level analyses was modeled using several alternative measures of 
segregation and several alternative measures of fragmentation.  These models all aimed to 
measure the extent to which fragmentation affects residential segregation and come to a 
more robust conclusion the relationship between the two.  I determine that model 15, 
which includes all control variables except for age of the MSA, was the best model to 
assess the relationship between residential segregation and fragmentation while the 
accompanying models were helpful for diagnostic purposes. 
When modeled with the separation index, place measures of fragmentation were 
mostly significant in model 15 although not as strong in significance when modeled with 
other measures of segregation.  Looking past significance, the separation index would 
move between a negative relationship with fragmentation and a positive relationship with 
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fragmentation.  This may be due to the separation index’s behavior of responding 
“strongly to displacement from even distribution only in situations when it produces group 
separation and area ethnic polarization” (Fossett 2016a).  Thus, the separation index for 
an MSA may be low when dissimilarity and Hutchens index values are high.  In the “best 
model”, total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA 
residents, total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population, and the total share of 
the MSA population residing outside the largest city had statistically significant effects 
with the total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population having the greatest 
fragmentation effect on residential segregation. 
When modeled with the dissimilarity index, measures of fragmentation increase in 
significance over the separation index and continue to have positive and statistically 
significant effects with five measures of fragmentation - the total number of cities per 1 
million MSA residents, the total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 
million MSA residents, the total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 
1 million MSA residents, the total share of the MSA population residing outside the largest 
city, and the total share of the MSA population residing outside the largest school district.  
The total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents 
had the strongest fragmentation effect on residential segregation. 
Analyses using the Theil and Hutchens models repeat the behavior of previous 
analyses although Hutchens seems to have had a few more models reach statistical 
significance over the previous measures of segregation.  These two measures of 
segregation also had the best empirical performance with four place measures of 
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fragmentation - the total number of cities per 1 million MSA residents, the total number 
of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents, the total number 
of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents, the total share 
of the MSA population residing outside the largest city, and the total share of the MSA 
population residing outside the largest school district.  The total number of cities with a 
minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents had the strongest fragmentation 
effect on residential segregation for both measures of segregation.  
Place concentration, the likelihood of two students in an MSA attending different 
school districts, the total number of school districts per 1 million MSA students enrolled, 
and total share of the MSA population residing outside the largest school district did not 
have consistent relationships with residential segregation and were statistically 
insignificant most of the time. 
I assess the total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million 
MSA residents as being the best measure fragmentation in this analysis.  Conceptually, 
total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents is 
the more fruitful measure of fragmentation because it may serve as a proxy for other 
fragments in the form of special districts, utility districts, and school districts since all are 
likely to occur in larger populations.  This measure of fragmentation excludes cities with 
too small of a population to have any sociological meaningful impact on residential 
segregation.  Empirically, this measure of fragmentation has the strongest and statistically 
significant effect on residential segregation of all measures of fragmentation on all 
measures of segregation.   
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Table 4 summarizes the model 15 regression results for total number of cities with 
a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents and residential segregation 
which included all control variables except for age of the MSA.  Fractional logit regression 
results can be difficult to interpret.  Generally, in Table 4 summarizing the model 15 
results, fragmentation is positively associated with residential segregation and statistically 
significant.  To ease the interpretation of the effect fragmentation has on residential 
segregation, I transform the logit coefficients to instantaneous slope effects.  Table 5 
presents the results for the transformed fractional logit regression effects using 
fragmentation measures in their natural metric (i.e. not multiplied by 100).  These effects 
calculate the maximum slope effect at the middle point where ((p)*(1-p))*b evaluated at 
y = 0.50.  Table 6 presents the results for the transformed fractional logit regression effects 
by calculating minimal slope effect, near the bounded area of the slope evaluated at y = 
0.80. 
Across all measures of segregation, the maximum slope for the effect of 
fragmentation on segregation in its natural metric is 0.003.  The maximum slope for the 
effect of MSA percentage white, percentage vacant, and suburbanization have consistent 
direction but vary in strength depending the measure of segregation.  The maximum slope 
for the effect of city size on segregation was greater than all other variables in the model 
with a range between 0.02 and 0.07.  Although not having the strongest effect on 
residential segregation, the strength of fragmentation is similar to other control variables 
such as the percentage of housing units built post-FHA.  These patterns remain true when 
analyzing the minimal slope effect evaluated at y = 0.80. 
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Table 4. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities with a Minimum 10,000+ Population per 1 Million MSA Residents - Summary 
Findings 
  Separation Index Dissimilarity Index Theil Index Hutchens Index 
Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 Million MSA 
Residents 
1.336* 1.307*** 1.354*** 1.278*** 
(0.624) (0.343) (0.399) (0.307) 
% White -0.053*** -0.004** -0.025*** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.029*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.052*** -0.041*** -0.048*** -0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.005*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.281*** 0.106*** 0.182*** 0.087*** 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015) 
Constant 1.124 0.274 0.105 0.206 
 (0.587) (0.291) (0.377) (0.267) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100.  
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 5. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 Million MSA 
Residents - Summary of Effects - Instantaneous Slope - Evaluated at y = 0.50 
  
Separation 
Index 
Dissimilarity 
Index Theil Index 
Hutchens 
Index 
Fragmentation 0.00325 0.00325 0.00350 0.00325 
     
% White -0.01325 -0.00100 -0.00625 -0.00050 
     
% Housing Units Vacant 0.01375 0.00775 0.01050 0.00725 
     
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.01300 -0.01025 -0.01200 -0.00900 
     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.00375 -0.00300 -0.00325 -0.00250 
     
Suburbanization -0.00125 -0.00075 -0.00100 -0.00050 
     
Total Population (log) 0.07025 0.02650 0.04550 0.02175 
     
Constant 0.28100 0.06850 0.02625 0.05150 
     
Observations 310 310 310 310 
Note: All effect coefficients are statistically significant by at least the 0.05 level.  First 
derivatives are calculated at the point in the slope with the greatest effect on residential 
segregation where p=0.50 
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Table 6. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 Million MSA 
Residents - Summary of Effects - Instantaneous Slope - Evaluated at y = 0.80 
  
Separation 
Index 
Dissimilarity 
Index Theil Index 
Hutchens 
Index 
Fragmentation 0.00208 0.00208 0.00224 0.00208 
     
% White -0.00848 -0.00064 -0.00400 -0.00032 
     
% Housing Units Vacant 0.00880 0.00496 0.00672 0.00464 
     
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.00832 -0.00656 -0.00768 -0.00576 
     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.00240 -0.00192 -0.00208 -0.00160 
     
Suburbanization -0.00080 -0.00048 -0.00064 -0.00032 
     
Total Population (log) 0.04496 0.01696 0.02912 0.01392 
     
Constant 0.17984 0.04384 0.01680 0.03296 
     
Observations 310 310 310 310 
Note: All effect coefficients are statistically significant by at least the 0.05 level.  First 
derivatives are calculated at the point in the slope near the bounded area and thus a low 
effect on residential segregation where p=0.80 
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The final examination of the aggregate level analysis results is where I investigate 
the impact fragmentation has on residential segregation at varying profiles of 
fragmentation (Table 7).  The assessment examines the impact fragmentation has on 
residential segregation if fragmentation were set to low scores, observed scores, and high 
scores.  The total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA 
residents ranges between 1.14 and 28.89.  I categorize the low fragmentation profile as 
2.00.  The observed profile scores are equivalent to the mean score of fragmentation of 
10.08.  Finally, the high fragmentation profile scores are set to 28.00. 
The assessment using the fragmentation profiles is promising because it shows that 
cities with higher fragmentation have greater impacts on the segregation score relative to 
cities with lower fragmentation.  Across all measures of segregation, fragmentation has a 
difference between 0.06 and 0.09 going from low to high fragmentation profiles.  Thus 
the findings are robust that higher fragmentation has stronger impacts on residential 
segregation.   
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Table 7. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 Million MSA Residents 
- Predictions Based on High, Observed, and Low Profiles 
    Fragmentation 
Separation 
Index 
Dissimilarity 
Index 
Theil 
Index 
Hutchens 
Index 
Fragmentation 
Low 2.00 0.36080 0.68834 0.43418 0.68474 
Observed 10.08 0.38605 0.71054 0.46121 0.70660 
High 28.00 0.44409 0.75626 0.52176 0.75176 
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In this Chapter, I investigated the empirical relationship between residential 
segregation and political fragmentation at the aggregate level across U.S. metropolitan 
areas.  All models taken as a whole, fragmentation has a weak, and mostly positive, 
relationship with residential segregation.  The results of the aggregate level analyses, 
although modeled with the intent to come to a more robust conclusion about whether 
segregation crystallizes along fragment boundaries, do not allow for the definitive 
conclusion regarding the relationship between the two.  According to the results, the 
relationship between fragmentation and residential segregation, when there, is weak.  In 
addition, the aggregate level analysis alone cannot attest to that fact the finding are not the 
result of any spurious effects which leads us to the next chapter which further partitions 
residential segregation as it relates to cities and fragments in an MSA. 
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CHAPTER VI  
FORMAL AND SIMPLE METHODS FOR DECOMPOSING SEGREGATION 
 
In this chapter I perform decomposition analyses to determine how segregation at 
different spatial levels, such as cities, tracts, and block determines overall segregation in 
the city.  I first review methods for decomposing segregation across nested geographic 
levels to establish how the overall level of segregation can be quantitatively partitioned 
into contributions that originate at different spatial levels.  Specifically, I review the 
decomposition methods developed by Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) and then outline how 
the components of their decomposition for segregation across nested geographies can be 
obtained by simpler calculations as clarified by Fossett (2016b)2 . 
Methodological Decomposable Properties  
Methods for performing decomposition analysis of segregation to assess how 
segregation at different spatial levels contributes to the overall segregation score for the 
city is set forth in Reardon and Firebaugh (2002).  Reardon and Firebaugh (2002:38) 
identify two decomposability properties which are desirable for segregation indices: 
additive organizational decomposability and additive group decomposability.  The 
property of interest for this dissertation is the additive organizational decomposability 
property.  Additive organizational decomposability refers to the capability of a segregation 
                                                 
2 A significant amount of the discussion in this chapter was developed during ‘Segregation Group’ 
meetings held by Dr. Mark Fossett.  The group meetings are held semiregularly between Spring 2014 and 
Summer 2016 in the Department of Sociology at Texas A&M University - College Station.  The 
Segregation Group meetings are used as an opportunity to discuss issues in residential segregation and 
segregation measurement not covered in currently available scientific research. 
90 
 
measure to decompose “into a sum of independent within- and between- cluster 
components” (Reardon and Firebaugh 2002:38).  Reardon and Firebaugh (2002:52) 
conclude that a measure of segregation has additive organizational decomposable 
capabilities if:  
Total segregation can be partitioned into 𝐾 + 1 independent additive components, 
which is a between-cluster component and 𝐾 within-cluster components. The portion of 
total segregation due to segregation within cluster 𝑘 should be the amount by which total 
segregation would be reduced if segregation within cluster 𝑘 were eliminated by 
rearranging individuals among its units while leaving all other units unchanged. 
In empirical analyses, decomposable measures are commonly used to measure 
segregation across nested levels such as block, block group, and tract levels.  These 
measures also have the capabilities to measure segregation at other nested relationships 
such as macro and micro levels which can reveal the importance of within-city, within-
suburb, within-fringe, between-city-suburb-fringe, and between-suburb-to-suburb 
components in a metropolitan area (Lichter et al. 2015:853).   
Decomposable Measures of Segregation - The Detailed Formal Calculations 
Reardon and Firebaugh (2002:56) identify four measures of segregation that 
satisfy the additive organizational decomposability properties: the Theil index, the squared 
coefficient of variation, the relative diversity index, and the normalized exposure index 
which is equivalent to the separation index.  In the following section I review Theil index 
(H) and the separation index (S), which is the mathematical equivalent of the normalized 
exposure index as discussed in Reardon and Firebaugh (2002).  I also discuss the Hutchens 
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square root index (R) which was not included in Reardon and Firebaugh’s (2002) 
discussion - due to being relatively newer than other segregation measures - but also has 
the property of being additively organizational decomposable (Hutchens 2004).  Reardon 
and Firebaugh’s (2002) article discusses the decomposition in the context of investigating 
multi-group segregation.  Multi-group segregation measures are constructed from 
complex weightings of two-group segregation measures.  This additional complexity is 
not relevant to the discussion here.  So I review decomposition methods as applied in the 
less complicated context of a two-group segregation comparison. 
Reardon and Firebaugh’s (2002) formula for a decomposable two-group Theil 
index is as follows: 
𝐻 =  𝐻𝑘 + ∑(𝑡𝑘/𝑇) ∗ (𝑒𝑘/𝐸) ∗ ℎ𝑘 
where 𝑇 is the city-level total for the combined population of group 1 and group 
2, 𝐸 is the entropy value for the city as a whole, 𝑡𝑘 is the total for the combined population 
of group 1 and group 2 in the higher level unit, such as tracts, 𝑒𝑘 is the entropy value for 
area 𝑖, such as tracts, 𝐻 is segregation computed using the lowest level spatial unit, such 
as block groups, 𝐻𝑘 is segregation computed using 𝑘-level, such as tracts, and ℎ𝑘 is 
segregation computed using lower-level units within a single higher 𝑗-level unit, such as 
block groups. 
Reardon and Firebaugh’s (2002) formula for a decomposable separation is as 
follows: 
𝑉 =  𝑉𝑘 + ∑(𝑡𝑘/𝑇) ∗ (𝐼𝑘/𝐼) ∗ 𝑣𝑘 
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where 𝑉 is segregation computed using the lowest 𝑗-level spatial unit, such as 
block groups, 𝑉𝑘 is segregation computed at 𝑘-level, such as tracts, 𝑣𝑘 is segregation 
computed at the lower 𝑗-level, such as block groups, 𝐼 is the Simpson Interaction index 
for the city as a whole, and 𝐼𝑘 is the Simpson Interaction index for the 𝑘-level units.  
A comparable formula for the Hutchens index (Hutchens 2004) can be given as 
follows: 
𝑅 =  𝑅𝑘 + ∑ √𝑆1𝑘 ∗ 𝑆2𝑘 ∗ 𝑟𝑘 
where 𝑅 is segregation calculated at the 𝑗-level for the city overall, 𝑅𝑘 is the value 
of 𝑅 computed using 𝑘-level data, such as tracts, 𝑟𝑘 is the value of 𝑅 computed using block 
group 𝑗-level data for 𝑘-level data such as tracts. 
Decomposable Measures of Segregation - A Simpler Option for Calculation 
The above formulas generate values of components based on complex calculations 
wherein over nested 𝑗-level and 𝑘-levels one computes segregation at the 𝑗-level within 𝑘-
levels units and then aggregates these results using weights calculated separately for each 
k-level unit, and combine the result with the segregation score obtained using k-level data 
to obtain the segregation score based on j-level data for the entire city.  The procedure is 
repeated over each successive nested spatial level until the full decomposition is obtained.  
Review of these procedures in Fossett (2016b) shows that the same decomposition 
results can be obtained by computing the difference of city-level segregation scores based 
on j-level and k-level.  Thus, in an empirical decomposition analysis of the Theil index 
(H) where j-level refers to block groups and k-level refers to tracts, the overall segregation 
at level j (𝐻𝐽) is decomposed into a contribution from overall segregation at level k (𝐻𝐾) 
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and contribution from within area segregation (𝐻𝑊) given by the weighted sum of j-level 
segregation within each k unit.  That is,  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑔. (𝐻𝐽) = 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐻𝐾) + 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐻𝑊) 
(𝐻𝐽) =  (𝐻𝐾) − (𝐻𝑊) 
 
In the Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) formulation the within area contribution 
(𝐻𝑊) is calculated from the complex expression 
∑(𝑡𝑘/𝑇) ∗ (𝑒𝑘/𝐸) ∗ ℎ𝑘 
Fossett (2016b) outlines a simpler computational approach for obtaining the value 
of the within area contribution (𝐻𝑊).  It is based on rearranging the earlier expression to 
the form  
(𝐻𝑊) =  (𝐻𝐽) − (𝐻𝐾) 
where 
 𝐻𝐽 =  (1/𝑇) ∗ ∑ 𝑡𝑗(𝐸 − 𝑒𝑗)/𝐸 = 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑔. 
𝐻𝑘 =  (1/𝑇) ∗ ∑ 𝑡𝑘(𝐸 − 𝑒𝑘)/𝐸 = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑔. 
That is, the within component of segregation (𝐻𝑊) can be obtained by subtracting 
segregation calculated at the block group level (𝐻𝐽) from segregation calculated at the 
tract level (𝐻𝐾).   
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Similarly, the same decomposition result can be obtained for the Separation index 
(S) and the Hutchens square root index (R) based on  
(𝑆𝑊) =  (𝑆𝐽) − (𝑆𝐾) 
(𝑅𝑊) =  (𝑅𝐽) − (𝑅𝐾) 
Recognizing that these computationally less demanding strategies can be used to 
obtain the value of the within-area component of segregation has great practical value.  It 
allows one to perform complex decompositions over multiple nested spatial levels based 
on the results of computing overall segregation at each spatial level and then performing 
the relevant calculations to obtain within area segregation at each step in the progression 
from higher to lower spatial levels.   
The Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) decomposition formulation makes the crucial 
methodological contribution of formally establishing how j-level segregation within k-
level areas aggregates up to determine overall j-level segregation when combined with k-
level segregation.  Surprisingly, however, their article does not specifically note the useful 
point of information that the within k-level component can be obtained by simpler 
calculations.3  I review an empirical example to illustrate this point that the simpler 
approach to calculating the quantitative contribution of within-area segregation 
components will yield correct results only for measures that are established to be 
additively decomposable.  For example, the Gini index (G) and the Dissimilarity index 
                                                 
3 It may be that Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) viewed this as obvious and not warranting mention.  
Fossett speculates the fact is not widely appreciated because, if it were, the decomposition approach would 
be used often instead of only occasionally, as is currently the case. 
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(D) are not additively decomposable.  Consequently, while the calculation 𝐺𝐽 − 𝐺𝐾 will 
yield a numeric result, the result cannot be interpreted as a within-area contribution to 
overall segregation. 
Formal versus Simple Calculation of Decomposition Components - Working 
Example 
In this section I present a hypothetical case to illustrate how two different 
approaches can be used to obtain the values of a spatial decomposition of segregation.  
The hypothetical case study compares patterns across tracts, block groups, and blocks.  
The preceding review of the formal decomposition denotes 𝑗 for block groups and 𝑘 for 
tracts.  In the working example, Census blocks are denoted by 𝑖.  The working example 
draws on the following terms: 
𝑃 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑄 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐸 = 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 
𝑒𝑘 = 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖 
𝑖 = 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠 
𝑡𝑖 = 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 & 2 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖 
 
The case study example begins with 3 tracts, 6 block groups, and 12 blocks.  Each 
unit is then given a hypothetical group 1 (W) and group 2 (B) composition that corresponds 
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to the composition of a nested relationship (Table 8 and Table 9).  Table 10 breaks down 
the segregation index scores at each of the unit levels.  Hutchens has a .0135, .0463, and 
.0638 at the tract, block group, and block level, respectively.  Theil has a .0194, .0653, 
and .0882 at the tract, block group, and block level, respectively.  Separation has a .0267, 
.0867, and .1133 at the tract, block group, and block level, respectively.  The following 
sections begin by reviewing the computing steps for the within component according to 
Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) 
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Table 8. Formal vs Simple  Decomposition Case Study Illustration I 
Area Notation 
TR [k] 1 2 3 
BG [j] 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 
BK [i] 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 
 
 
Table 9. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration II 
Unit Tract 1 Tract 2 Tract 3 Total 
TR W    240     200     160 600 = W 
TR B    160     200     240 600 = B 
TR T    400     400     400 1200 = T 
                     
TR p    0.60     0.50     0.40 0.50 = P 
TR q    0.40     0.50     0.60 0.50 = Q 
                     
BG W  150  90   100  100   50  110 600 = W 
BG B  50  110   100  100   150  90 600 = B 
BG T  200  200   200  200   200  200 1200 = T 
                     
BG p  0.75  0.45   0.50  0.50   0.25  0.55 0.50 = P 
BG q  0.25  0.55   0.50  0.50   0.75  0.45 0.50 = Q 
                     
BK W 85 65 55 35 50 50 50 50 35 15 65 45 600 = W 
BK B 15 35 45 65 50 50 50 50 65 85 35 55 600 = B 
BK T 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1200 = T 
                     
BK p 0.85 0.65 0.55 0.35 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.35 0.15 0.65 0.45 0.50 = P 
BK q 0.15 0.35 0.45 0.65 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.65 0.85 0.35 0.55 0.50 = Q 
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Table 10. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - Segregation Scores 
Unit Tract 1 Tract 2 Tract 3 Index Score 
Tract    0.3266    0.3333    0.3266 0.0135 = (R) 
Tract    0.0097    0.0000    0.0097 0.0194 = (H) 
Tract    0.0033    0.0000    0.0033 0.0267 = (V) 
                   
Blk Grp.  0.1443  0.1658  0.1667  0.1667  0.1443  0.1658 0.0463 = (R) 
Blk Grp.  0.0315  0.0012  0.0000  0.0000  0.0315  0.0012 0.0653 = (H) 
Blk Grp.  0.0104  0.0004  0.0000  0.0000  0.0104  0.0004 0.0867 = (V) 
                   
Block 0.0595 0.0795 0.0829 0.0795 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0795 0.0595 0.0795 0.0829 0.0638 = (R) 
Block 0.0325 0.0055 0.0006 0.0055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0055 0.0325 0.0055 0.0006 0.0882 = (H) 
Block 0.0102 0.0019 0.0002 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0102 0.0019 0.0002 0.1133 = (V) 
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Table 11 begins the computing process to calculate the weighted sum of block level 
segregation within block group clusters, also known as block level contribution to the 
overall segregation score.  Table 12 continues the computing process by taking the 
decomposition ‘parts’ in Table 11 and calculating the weighted sum of block level 
segregation within block group clusters.  Table 41 computes ∑ ℎ [𝑗], ∑ 𝑣 [𝑗], and ∑ 𝑟 [𝑗] 
which are terms for block level segregation within block group units.  The values are .0229, 
.0267, and .0175 for Theil, separation, and Hutchens indices, respectively. 
 
100 
 
Table 11. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - Block within Block Group Segregation - Parts 
  Block Group (j-level) Terms Block (i-level) Terms       
    t[j] p[j] q[j] e[j] t[i] p[i] q[i] e[i] t[i]/t[j] t[i]/(tpq)[j] 
(e[j]-
e[i])/e[j] 
h[j] 
parts 
v[j] 
parts 
r[j] 
parts 
BG j=1.1 200 0.7500 0.2500 0.5623          0.0485 0.0533 0.0369 
 BK[1.1.1]       100 0.8500 0.1500 0.4227 0.5000 2.6667 0.2483 0.1241 0.0267 0.4123 
 BK[1.1.2]       100 0.6500 0.3500 0.6474 0.5000 2.6667 -0.1514 -0.0757 0.0267 0.5508 
                      
BG j=1.2 200 0.4500 0.5500 0.6881          0.0296 0.0404 0.0206 
 BK[1.2.1]       100 0.5500 0.4500 0.6881 0.5000 2.0202 0.0000 0.0000 0.0202 0.5000 
 BK[1.2.2]       100 0.3500 0.6500 0.6474 0.5000 2.0202 0.0591 0.0296 0.0202 0.4794 
                      
BG j=2.1 200 0.5000 0.5000 0.6931          0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 BK[2.1.1]       100 0.5000 0.5000 0.6931 0.5000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 
 BK[2.1.2]       100 0.5000 0.5000 0.6931 0.5000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 
                      
BG j=2.2 200 0.5000 0.5000 0.6931          0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 BK[2.2.1]       100 0.5000 0.5000 0.6931 0.5000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 
 BK[2.2.2]       100 0.5000 0.5000 0.6931 0.5000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 
                      
BG j=3.1 200 0.2500 0.7500 0.5623          0.0485 0.0533 0.0369 
 BK[3.1.1]       100 0.3500 0.6500 0.6474 0.5000 2.6667 -0.1514 -0.0757 0.0267 0.5508 
 BK[3.1.2]       100 0.1500 0.8500 0.4227 0.5000 2.6667 0.2483 0.1241 0.0267 0.4123 
                      
BG j=3.2 200 0.5500 0.4500 0.6881          0.0296 0.0404 0.0206 
 BK[3.2.1]       100 0.6500 0.3500 0.6474 0.5000 2.0202 0.0591 0.0296 0.0202 0.4794 
  BK[3.2.2]         100 0.4500 0.5500 0.6881 0.5000 2.0202 0.0000 0.0000 0.0202 0.5000 
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Table 12. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - within Block Group Segregation - Calculated Weighted Sum of Block 
Level Segregation within Block Group Clusters 
              
  H = H[I] = H[J] + Σ w[j]*h[j]   V = V[I] = V[J] + Σ w[j]*v[j]  R = R[I] = R[J] + Σ w[j]*r[j] 
              
Blk. Grp. e[j] e[j]/E h[j] w[j]*h[j]   pq/PQ v[j] w[j]*v[j]   w[j] r[j] w[j]*r[j]  
              
BG 1.1 0.5623 0.8113 0.0485 0.0066  0.7500 0.0533 0.0067   0.0369 0.0053  
BG 1.2 0.6881 0.9928 0.0296 0.0049  0.9900 0.0404 0.0067   0.0206 0.0034  
BG 2.1 0.6931 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000  1.0000 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
BG 2.2 0.6931 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000  1.0000 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
BG 3.1 0.5623 0.8113 0.0485 0.0066  0.7500 0.0533 0.0067   0.0369 0.0053  
BG 3.2 0.6881 0.9928 0.0296 0.0049  0.9900 0.0404 0.0067   0.0206 0.0034  
        0.0229  = Σh[j]   0.0267  = Σv[j]     0.0175  = Σr[j] 
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Table 13 begins the computing process to calculate the weighted sum of block 
group segregation within tracts, also known as block group contribution to the overall 
segregation score.  Table 14 continues the computing process to calculate the weighted 
sum of block group segregation within tract clusters.  Table 43 computes ∑ ℎ [𝑘], ∑ 𝑣 [𝑘], 
and ∑ 𝑟 [𝑘] which are block group segregation within tract segregation.  The values are 
.0459, .0600, and .0329 for Theil, separation, and Hutchens indices, respectively. 
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Table 13. Formal vs. Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - within Tract Segregation 
  Tract (k) Level) Terms Block Group (j) Level) Terms       
                h[k] v[k] r[j] 
    t[k] p[k] q[k] e[k] t[j] p[j] q[j] e[j] t[j]/t[k] t[j]/(tpq)[k] (e[k]-e[j])/e[k] parts parts parts 
TR[1]   400 0.60 0.40 0.6730         0.0710 0.0938 0.0503 
 BG[1.1]      200 0.75 0.25 0.5623 0.50 2.0833 0.1644 0.0822 0.0469 0.4419 
 BG[1.2]      200 0.45 0.55 0.6881 0.50 2.0833 -0.0225 -0.0112 0.0469 0.5078 
                     
TR[2]   400 0.50 0.50 0.6931         0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 BG[2.1]      200 0.50 0.50 0.6931 0.50 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 
 BG[2.2]      200 0.50 0.50 0.6931 0.50 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 
                     
                     
TR[3]   400 0.40 0.60 0.6730         0.0710 0.0938 0.0503 
 BG[3.1]      200 0.25 0.75 0.5623 0.50 2.0833 0.1644 0.0822 0.0469 0.4419 
  BG[3.2]         200 0.55 0.45 0.6881 0.50 2.0833 -0.0225 -0.0112 0.0469 0.5078 
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Table 14. Formal vs Simple Decomposition Case Study Illustration - within Tract Segregation - Calculated Weighted Sum of Block Group 
Segregation within Tract Clusters 
              
  H = H[J] = H[K] + Σ w[k]*h[k]   V = V[J] = V[K] + Σ w[k]*v[k]  R = R[J] = R[K] + Σ w[k]*r[k] 
              
Area e[k] e[k]/E h[k] w[k]*h[k]   pq/PQ v[k] w[k]*v[k]   w[k] r[k] w[k]*r[k]   
              
Tract 1 0.6730 0.9710 0.0710 0.0230  0.9600 0.0938 0.0300  0.3266 0.0503 0.0164  
Tract 2 0.6931 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000  1.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.3333 0.0000 0.0000  
Tract 3 0.6730 0.9710 0.0710 0.0230  0.9600 0.0938 0.0300  0.3266 0.0503 0.0164  
        0.0459  = Σh[k]   0.0600  = Σv[k]     0.0329  = Σr[k] 
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I now review the steps necessary to compute the within component from the simple 
calculation method.  Recall that the computations to obtain the within the component for 
Theil, separation, and Hutchens are simply: 
(𝐻𝑊) =  (𝐻𝐽) − (𝐻𝐾) 
(𝑆𝑊) =  (𝑆𝐽) − (𝑆𝐾) 
(𝑅𝑊) =  (𝑅𝐽) − (𝑅𝐾) 
To compute the within components for Theil we switch the terms with the 
segregation scores already computed for the between component: 
(𝐻𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠) = (. 0882) − (. 0653) = .0229 
(𝐻𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠) = (. 0653) − (. 0194) = .0459 
To compute the within components for the separation index we switch the terms 
with the segregation scores already computed for the between component: 
(𝑉𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠) = (. 1133) − (. 0867) = .0266 
(𝑉𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠) = (. 0867) − (. 0267) = .06 
To compute the within components for the Hutchens index we switch the terms 
with the segregation scores already computed for the between component: 
(𝑅𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠) = (. 0638) − (. 0463) = .0175 
(𝑅𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠) = (. 0463) − (. 0135) = .0328 
The results produced from the simple method are identical to the more complex 
method developed by Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) with the exception of a few 
differences due to rounding error at the ten thousandth decimal place.   
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The value of this exercise is that it provides a clear demonstration that the simpler 
method of obtaining component values in fact works as described.  This is useful for the 
present analysis as the Reardon and Firebaugh approach to obtaining values of the 
components of the decomposition is computationally demanding.  Instead, I adopt the 
simpler approach for calculating the values of the components so I can conduct spatial 
decomposition analyses for a large number of metropolitan areas.  I report the results of 
these analyses in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER VII  
ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRAGMENTATION AND 
SEGREGATION WITHIN INDIVIDUAL METROPOLITAN AREAS 
 
In this chapter, I investigate the empirical relationship between residential 
segregation and political fragmentation more closely by decomposing segregation to 
examine whether segregation in cities aligns with fragmentation.  Decomposition analyses 
can reveal the extent to which segregation varies within boundaries and between 
boundaries at different spatial levels.  If a large contribution to overall segregation 
originates in segregation between place-level fragments it will lend support to the 
hypothesis that fragmentation matters.  Accordingly, decomposing segregation into 
components reflecting segregation originating within and between fragment units can help 
test which aspect of fragmentation has its greatest effect on segregation.  High segregation 
and greater differences between fragments may suggest that segregation crystallizes along 
fragmentation boundaries.  Low or no differences may suggest that a spurious relationship 
exist between fragmentation and residential segregation and that further analyses need to 
be considered. 
Decomposition Analyses Measures 
I calculate segregation using the dissimilarity index (D), separation index (S), 
Hutchens square root index (R), and Theil index (H).  Dissimilarity does not satisfy the 
additive organization decomposability property that Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) have 
set forth as a requirement.  Thus, in this chapter, comparisons involving dissimilarity is 
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used in more of a descriptive capacity rather than a decomposable capacity.  The values 
of D can be compared to the values of Hutchens square root index (R, discussed below) 
which, among indices that are additively decomposable, is closest to D in terms of 
conceptual underpinnings and empirical performance.  For descriptive purposes, I 
calculate segregation using the dissimilarity index to assess the degree to which blacks 
and whites are segregated at the block, block group, tract, place, and county level and 
examine the values and differences for D at each spatial level, and the covariation of the 
terms.  As noted, already, D does not have the particular formal property of being 
additively decomposable.  Nevertheless, one can gain insight into the relative importance 
of segregation at different spatial scales by performing a descriptive analysis of D 
measured using units at different spatial scales.  It is, of course, necessarily the case that 
the value of D will increase monotonically when one calculates D using nested spatial 
units starting with larger units and moving to smaller units.  This is not unique to D.  It 
applies to all measures of uneven distribution.   
I also perform analyses using the separation index to ensure the findings are robust.  
In addition to being additively decomposable, S has been widely used in previous research 
and S tends to track D for samples of very large metropolitan areas with substantial 
minority populations (Duncan and Duncan 1955; Massey and Denton 1988; Fossett 
2016a).   
I also report decomposition results for the Theil Index.  H has been used less widely 
than D and S in empirical studies of segregation generally. Because it is additively 
decomposable, it has been more widely used in studies that involve decompositions, 
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including decompositions of segregation across nested geographies (Fischer et al. 
2004:40).    
Finally, as noted above, I also review results for the Hutchens square root index 
(R).  Like S and H, R has the property of being additively decomposable (Hutchens 2001; 
2004).  In addition, R is conceptually similar to D because it ranks segregation 
comparisons in accord with the principle of segregation curve dominance (James and 
Taeuber 1985).  This principle holds for two segregation comparisons, a segregation index 
should take a lower value for one comparison if the segregation curve for that comparison 
is somewhere inside and nowhere outside the segregation curve for the comparison.  The 
principle is controversial and is not widely accepted (White 1986; Fossett 2016a).  
However, the principle is relevant here because measures that conform to the principle 
have similar conceptual underpinnings.  D and G conform to this principle and R also 
conforms to this principle.  H and S do not conform to this property.  Thus, Hutchens (R) 
is useful because among all indices that are additively decomposable it is most similar to 
D in how it measures segregation (as documented in Chapter 4). 
Decomposition Analyses - Close Analysis of Selected Cases 
In this section I present detailed quantitative decomposition analyses of a set of 30 
metropolitan areas.  Of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) with a minimum of 1,000 
non-Hispanic black population, I selected ten MSAs with the smallest total population, ten 
moderately sized MSAs, and ten areas with the largest total population (Table 15).  Using 
these 30 MSAs, I decompose segregation into nested within- and between-area 
components (Lichter et al. 2015:846). 
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Table 15. Selected Areas for Decomposition Analyses 
Small 
Cheyenne, WY MSA 
Moderate 
Allentown, PA MSA 
Large 
Atlanta, GA MSA 
Enid, OK MSA Ann Arbor, MI PMSA Boston, MA PMSA 
Flagstaff, AZ--UT MSA Charleston, SC MSA Chicago, IL PMSA 
Jonesboro, AR MSA Gary, IN PMSA Detroit, MI PMSA 
Las Cruces, NM MSA Little Rock, AR MSA Houston, TX PMSA 
McAllen, TX MSA Mobile, AL MSA Los Angeles, CA PMSA 
Pittsfield, MA MSA Sarasota, FL MSA Minneapolis, MN MSA 
San Angelo, TX MSA Toledo, OH MSA New York, NY PMSA 
Victoria, TX MSA Tucson, AZ MSA Philadelphia, PA PMSA 
Yuma, AZ MSA Wilmington, DE PMSA Washington, DC PMSA 
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Although not strictly and officially nested boundaries, I calculate segregation at 
the place boundary and at intermediate boundaries progressing down to blocks.  Blocks 
do not strictly and formally nest under places but as a practical matter blocks can be treated 
as nesting under places within metropolitan areas due to their small spatial size (Lichter 
et al. 2015:852).  I opted to perform this type of between and within level decomposition 
analysis at each of the nested and non-nested fragment geographies because population 
patterns can potentially align with boundaries outside of administratively nested 
geographies.  Lichter et al. (2015:843) argue that segregation is increasingly a part of 
social processes at larger units such as place boundaries.  I attempt to capture these 
changes in segregation patterns by breaking down the components in measurement for 
nested geographies, as well as non-nested geographies which I discuss in greater detail 
below. 
The only non-nested geographies in this study are Census places.  As noted above, 
blocks can be treated as “nesting” within cities because blocks are so small, errors have 
no practical consequences.  Block groups and tracts are large enough that the issue of 
nesting cannot be set aside.  It can be overcome by using the place-tract and place-block 
group combinations when computing segregation at the tract and block group levels.  This 
has a small practical consequence of yielding higher scores at the tract and block group 
level - because, for example, segregation scores can only go higher when tracts are split 
into place-tract subunits.  
Thus, I will use the smallest available geographical unit, blocks, to examine the 
variation in racial distribution in space and then calculate components to determine the 
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extent to which each spatial level in the decomposition analysis contributes to overall 
segregation.  By adopting this approach, I follow previous research which has reported 
that this is a fruitful approach (Lichter et al. 2007:4; Lichter et al. 2015:852).   
A Brief Aside Discussing Blocks and First-Order Contiguity Neighborhoods 
The spatial decomposition I implement assesses overall segregation using census 
blocks.  These are the smallest spatial units for which census tabulations of population by 
race area systematically available.  Blocks typically have 8-15 households and 25-40 
persons and are treated by many researchers as useful approximations of small-scale 
residential neighborhoods (Lichter et al. 2015).  One criticism of blocks is that they often 
are delimited by roads and as a result sometimes assign “across the street neighbors” as 
being on different blocks when household-level conceptions of neighbors might include 
across the street neighbors in small-scale spatial neighborhoods. 
In my dissertation proposal I had outlined a plan of analysis to address this concern 
by calculating segregation using first-order spatial contiguity neighborhoods instead of 
blocks to delimit small-scale neighborhoods.  Ultimately, I did not implement this 
approach.  The reason for this was that my preliminary methodological investigation of 
the issue revealed that it would not have added value to the analysis.  Two factors were 
central to my decisions.  First and foremost, I found no practical difference between 
segregation scores computed using blocks and using first-order spatial contiguity areas.  
This was true even in the smallest metropolitan areas where one would expect to see a 
difference if one existed.  Second, the implementation of a first-order contiguity unit 
would have presented complications for the analysis in terms of computation burdens and 
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dealing with nesting of small areas within block groups and tracts.  In light of the fact that 
the first-order contiguity unit did not display meaningful differences in measured 
segregation, I concluded census blocks were satisfactory for the needs of the present 
analysis. 
Analyses of Nested Units 
I first begin by examining covariation among segregation by decomposing each 
measure of segregation into between and within components at each of the newly nested 
Census geographies: blocks, block groups, tracts, and places.  The first set of figures 
depicts segregation scores calculated using data for each of the several levels of spatially 
nested units.   
Figures 3 thru 14 are organized by measure of segregation - dissimilarity, 
separation, Theil, and Hutchens - and size of the MSA - small, moderate, and large.  All 
of the figures confirm the expected behavior of segregation indices which is that the scores 
monotonically decrease as spatial scale increases; that is, index scores are never higher 
and usually are lower when moving from smaller to larger spatial units.  Thus, as the chart 
moves from block to place, the level of measured segregation between whites and blacks 
steadily moves to lower scores. 
The most important substantive finding in this part of the analysis is that the extent 
to which segregation is captured by units at different spatial levels varies systematically 
by size of the MSA.  Census tracts are the most widely used spatial unit in segregation 
analyses based on the assumption that they can sufficiently capture segregation for 
metropolitan areas (Lee et al. 2008:767).  The data reviewed here indicate this assumption 
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may be reasonable for large metropolitan areas, but not for smaller metropolitan areas.  
The figures for the moderate and large MSAs show that the difference in the level of 
segregation measured using blocks and tracts is relatively similar and might perhaps 
support the conclusion that the differences are not substantively important for the purposes 
of many kinds of studies.  For example, a large MSA such as Detroit, MI has a Hutchens 
.8484 score at the block level and a .7751 score at the tract level (Figure 11).  A moderate 
MSA such as Gary, IN has a Hutchens .8757 score at the block level and a .7857 score at 
the tract level (Figure 10).  Each MSA has a about a .08 to .09 difference between 
segregation calculated at the block and tract level. 
On the other hand, the differences between levels of segregation measured using 
different spatial units are large and dramatic for Small MSAs.  In all cases, the block level 
segregation scores are much higher than segregation scores captured at the tract level.  For 
example, a small MSA such as McAllen, TX has a Hutchens .8412 score at the block level 
and a .5266 score at the tract level (Figure 9).  Another small MSA such as Cheyenne, 
WY has a Hutchens .673 score at the block level and a .3151 score at the tract level (Figure 
9). 
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Figure 3. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Small MSAs - Dissimilarity 
 
 
D Block D Block Group D Tract D Place
Cheyenne, WY 0.6708 0.3826 0.3362 0.0589
Enid, OK 0.6534 0.3572 0.3182 0.1779
Flagstaff, AZ 0.7036 0.4523 0.3888 0.2937
Jonesboro, AR 0.6918 0.5443 0.4835 0.3334
Las Cruces, NM 0.6422 0.3624 0.3042 0.1093
McAllen, TX 0.8548 0.5893 0.5004 0.3324
Pittsfield, MA 0.7016 0.5226 0.4564 0.3350
San Angelo, TX 0.6704 0.4555 0.3580 0.1655
Victoria, TX 0.6650 0.4987 0.4298 0.2169
Yuma, AZ 0.6551 0.4923 0.4379 0.3142
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Figure 4. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - Dissimilarity 
 
 
D Block D Block Group D Tract D Place
Allentown, PA 0.7579 0.5735 0.5427 0.4958
Ann Arbor, MI 0.7282 0.6709 0.6464 0.1977
Charleston, SC 0.6437 0.5134 0.4766 0.2209
Gary, IN 0.8968 0.8699 0.8475 0.7686
Little Rock, AR 0.7274 0.6495 0.6165 0.4479
Mobile, AL 0.7762 0.6742 0.6396 0.5147
Sarasota, FL 0.8077 0.7166 0.6808 0.3418
Toledo, OH 0.7768 0.7288 0.7063 0.5071
Tucson, AZ 0.5743 0.4419 0.4066 0.3184
Wilmington, DE 0.6648 0.5884 0.5367 0.3434
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Figure 5. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Large MSAs - Dissimilarity 
 
 
D Block D Block Group D Tract D Place
Atlanta, GA 0.7350 0.6787 0.6589 0.2444
Boston, MA 0.7550 0.7000 0.6730 0.5785
Chicago, IL 0.8536 0.8266 0.8157 0.6543
Detroit, MI 0.8800 0.8635 0.8552 0.8366
Houston, TX 0.7525 0.7089 0.6786 0.3960
Los Angeles, CA 0.7457 0.7049 0.6908 0.3226
Minneapolis, MN 0.7269 0.6362 0.6011 0.5491
New York, NY 0.8512 0.8356 0.8250 0.1831
Philadelphia, PA 0.7999 0.7584 0.7297 0.5631
Washington, DC 0.6948 0.6571 0.6374 0.4161
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Figure 6. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Small MSAs - Separation 
 
 
V Block V Block Group V Tract V Place
Cheyenne, WY 0.1213 0.0311 0.0248 0.0008
Enid, OK 0.2353 0.0371 0.0203 0.0070
Flagstaff, AZ 0.1435 0.0372 0.0255 0.0063
Jonesboro, AR 0.3309 0.2087 0.1209 0.0375
Las Cruces, NM 0.1740 0.0425 0.0236 0.0023
McAllen, TX 0.4624 0.2950 0.2405 0.0213
Pittsfield, MA 0.1554 0.0708 0.0448 0.0100
San Angelo, TX 0.2853 0.1502 0.1026 0.0102
Victoria, TX 0.3632 0.1891 0.1608 0.0198
Yuma, AZ 0.1790 0.0876 0.0804 0.0428
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Figure 7. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - Separation 
 
 
V Block V Block Group V Tract V Place
Allentown, PA 0.2187 0.1029 0.0899 0.0481
Ann Arbor, MI 0.3794 0.3117 0.2737 0.0459
Charleston, SC 0.5019 0.3301 0.2825 0.0876
Gary, IN 0.8193 0.7794 0.7537 0.6496
Little Rock, AR 0.5742 0.4661 0.4238 0.1562
Mobile, AL 0.6747 0.5442 0.5059 0.2573
Sarasota, FL 0.5808 0.4614 0.3770 0.0488
Toledo, OH 0.5946 0.5301 0.4980 0.1214
Tucson, AZ 0.1589 0.0948 0.0715 0.0178
Wilmington, DE 0.4807 0.3992 0.3527 0.1858
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Figure 8. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Large MSAs - Separation 
 
 
V Block V Block Group V Tract V Place
Atlanta, GA 0.6163 0.5436 0.5181 0.1170
Boston, MA 0.5432 0.4946 0.4659 0.1657
Chicago, IL 0.7791 0.7416 0.7250 0.3670
Detroit, MI 0.8008 0.7736 0.7604 0.6904
Houston, TX 0.6323 0.5712 0.5307 0.1368
Los Angeles, CA 0.6253 0.5774 0.5630 0.1749
Minneapolis, MN 0.3841 0.3032 0.2672 0.1008
New York, NY 0.7720 0.7480 0.7307 0.0658
Philadelphia, PA 0.6911 0.6372 0.6035 0.2725
Washington, DC 0.5717 0.5240 0.5012 0.1957
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Figure 9. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Small MSAs - Hutchens 
 
 
R Block R Block Group R Tract R Place
Cheyenne, WY 0.6730 0.3514 0.3151 0.0916
Enid, OK 0.6852 0.3623 0.3044 0.2343
Flagstaff, AZ 0.7028 0.4351 0.3666 0.2691
Jonesboro, AR 0.6925 0.5312 0.4603 0.3602
Las Cruces, NM 0.6601 0.3584 0.2752 0.1082
McAllen, TX 0.8412 0.6142 0.5266 0.2919
Pittsfield, MA 0.7008 0.4711 0.3951 0.2657
San Angelo, TX 0.6899 0.4495 0.3682 0.2045
Victoria, TX 0.6738 0.4413 0.3991 0.1830
Yuma, AZ 0.6581 0.4562 0.4153 0.2882
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Figure 10. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - Hutchens 
 
 
R Block R Block Group R Tract R Place
Allentown, PA 0.7431 0.5126 0.4749 0.3949
Ann Arbor, MI 0.7180 0.6269 0.5959 0.2708
Charleston, SC 0.6364 0.4734 0.4306 0.2505
Gary, IN 0.8757 0.8065 0.7857 0.7010
Little Rock, AR 0.7224 0.6111 0.5761 0.3660
Mobile, AL 0.7736 0.6373 0.6008 0.4157
Sarasota, FL 0.8002 0.6670 0.6227 0.2900
Toledo, OH 0.7651 0.6752 0.6503 0.4327
Tucson, AZ 0.5901 0.4109 0.3771 0.2502
Wilmington, DE 0.6558 0.5478 0.5068 0.3545
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Figure 11. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Large MSAs - Hutchens 
 
 
R Block R Block Group R Tract R Place
Atlanta, GA 0.7002 0.6212 0.6009 0.2605
Boston, MA 0.7578 0.6584 0.6287 0.4593
Chicago, IL 0.8418 0.7798 0.7627 0.5585
Detroit, MI 0.8484 0.7911 0.7751 0.7059
Houston, TX 0.7318 0.6515 0.6221 0.3173
Los Angeles, CA 0.7275 0.6524 0.6383 0.3749
Minneapolis, MN 0.7201 0.5864 0.5529 0.4623
New York, NY 0.8020 0.7661 0.7495 0.2269
Philadelphia, PA 0.7844 0.7026 0.6745 0.4522
Washington, DC 0.6718 0.6094 0.5894 0.3521
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Figure 12. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Small MSAs - Theil 
 
H Block H Block Group H Tract H Place
Cheyenne, WY 0.3009 0.0991 0.0807 0.0048
Enid, OK 0.3645 0.1027 0.0700 0.0346
Flagstaff, AZ 0.3393 0.1391 0.1027 0.0446
Jonesboro, AR 0.4222 0.2735 0.1936 0.0975
Las Cruces, NM 0.3207 0.1057 0.0655 0.0087
McAllen, TX 0.6035 0.3668 0.2983 0.0705
Pittsfield, MA 0.3478 0.1882 0.1358 0.0522
San Angelo, TX 0.3946 0.1993 0.1360 0.0326
Victoria, TX 0.4233 0.2201 0.1845 0.0343
Yuma, AZ 0.3256 0.1818 0.1597 0.0819
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Figure 13. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - Theil 
 
 
H Block H Block Group H Tract H Place
Allentown, PA 0.4105 0.2279 0.2036 0.1374
Ann Arbor, MI 0.4658 0.3877 0.3524 0.0700
Charleston, SC 0.4607 0.2850 0.2398 0.0786
Gary, IN 0.8021 0.7427 0.7145 0.5953
Little Rock, AR 0.5571 0.4372 0.3945 0.1582
Mobile, AL 0.6458 0.4926 0.4492 0.2240
Sarasota, FL 0.6290 0.4941 0.4264 0.0853
Toledo, OH 0.6025 0.5210 0.4904 0.1820
Tucson, AZ 0.2738 0.1617 0.1348 0.0538
Wilmington, DE 0.4687 0.3699 0.3226 0.1635
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Figure 14. Residential Segregation Between Nested Units in Large MSAs - Theil 
 
 
 
H Block H Block Group H Tract H Place
Atlanta, GA 0.5663 0.4811 0.4545 0.0928
Boston, MA 0.5770 0.5018 0.4695 0.2315
Chicago, IL 0.7548 0.7010 0.6812 0.3624
Detroit, MI 0.7724 0.7275 0.7103 0.6203
Houston, TX 0.5957 0.5183 0.4782 0.1258
Los Angeles, CA 0.5910 0.5242 0.5077 0.1688
Minneapolis, MN 0.4729 0.3641 0.3277 0.1965
New York, NY 0.7250 0.6915 0.6707 0.0625
Philadelphia, PA 0.6657 0.5914 0.5547 0.2555
Washington, DC 0.5235 0.4636 0.4388 0.1643
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It is argued that blocks can produce upwardly biased segregation measures because 
they are too low of a level that results in homogeneous populations (Lee et al. 2008:779; 
Wong 1997:131; Winship 1977; Fossett 2016b).  This view is not supported in the data 
reviewed here.  This impact is the same in small, medium, and large metropolitan areas 
and so cannot drive the important differences in segregation documented in the figures 
just reviewed.   
The first set of decomposition figures show that for moderate and large MSAs, 
choice of scale may not matter.  Using blocks or tracts, measures of segregation produce 
similar results that differ by a few points.  MSAs that are found to have high segregation 
using block data are still highly segregated using tract data.  In contrast, scale choice 
matters by large amounts for small MSAs.  Segregation scores using blocks were much 
higher than scores captured at the tract level.  The differences were enough to classify an 
MSA as having high segregation at the block level or moderate segregation at the tract 
level.   
There are two points to consider.  The first is that: scale choice may not matter for 
moderate or large MSAs but may matter for small MSAs.  The second is that the concern 
that blocks may be considered too homogeneous for segregation research does not appear 
to be supported; instead the data here suggest the possibility that tracts may be too large 
to capture the true level of segregation of population groups in small MSAs.  I analyze 
this a little further by examining the population distribution of McAllen, TX MSA (Figure 
15).  We can see a high concentration of the black population in the northernmost part of 
the MSA while the white population is spread out along major arterials.   
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Upon closer inspection, the concentrated black population falls within a single 
Census block (Figure 15).  When moving to block groups, the concentrated black 
population now resides within a block group that includes substantial numbers of whites 
from adjacent areas (Figure 16).  At the tract level, the concentrated black population is 
now included in a unit that includes a larger white population (Figure 16).  For McAllen, 
TX MSA, as the spatial unit became larger, the area with the highest concentration of 
isolated blacks is included in areas that are more diverse and less homogeneously black.  
Thus, tracts were indeed masking the true population distribution because in tracts the 
concentrated black population was considered in the same tract as whites who were 
residing miles away.  Ultimately, Census blocks capture segregation better than Census 
tracts regardless of size of the MSA. 
This conclusion cannot be easily dismissed.  One basis for setting it aside is to 
argue that block-level segregation is not sociologically meaningful while tract-level 
segregation is sociologically meaningful.  For many concerns, this argument can be 
dismissed.  For example, the block with concentrated black presence in the figure is just 
outside of city-limit boundaries and thus potentially experiences disparities in services and 
infrastructure.  Ethnographic studies of segregation patterns even in large metropolitan 
areas suggest that neighborhood outcomes and life chances vary even at the level of small 
scale neighborhoods such as city blocks.  Thus, while it might be reasonable to conclude 
that tracts are adequate for capturing segregation in major metropolitan areas that does not 
lead to the conclusion that the additional segregation observed at smaller spatial scales is 
sociologically unimportant.   
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Figure 15. McAllen, TX MSA Black & White Population - 2000 
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Figure 16. McAllen, TX MSA Black & White Population Distribution - 2000 
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Figures 17 thru 25 are similar in that they are also organized by measure of 
segregation and size of the MSA.  These figures differ than the preceding because they 
depict each unit’s contribution to the segregation score which was obtained using the 
simple method of decomposition.  The previous figures conclude that scale choice does 
matter and generally using Census tracts to measure segregation across MSAs may not be 
adequate in analyses examining segregation across metropolitan areas of differing size.  In 
the next section I examine the data seen in the previous figures in ways that are better 
suited to revealing the spatial scale at which segregation coalesces.  The following figures 
may be of greater importance because they display the source of influence to the 
segregation score thus determining whether segregation may be the result of lower level 
blocks or larger fragments, such as place units.  
The following analysis used the simple method of decomposition to determine how 
segregation at each spatial scale contributes to the city’s overall segregation score.  The 
dissimilarity index was used in the previous section for more descriptive purposes but 
since it does not satisfy additive organizational decomposition properties it is not used in 
the following analyses.  Each unit’s contribution to the segregation score was calculated 
for the separation index, Theil index, and Hutchens index. 
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Figure 17. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Small MSAs - Separation - Unit Contribution 
 
 
Block Contribution (S)
Block Group Contribution
(S)
Tract Contribution (S) Place Contribution (S)
Cheyenne, WY 0.0902 0.0063 0.0240 0.0008
Enid, OK 0.1982 0.0168 0.0133 0.0070
Flagstaff, AZ 0.1063 0.0117 0.0192 0.0063
Jonesboro, AR 0.1222 0.0878 0.0833 0.0375
Las Cruces, NM 0.1315 0.0189 0.0214 0.0023
McAllen, TX 0.1673 0.0545 0.2192 0.0213
Pittsfield, MA 0.0846 0.0260 0.0348 0.0100
San Angelo, TX 0.1350 0.0477 0.0923 0.0102
Victoria, TX 0.1741 0.0283 0.1410 0.0198
Yuma, AZ 0.0913 0.0072 0.0376 0.0428
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
Se
p
ar
at
io
n
 In
d
ex
133 
 
Figure 18. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Small MSAs - Theil - Unit Contribution 
 
 
 
Block Contribution (H)
Block Group Contribution
(H)
Tract Contribution (H) Place Contribution (H)
Cheyenne, WY 0.2018 0.0183 0.0759 0.0048
Enid, OK 0.2617 0.0328 0.0354 0.0346
Flagstaff, AZ 0.2001 0.0365 0.0581 0.0446
Jonesboro, AR 0.1487 0.0799 0.0961 0.0975
Las Cruces, NM 0.2149 0.0402 0.0569 0.0087
McAllen, TX 0.2368 0.0685 0.2278 0.0705
Pittsfield, MA 0.1597 0.0523 0.0836 0.0522
San Angelo, TX 0.1952 0.0633 0.1034 0.0326
Victoria, TX 0.2032 0.0357 0.1502 0.0343
Yuma, AZ 0.1438 0.0221 0.0777 0.0819
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Figure 19. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Small MSAs - Hutchens - Unit Contribution 
 
 
 
Block Contribution (R)
Block Group Contribution
(R)
Tract Contribution (R) Place Contribution (R)
Cheyenne, WY 0.3216 0.0363 0.2236 0.0916
Enid, OK 0.3229 0.0578 0.0701 0.2343
Flagstaff, AZ 0.2677 0.0684 0.0975 0.2691
Jonesboro, AR 0.1614 0.0708 0.1002 0.3602
Las Cruces, NM 0.3017 0.0832 0.1670 0.1082
McAllen, TX 0.2270 0.0877 0.2347 0.2919
Pittsfield, MA 0.2297 0.0760 0.1294 0.2657
San Angelo, TX 0.2404 0.0814 0.1637 0.2045
Victoria, TX 0.2324 0.0422 0.2161 0.1830
Yuma, AZ 0.2019 0.0410 0.1271 0.2882
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Figure 20. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - Separation - Unit Contribution 
 
 
 
Block Contribution (S)
Block Group Contribution
(S)
Tract Contribution (S) Place Contribution (S)
Allentown, PA 0.1158 0.0129 0.0418 0.0481
Ann Arbor, MI 0.0677 0.0380 0.2278 0.0459
Charleston, SC 0.1718 0.0477 0.1949 0.0876
Gary, IN 0.0400 0.0257 0.1040 0.6496
Little Rock, AR 0.1081 0.0423 0.2677 0.1562
Mobile, AL 0.1305 0.0383 0.2486 0.2573
Sarasota, FL 0.1194 0.0844 0.3282 0.0488
Toledo, OH 0.0645 0.0321 0.3766 0.1214
Tucson, AZ 0.0641 0.0233 0.0537 0.0178
Wilmington, DE 0.0815 0.0465 0.1670 0.1858
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Figure 21. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - Theil - Unit Contribution 
 
 
 
Block Contribution (H)
Block Group Contribution
(H)
Tract Contribution (H) Place Contribution (H)
Allentown, PA 0.1826 0.0243 0.0662 0.1374
Ann Arbor, MI 0.0781 0.0354 0.2824 0.0700
Charleston, SC 0.1758 0.0451 0.1613 0.0786
Gary, IN 0.0594 0.0282 0.1192 0.5953
Little Rock, AR 0.1198 0.0427 0.2363 0.1582
Mobile, AL 0.1532 0.0434 0.2253 0.2240
Sarasota, FL 0.1349 0.0677 0.3411 0.0853
Toledo, OH 0.0815 0.0307 0.3084 0.1820
Tucson, AZ 0.1122 0.0269 0.0809 0.0538
Wilmington, DE 0.0988 0.0472 0.1592 0.1635
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Figure 22. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Moderate MSAs - Hutchens - Unit Contribution 
 
 
 
Block Contribution (R)
Block Group Contribution
(R)
Tract Contribution (R) Place Contribution (R)
Allentown, PA 0.2305 0.0377 0.0800 0.3949
Ann Arbor, MI 0.0911 0.0310 0.3251 0.2708
Charleston, SC 0.1630 0.0428 0.1800 0.2505
Gary, IN 0.0692 0.0208 0.0847 0.7010
Little Rock, AR 0.1112 0.0350 0.2102 0.3660
Mobile, AL 0.1363 0.0365 0.1851 0.4157
Sarasota, FL 0.1332 0.0443 0.3327 0.2900
Toledo, OH 0.0899 0.0249 0.2176 0.4327
Tucson, AZ 0.1792 0.0338 0.1268 0.2502
Wilmington, DE 0.1080 0.0411 0.1523 0.3545
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Figure 23. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Large MSAs - Separation - Unit Contribution 
 
 
 
Block Contribution (S)
Block Group
Contribution (S)
Tract Contribution (S) Place Contribution (S)
Atlanta, GA 0.0727 0.0255 0.4011 0.1170
Boston, MA 0.0487 0.0287 0.3003 0.1657
Chicago, IL 0.0375 0.0167 0.3580 0.3670
Detroit, MI 0.0272 0.0132 0.0700 0.6904
Houston, TX 0.0611 0.0405 0.3939 0.1368
Los Angeles, CA 0.0479 0.0144 0.3881 0.1749
Minneapolis, MN 0.0809 0.0360 0.1664 0.1008
New York, NY 0.0240 0.0173 0.6649 0.0658
Philadelphia, PA 0.0538 0.0337 0.3310 0.2725
Washington, DC 0.0476 0.0228 0.3055 0.1957
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Figure 24. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Large MSAs - Theil - Unit Contribution 
 
 
 
Block Contribution (H)
Block Group
Contribution (H)
Tract Contribution (H) Place Contribution (H)
Atlanta, GA 0.0852 0.0266 0.3617 0.0928
Boston, MA 0.0752 0.0323 0.2380 0.2315
Chicago, IL 0.0538 0.0198 0.3188 0.3624
Detroit, MI 0.0448 0.0173 0.0899 0.6203
Houston, TX 0.0775 0.0400 0.3525 0.1258
Los Angeles, CA 0.0667 0.0165 0.3389 0.1688
Minneapolis, MN 0.1088 0.0364 0.1312 0.1965
New York, NY 0.0335 0.0208 0.6083 0.0625
Philadelphia, PA 0.0743 0.0367 0.2992 0.2555
Washington, DC 0.0599 0.0247 0.2746 0.1643
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Figure 25. Residential Segregation within Nested Units in Large MSAs - Hutchens - Unit Contribution 
 
 
Block Contribution (R)
Block Group
Contribution (R)
Tract Contribution (R) Place Contribution (R)
Atlanta, GA 0.0790 0.0204 0.3404 0.2605
Boston, MA 0.0994 0.0297 0.1693 0.4593
Chicago, IL 0.0620 0.0171 0.2042 0.5585
Detroit, MI 0.0573 0.0160 0.0691 0.7059
Houston, TX 0.0803 0.0294 0.3048 0.3173
Los Angeles, CA 0.0751 0.0141 0.2634 0.3749
Minneapolis, MN 0.1337 0.0335 0.0906 0.4623
New York, NY 0.0358 0.0166 0.5226 0.2269
Philadelphia, PA 0.0817 0.0281 0.2223 0.4522
Washington, DC 0.0624 0.0200 0.2373 0.3521
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Segregation originates at various unit levels according the size of the MSA and 
measure of segregation.  For small MSAs, separation and Theil indices display similar 
patterns.  Block level units have greater contributions to the overall segregation score.  
Several of the smaller MSAs have blocks and tracts both equally, or more, contributing to 
the overall segregation score.  Generally, block groups, as do place units, do not seem to 
contribute to the overall segregation score relative to blocks and tracts.  For example, 
McAllen, TX MSA has a separation index contribution score of .1673 at the block level 
and a .2192 contribution score at the tract level but its block group and place scores are 
.0545 and .0213, respectively (Figure 17). 
The Hutchens index produced patterns that differed from the separation and Theil 
indices.  For small MSAs, block, tract, and place level contributions to the overall 
segregation were mostly greater than contributions at the block group level.  For example, 
recall that McAllen, TX MSA had greater contributions at the block and tract level for 
separation and Theil.  For Hutchens, McAllen, TX MSA has a Hutchens contribution score 
of .2270 at the block level, .2347 at the tract level, and a .2347 contribution score at the 
place level (Figure 19).  The block group contribution is a .0877. 
Moving to moderate sized MSAs, separation, Theil, and Hutchens indices all 
display somewhat similar patterns to each other.  In moderately sized MSAs, you see place 
level units begin to have greater influence in contribution to the overall segregation score.  
First, block level contribution to the overall segregation score becomes less important and 
almost at the level of block groups’ contribution.  For Theil and separation, tracts mostly 
have the greatest contribution to the overall segregation score with place contribution not 
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far behind.  The Hutchens index is interesting because it also shows block contribution at 
similar levels as block groups but instead of tracts having the most of the contribution to 
the overall segregation score, place level contribution surpasses tract contribution in most 
moderate sized MSAs. 
One moderate sized MSA, Gary, IN, stood out from other MSAs in all measures 
of segregation.  Gary, IN MSA has a separation contribution score of .04 at the block level, 
.0257 at the block group level, .1040 at the tract level, and .6496 at the place level (Figure 
20).  The Theil contribution scores were .0594, .0282, .1192, and .5953 at the block, block 
group, tract, and place level, respectively (Figure 21).  The Hutchens contribution scores 
were .0692, .0208, .0847, and .7010 at the block, block group, tract, and place level 
respectively (Figure 22). 
Large MSAs have contribution patterns across all measures of segregation.  Blocks 
and block groups have consistently weak contributions to the overall segregation score.  
For Theil and separation, the place level contribution continue to increase over moderately 
sized MSAs.  The Hutchens index again captures segregations greatest contribution at the 
place level. 
Two MSAs, New York, NY and Detroit, MI, stand out from the large sized MSAs.  
First, New York, NY, in all measures of segregation, captures a high degree of segregation 
at the tract level leaving all other unit levels with weak contributions.  That is a departure 
from other MSAs since most other areas have most of their segregation contribution split 
between two of the nested levels where in New York, it’s mostly at the tract level.  For 
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example, New York, NY has a .0240, .0173, .6649, and .0658 separation index 
contribution score at the block, block group, tract, and place level (Figure 23). 
Similarly, Detroit, MI MSA, in all measures of segregation, captures a high degree 
of segregation at a single level as opposed to splitting the contribution between two levels.  
Detroit, MI has its greatest contribution to the overall segregation score at the place level 
leaving block, block group, and tract to have a minimal contribution to segregation.  For 
example, Detroit, MI has a .0573, .0160, .0691, and .7059 Hutchens contribution score at 
the block, block group, tract, and place respectively (Figure 25).  
Overall, the Hutchens decomposition has found that segregation coalesces around 
place boundaries for most MSAs.  As the size of the MSA increases, the place contribution 
to the overall segregation score becomes more apparent.  The Theil and separation 
decompositions also found that segregation mostly coalesces around place levels but not 
for small sized MSAs.  In small sized MSAs, blocks and tracts had greater contributions 
to segregation. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, which is to investigate the impact of 
fragmentation on segregation, I placed a greater focus in occasions where the place 
contribution was significant or the highest level of contribution.  Patterns where 
segregation coalesced around places appeared in moderate and large MSAs and never in 
small MSAs across all measures of segregation.  For small MSAs, segregation coalesced 
around places only when measured using the Hutchens index.  To examine these 
differences amongst small to large MSAs I visually inspected the population distribution 
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of a small, moderate, and large MSAs and how the distribution aligns with city boundaries 
within the MSA.   
I examine McAllen, TX for the small MSAs (Figure 26).  The McAllen, TX MSA 
has whites mostly concentrated within place boundaries with some whites residing in 
unincorporated areas of the MSA.  The distribution of the black population is much 
different relative to whites.  Non-Hispanic blacks are located sparsely within city 
boundaries or alongside the white population.  The majority of the black population resides 
north of the non-Hispanic white population concentration in the unincorporated area.  In 
fact, this concentration of blacks are underbounded.  In this case, the City of Edinburg has 
gone through a ‘flag’, or ‘shoestring’, annexation by opting to annex territory north of the 
concentrated black households without having to annex the black population.  Thereby 
underbounding the black community. 
 
 
145 
 
Figure 26. McAllen, TX MSA Black & White Population Distribution with 
Place Boundaries - 2000 
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For the moderate MSA, I examine Gary, IN (Figure 27).  Gary, IN has a much 
larger black and white population than McAllen, TX which had a mostly white population.  
In this instance, the non-Hispanic black population is concentrated within city boundaries.  
Although blacks now reside within city boundaries, they are not residing alongside white 
residents.  The two groups are clearly delineated by city boundaries with the City of Gary 
containing the majority of the black population.  Gary, IN MSA is also unique in that the 
two population groups are not only separated by city but by dead spaces or areas with no 
population.  These areas are large industrial sites and an airport. 
Finally, for the large MSA, I examine Detroit, MI (Figure 28).  Similar to Gary, 
IN, the non-Hispanic black population resides within cities and is segregated from cities 
that are almost entirely white.  Detroit, MI MSA has a handful of cities that contain almost 
the entire black population while a small portion seems to reside in the western portion of 
the MSA. 
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Figure 27. Gary, IN MSA Black & White Population Distribution with Place 
Boundaries - 2000 
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Figure 28. Detroit, MI MSA Black & White Population Distribution with 
Place Boundaries - 2000 
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The visual analysis put the previous unit level contribution analyses into 
perspective.  Examining the three MSAs, we are able to see the reasons behind the place 
level contribution being low in small MSAs and high in moderate and large MSAs.  The 
interesting point in small MSAs was that a significant amount of the black population was 
underbounded and considered residing alongside rural whites.  Thus decreasing the degree 
to which place contributes to the total segregation score.  Another interesting point of the 
visual analysis was between Gary, IN and Detroit, MI.  Both MSAs have places that 
equally contribute to the overall segregation score but both are spatially different in terms 
of their population distribution.  Segregation between blacks and whites in Gary, IN is by 
place boundary on top of the two groups having spatial distance between each other.   
Segregation between blacks and whites in Detroit, MI is also by place boundary but the 
two groups do not have any spatial distance between each other.  In Detroit, MI MSA, the 
two population groups exactly align along city boundaries.   
Regression Analyses 
The following section is one in which I make new contributions to the literature 
measuring municipal boundaries and their effect on residential segregation.  Utilizing the 
results from decomposing segregation at nested Census units, I implement the contribution 
scores at each level into regression analyses.  Rather than use the overall segregation 
scores as modeled in the Chapter 5 metropolitan level analysis, I model the contribution 
scores as the dependent variable.  I regress fragmentation on segregation derived from a 
variety of spatial unit contributions to determine the robustness of the findings and 
whether the geographic unit used in assessing segregation affects the extent to which the 
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two are related (Firebaugh 1989; Wan and Zhou 2005).  The results will aid in concluding 
whether segregation crystallizes along fragment borders.  Lastly, rather than include all 
measures of fragmentation and control variables, the regression models in this section 
utilize the fragmentation measures and control variables that were most promising in the 
metropolitan level analysis.   
The fragmentation measures used in this analysis are the total number of cities with 
a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents and the MSA share of the 
population residing outside the largest city.  The control variables used are: percentage of 
the white population, percentage of the population in the armed forces, percentage of the 
housing units built post-FHA, natural log of the population, and recent population growth.  
Recent population growth is a new addition to the list of control variables.  Researchers 
note that in some cases the size of the population may not have an effect on residential 
segregation rather the recent growth of the population will positively affect residential 
segregation (Logan et al. 2004:13).  Recent population growth is the growth in MSA total 
population from 1990 to 2000 measured as a percentage.   
Table 16 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression 
analysis.  The table is organized by fragmentation measures, segregation measures, and 
control variables.  Previous analyses in this dissertation find that place fragmentation 
matters more in MSAs with large total populations and less in MSAs with small total 
populations.  As such, I also organize the descriptive statistics into small, medium, and 
large MSAs which correspond to cities with less than 250,000 total population, cities with 
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at least a 250,000 but less than 1,000,000 total population, and cities with at least a 
1,000,000 total population, respectively (Lichter et al. 2015:844).   
Grouping the MSAs into small, medium, and large will aid in interpreting the 
results of the regression.  In Table 16 we see that as the size of the MSA goes from small, 
medium, to large, the mean of the spatial contribution increases.  For example, Hutchens 
has a mean of .2715, .3440, and .3864 at the place level contribution for small, medium, 
and large MSAs, respectively.  Although these patterns remain consistent with previous 
findings, descriptive statistics can only be used for descriptive purposes.  Descriptive 
statistics cannot attest to the relationship between place boundaries and residential 
segregation which the decomposition regression can.   
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Table 16. Descriptive Statistics: Political Fragmentation, Residential Segregation (Unit Contribution) and Controls 
Variable 
Small Medium  Large All 
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
Fragmentation 
Measure 
Frag2* 151 21.2497 12.0610 110 21.2399 11.2757 50 17.4345 10.1697 311 20.6329 11.5501 
Frag3* 150 10.7979 5.0496 110 9.5673 4.9126 50 9.0684 4.6078 310 10.0823 4.9684 
Frag4* 151 61.0970 20.4490 110 69.3780 16.1087 50 73.7132 16.6078 311 66.0543 19.0401 
Separation 
Contribution 
Block 151 0.1203 0.0534 110 0.0974 0.0390 50 0.0703 0.0272 311 0.1042 0.0486 
Block Group 151 0.0374 0.0287 110 0.0367 0.0213 50 0.0294 0.0112 311 0.0359 0.0242 
Tract 151 0.1226 0.0997 110 0.1772 0.1053 50 0.2426 0.1021 311 0.1612 0.1106 
Place 151 0.0519 0.0631 110 0.1143 0.1110 50 0.1714 0.1270 311 0.0932 0.1039 
Theil Contribution 
Block 151 0.1604 0.0438 110 0.1261 0.0380 50 0.0891 0.0288 311 0.1368 0.0474 
Block Group 151 0.0439 0.0217 110 0.0391 0.0162 50 0.0309 0.0093 311 0.0401 0.0188 
Tract 151 0.1330 0.0800 110 0.1684 0.0798 50 0.2178 0.0875 311 0.1591 0.0864 
Place 151 0.0803 0.0638 110 0.1420 0.1011 50 0.1850 0.1134 311 0.1190 0.0960 
Hutchens 
Contribution 
Block 151 0.1963 0.0638 110 0.1502 0.0606 50 0.1049 0.0427 311 0.1653 0.0684 
Block Group 151 0.0523 0.0204 110 0.0398 0.0168 50 0.0278 0.0085 311 0.0439 0.0198 
Tract 151 0.1646 0.0775 110 0.1641 0.0637 50 0.1802 0.0703 311 0.1669 0.0718 
Place 151 0.2715 0.1055 110 0.3440 0.1187 50 0.3864 0.1127 311 0.3156 0.1199 
Control Variables 
% White 151 89.3850 10.9975 110 86.5763 11.7473 50 82.5651 10.3340 311 87.2951 11.3949 
% Armed Forces 151 1.6837 4.8076 110 1.1464 2.8402 50 0.7175 1.8181 311 1.3383 3.8309 
% Built Post-FHA 151 53.4856 14.7248 110 52.7265 14.2772 50 51.9748 16.7162 311 52.9742 14.8682 
Population Log 151 11.8448 0.3415 110 12.9982 0.3879 50 14.3937 0.4879 311 12.6625 0.9980 
Population Growth 151 12.0256 11.1107 110 13.4755 9.9898 50 17.1656 14.8320 311 13.3648 11.5240 
* Frag2 refers to total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents.  Frag3 refers to total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 
population per 1 million MSA residents.  Frag4 refers to total share of the MSA population residing outside the largest city. 
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Table 17 reports models where fragmentation is measured using total number of 
cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents and segregation is 
measured using the separation index.  Fragmentation has its strongest positive and 
statistically significant effect on residential segregation measured as place contribution to 
the segregation score.  Block and block group contributions have weaker and significant 
relationships with fragmentation.  
A significant finding in this model is that between city size, measured using log of 
the population, and residential segregation.  Log of the population has negative and 
statistically significant relationships with block level and block group level contribution 
scores.  The relationship becomes positive and significant at the tract level and even 
stronger for place contribution.  These findings are promising because they display similar 
patterns found in previous analyses.  Segregation coalesces around fragmentation to a 
greater degree in cities with larger populations. 
Overall, the control variables have consistent, statistically significant effects in the 
expected direction across models with the exception of percentage of the housing units 
built post-FHA.  Percentage of the housing units built post-FHA has a positive and 
statistically significant relationship at the block level contribution.  This changes to a 
negative relationship in tract and place contribution models although the effect is 
statistically insignificant.   
These findings differ in that previous research suggests that cities with a greater 
number of housing units built post-FHA may tend to have lower degrees of residential 
segregation.  The relationship in this model suggests that this may be the case in cities 
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with large populations but inversely related in cities with small populations.  Percentage 
of the housing units built post-FHA may allow for greater opportunities for whites and 
blacks to segregate in smaller communities MSAs.  MSA percent white and percent in the 
armed forces have negative relationships and statistically significant relationships with 
residential segregation.    The effects of the control variables tend to be consistent across 
the models so I will not comment further on the effects of control variables unless they 
depart in important ways from the above summary.  
Table 18 presents the model results where fragmentation is measured by total 
number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents and 
residential segregation is measured by the separation index.  Fragmentations effect on 
residential segregation has more than doubled to 0.051 in the place contribution model 
than in the previous fragmentation measure.  City size also slightly increased 0.432 effect 
on residential segregation. 
Table 19 presents the model results where fragmentation is measured using MSA 
population share residing outside the largest city and segregation is measured by the 
separation index.  Again, fragmentation and residential segregation has positive and 
statistically significant relationships at the block, block group, and place level contribution 
scores.  Fragmentation has its greatest strength at the place level contribution with a .022.  
Although fragmentation’s greatest strength is at the place level, log of the population has 
an even stronger relationship with a 0.261 that is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
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Table 17. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation I - Separation 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
Number of Cities 2,500 per 1M MSA 
Residents 
0.010*** 0.009** -0.004 0.022*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
% White -0.015*** -0.020*** -0.034*** -0.046*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.018*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.062** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 
0.015*** 0.009 -0.004 -0.013 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 
     
Population Log -0.234*** -0.109** 0.242*** 0.413*** 
 (0.024) (0.041) (0.044) (0.053) 
     
Population Growth -0.010** -0.011 -0.003 -0.019 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) 
     
Constant 1.196* -0.700 -1.450 -3.160* 
 (0.493) (0.864) (0.818) (1.259) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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Table 18. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation II - Separation 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
Number of Cities 10,000 per 1M 
MSA Residents 
0.002 -0.000 -0.018* 0.051*** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) 
     
% White -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.034*** -0.042*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.023*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.067** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 0.014*** 0.008 -0.005 -0.011 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
     
Population Log -0.240*** -0.118** 0.233*** 0.432*** 
 (0.024) (0.042) (0.044) (0.051) 
     
Population Growth -0.011** -0.012 -0.003 -0.027* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
     
Constant 1.417** -0.443 -1.208 -3.859** 
 (0.495) (0.880) (0.824) (1.201) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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Table 19. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation III - Separation 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
MSA Population Share Residing 
Outside CC 
0.007*** 0.009*** -0.004 0.022*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
     
% White -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.053*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.019*** -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.067** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.025) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 
0.012*** 0.006 -0.003 -0.022** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
     
Population Log -0.294*** -0.181*** 0.272*** 0.261*** 
 (0.024) (0.041) (0.049) (0.059) 
     
Population Growth -0.008* -0.008 -0.005 -0.011 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
     
Constant 1.902*** 0.114 -1.789* -1.331 
 (0.459) (0.813) (0.866) (1.116) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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Table 20 presents the model results for fragmentation measured by the total 
number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents and 
residential segregation measured by the Theil index.  As in previous tables, fragmentation 
has its greatest strength at the place level contribution with a 0.018 effect that is 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  Log of the population also has its greatest effect 
on residential segregation at the place level contribution with a .319.  MSA percent white 
begins to depart from previous relationships.  At the block contribution level, MSA 
percent white has a 0.003 effect on residential segregation that is statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level.  This is a departure from previous analyses since MSA percent white 
tends to have a negative relationship with residential segregation. 
Table 21 presents the model results for fragmentation measured by the total 
number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents and 
residential segregation measured by the Theil index.  Again, fragmentations greatest effect 
is when modeled with place contribution as the segregation score.  Here fragmentation 
also increases in effect to 0.038 which is greater than the effect found in the previous 
fragmentation measure. 
Table 22 presents the model results where fragmentation is measured by the MSA 
share of the population residing outside the largest city and residential segregation is 
measured by the Theil index.  The findings in these models are identical to the results of 
the previous models.  Fragmentation has the greatest strength with place contribution over 
other unit level contributions with log of the population has the strongest relationship of 
all the variables. 
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Table 20. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation I - Theil 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
Number of Cities 2,500 per 1M 
MSA Residents 
0.005*** 0.007** -0.004 0.018*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
% White 0.003* -0.011*** -0.024*** -0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.056*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 
0.012*** 0.007* -0.004 -0.018* 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
     
Population Log -0.243*** -0.148*** 0.170*** 0.319*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.036) (0.040) 
     
Population Growth -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) 
     
Constant 0.255 -0.751 -1.408* -3.615*** 
 (0.363) (0.604) (0.704) (0.881) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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Table 21.  Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation II - Theil 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
Number of Cities 10,000 per 
1M MSA Residents 
0.004 0.002 -0.018** 0.038*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
     
% White 0.004* -0.010*** -0.024*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.022*** -0.040*** -0.032*** -0.062*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-
FHA 0.011*** 0.007* -0.005 -0.016* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
     
Population Log -0.244*** -0.152*** 0.160*** 0.331*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.037) (0.039) 
     
Population Growth -0.005 -0.009* -0.000 -0.016 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) 
     
Constant 0.313 -0.601 -1.158 -4.076*** 
 (0.362) (0.604) (0.715) (0.874) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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Table 22. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation III - Theil 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
MSA Population Share Residing 
Outside CC 
0.003** 0.005*** -0.003 0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
% White 0.003* -0.012*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.021*** -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.061** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 
0.010*** 0.005 -0.003 -0.023*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Population Log -0.270*** -0.193*** 0.193*** 0.216*** 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.042) (0.046) 
     
Population Growth -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) 
     
Constant 0.585 -0.223 -1.676* -2.394** 
 (0.359) (0.578) (0.747) (0.811) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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Table 23 presents the results where fragmentation is measured by the total number 
of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents and residential 
segregation is measured by the Hutchens index.  Table 24 presents the results whree 
fragmentation is measured by the total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population 
per 1 million MSA residents and residential segregation is measured by the Hutchens 
index.  Table 25 presents the results where fragmentation is measured by the total share 
of the MSA population residing outside the largest city and residential segregation 
measured by the Hutchens index.  The analysis in both of these tables repeat patterns seen 
in previous tables.  Overall, the analysis with the Hutchens index slightly departs from the 
pattern of the previous segregation measures.  For the first time, city size becomes 
statistically insignificant although only at the tract level.  At the block level, all measures 
of fragmentation are statistically insignificant while having their strongest, positive, 
effects at the place level contribution.  Log of the population continues to have the 
strongest effect of all variables on residential segregation in the place level contribution 
model. 
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Table 23. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation I - Hutchens 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
Number of Cities 2,500 per 1M 
MSA Residents 
0.000 0.005* -0.010*** 0.014*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
     
% White 0.022*** 0.005* -0.012*** -0.006* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.008* -0.026*** -0.010 -0.026** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 
0.011*** 0.009** 0.006 -0.016*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Population Log -0.237*** -0.235*** 0.018 0.190*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.030) (0.025) 
     
Population Growth -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
     
Constant -1.106* -1.133* -0.824 -2.121*** 
 (0.452) (0.520) (0.594) (0.519) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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Table 24. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation II - Hutchens 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
Number of Cities 10,000 per 1M 
MSA Residents 
0.004 0.007 -0.027*** 0.024*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
     
% White 0.022*** 0.006* -0.013*** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.008* -0.028*** -0.007 -0.031*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 0.011*** 0.009** 0.006 -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Population Log -0.233*** -0.233*** 0.007 0.196*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.031) (0.025) 
     
Population Growth -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
     
Constant -1.190** -1.142* -0.576 -2.270*** 
 (0.454) (0.508) (0.623) (0.541) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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Table 25. Residential Segregation Unit Contribution and Place Fragmentation III - Hutchens 
  Block 
Contribution 
Block Group 
Contribution 
Tract 
Contribution 
Place 
Contribution   
MSA Population Share Residing 
Outside CC 
0.000 0.002* -0.004* 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
% White 0.022*** 0.005* -0.012*** -0.006* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
% in Armed Forces -0.008* -0.027*** -0.008 -0.029** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
     
% Housing Units Built Post-FHA 
0.011*** 0.008** 0.008 -0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Population Log -0.238*** -0.259*** 0.059 0.133*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.037) (0.030) 
     
Population Growth -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
     
Constant -1.087* -0.832 -1.363* -1.386** 
 (0.458) (0.518) (0.639) (0.525) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
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The regression analysis at the aggregate level from Chapter 5 was an attempt to 
measure the relationship between political fragmentation and residential segregation.  The 
regression analysis in this Chapter was an attempt to measure the relationship between 
political fragmentation and residential segregation as it relates to the unit the population 
groups coalesce around.  If the relationship between political fragmentation and residential 
segregation had proven to be fruitful in the place contribution model it would further the 
finding that residential segregation coalescing around place boundaries is related to the 
degree an area is fragmented.   
In all measures of segregation, fragmentation has its strongest, positive, and 
statistically significant, relationship when modeled with the place contribution score.  This 
is encouraging because the results from the aggregate level regression in Chapter 5 show 
that fragmentation and segregation are positively related, although weak.  The strength of 
the relationship in Chapter 5 was not definitive enough to conclude that segregation 
coalesces around social fragments in space.  The decomposition regression in this section 
shows that this positive relationship was due to place boundary contributions to the total 
segregation score. 
Lastly, the decomposition regression confirmed the findings of previous analyses 
which found place fragmentation mattering most in cities with large populations.  The 
decomposition regression results had city size mattering most in the place level 
contribution models for all measures of segregation but negatively related in cities where 
block level contribution matters most, such as cities with small populations. 
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Decomposing Macro and Micro Place Segregation 
The final decomposition analysis examines the possibility that segregation 
coalesces at larger spatial areas, such as cities, rather than smaller spatial areas, such as 
Census administrative units.  This analysis models segregation in five ways: between 
central city, suburban places, and fringe; between suburban places; within the central city; 
within suburban place; and within the fringe area. 
The following analysis is organized by measure of segregation and size of the 
MSA.  Table 26 reports the results for macro and micro place segregation where residential 
segregation measured by the separation index.  For small MSAs, the greatest amount of 
segregation comes from either within central city, within suburban places, or within fringe 
area.  Several of the MSAs have within components that are similar to their total 
segregation score while others are starkly different.  For example, Enid, OK has a 23.53 
total segregation score while it’s within fringe area has a 51.36 segregation score.  
McAllen, TX has a 46.24 segregation score while it’s within fringe area has a 60.77 
segregation score.  A few of the MSAs have null segregation scores for suburban place 
components. These small MSAs have a central city without any additional cities that 
qualify as suburban. 
Moderate MSAs have their scores distributed more so than small MSAs.  Small 
MSAs were likelier to have a high segregation score in a single component.  Moderate 
MSAs are likelier to have high segregation scores in more than one component.  For 
example, Sarasota, FL has a 58.08 total segregation score, 64.15 within central city score, 
and 66.13 within suburban places score.  Charleston, SC has a 50.19 total segregation 
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score, 59.92 within central city score, 48.23 within suburban places score, and a 47.40 
within fringe area score.  Much like small MSAs, most of the between scores for moderate 
MSAs remain low except for Gary, IN and Mobile, AL.  Gary, IN has a 81.93 total 
segregation score, and 55.14 between central city, suburban places, and fringe score, but 
its highest was a 60.50 within suburban places score.  Mobile, AL has a 67.47 total 
segregation score and a 50.71 between suburban places score but its highest was a 76.69 
within suburban places score. 
Large MSAs display a pattern where the within central city component of 
segregation consistently scores highest of all components.  The one exception to this is 
Detroit, MI.  Detroit, MI has a 80.08 total segregation score 59.69 between central city, 
suburban places, and fringe score, with the highest within score being 58.08 captured 
within suburban places.  The overall pattern displayed for separation is that as the MSAs 
become larger in size their component scores are likelier to be greater at the within central 
city component.  The largest mean scores for small MSAs was 24.34 at the within fringe 
area component while moderate and large MSAs had their largest mean scores at the 
within central city component.
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Table 26. Decomposed Segregation for 30 Selected Metropolitan Areas - Separation 
   Between 
Central City, 
Suburban 
Places, and 
Fringe 
Between 
Suburban 
Places 
Within 
Central 
City 
Within 
Suburban 
Places 
Within 
Fringe 
Area 
   
  Metropolitan Area 
Total 
(S) 
Small 
Cheyenne, WY MSA 12.13 1.07 3.18 13.59 4.24 8.13 
Enid, OK MSA 23.53 0.69 0.50 22.86 13.04 51.36 
Flagstaff, AZ MSA 14.35 0.38 2.17 12.78 25.59 10.86 
Jonesboro, AR MSA 33.09 3.73 1.73 30.81 20.41 14.63 
Las Cruces, NM MSA 17.40 0.33 7.84 15.94 12.36 21.30 
McAllen, TX MSA 46.24 1.83 1.19 21.43 39.82 60.77 
Pittsfield, MA MSA 15.54 1.00 . 14.98 . 12.89 
San Angelo, TX MSA 28.53 1.02 . 28.19 . 13.91 
Victoria, TX MSA 36.32 1.98 . 35.06 . 34.88 
Yuma, AZ MSA 17.90 2.66 12.19 15.74 16.86 14.10 
 Mean 24.50 1.47 4.11 21.14 18.90 24.28 
Moderate 
Allentown, PA MSA 21.87 2.63 5.80 22.64 20.82 11.95 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 37.94 0.21 23.71 17.65 51.69 41.30 
Charleston, SC MSA 50.19 0.24 21.36 59.92 48.23 47.40 
Gary, IN PMSA 81.93 55.14 29.79 59.06 60.50 51.16 
Little Rock, AR MSA 57.42 10.88 13.75 56.25 45.13 58.31 
Mobile, AL MSA 67.47 13.57 50.71 58.55 76.69 52.47 
Sarasota, FL MSA 58.08 2.88 7.16 64.15 66.13 48.27 
Toledo, OH MSA 59.46 12.12 0.78 57.13 5.84 24.07 
Tucson, AZ MSA 15.89 1.68 2.78 15.47 12.60 9.34 
Wilmington, DE PMSA 48.07 17.20 4.17 57.58 26.32 32.39 
 Mean 49.83 11.66 16.00 46.84 41.40 37.67 
Large 
Atlanta, GA MSA 61.63 6.17 27.98 77.23 51.84 58.29 
Boston, MA PMSA 54.32 15.59 4.49 67.46 21.60 17.67 
Chicago, IL PMSA 77.91 21.39 43.25 82.44 60.71 41.05 
Detroit, MI PMSA 80.08 59.69 39.23 43.83 58.08 29.98 
Houston, TX PMSA 63.23 10.87 24.59 68.78 53.01 41.64 
Los Angeles, CA PMSA 62.53 0.89 36.05 67.03 55.60 71.51 
Minneapolis, MN MSA 38.41 6.53 6.25 44.89 27.43 10.50 
New York, NY PMSA 77.20 4.83 23.44 78.34 57.48 45.83 
Philadelphia, PA PMSA 69.11 19.57 44.03 73.98 60.56 39.95 
Washington, DC PMSA 57.17 8.84 24.31 73.54 43.15 51.36 
 Mean 64.16 15.44 27.36 67.75 48.95 40.78 
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Table 27 reports the results for macro and micro place segregation where 
residential segregation measured by the Theil index.  Small MSAs continue to have their 
highest segregation scores within fringe areas or within suburban places.  As with the 
separation index, Enid, OK had a stark contrast with its total segregation score of 36.45 
and a within fringe area score of 72.15.  Both the within suburban places and within fringe 
area mean segregation scores were significantly higher than the mean total segregation 
score.  The between scores for small MSAs are very low and are mostly a fraction of the 
total segregation score. 
The within central city component begins to display high segregation scores for 
moderate MSAs although the within suburban places and within fringe area component 
consistently have larger segregation scores.  Charleston, SC, Sarasota, FL, and 
Wilmington, DE all had their strongest component scores in within central city.  The more 
stark differences appeared in Mobile, AL which has a 64.58 total segregation score and 
73.8 within suburban places segregation score.  Although not higher than the total 
segregation mean score, the within central city, within suburban places, and within fringe 
area component mean scores all have significantly sized segregation scores. 
Similar to the separation index, Large MSAs begin to display stronger 
relationships in the within central city component when measured with the Theil index.  
Atlanta, GA has a 56.63 total segregation score but a 72.62 within central city component 
score.  Boston, MA has a 57.70 total segregation score but a 62.70 within central city 
component score.  Using the Theil index, Detroit, MI has a 77.24 total segregation score 
and its highest component score is a 60.86 captured within suburban places.  Whereas 
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Detroit’s highest component score using the separation index was in the between central 
city, suburban places, and fringe component.  The within central city component had the 
highest mean score of all components in large MSAs. 
Tables 28 reports the results for macro and micro place segregation where 
residential segregation measured by the Hutchens index.  The within suburban places and 
within fringe area components had the higher segregation scores for Small MSA 
components.  Again, Enid, OK has the starkest differences with a 68.52 total segregation 
score but a 93.82 within fringe area segregation score and an 85.63 within suburban places 
segregation score.  Cheyenne, WY has a 67.30 total segregation and 73.57 within fringe 
area score.  San Angelo, TX has a 68.99 total segregation score and an 83.7 within fringe 
area score.  Both the within suburban places component and within fringe area component 
had the strongest segregation scores of all components. 
Moderate MSAs continue to display higher segregation scores in the within 
suburban places and within fringe area components.  Charleston, SC and Wilmington, DE 
shift some importance to their within central city components.  Charleston, NC has a 63.63 
total segregation score, 69.16 within central city score, 62.46 within suburban places 
score, and 62.04 within fringe area score.  Wilmington, DE has a 65.58 total segregation 
score, 67.41 within central city score, 546.69 within suburban places score, and 59.60 
within fringe area score.  The between component scores did not reach a highest level for 
any MSA although the between component was still significant in size for some moderate 
MSAs. 
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Using the Hutchens index, large MSAs had their greatest segregation mean score 
of 75.48 at the within central city component.  Still, the within suburban places component 
and within fringe area component are not far behind with a 69.72 and 72.44 segregation 
score, respectively.  Detroit, MI is the only MSA that has a sizeable segregation in every 
component.  Detroit, MI has an 84.84 total segregation score, 61.66 between central city, 
suburban places, and fringe score, 58.66 between suburban places score, 65.97 within 
central city score, 77.88 within suburban places score, and a 72.63 within fringe area score.  
The within central city mean segregation score continued to have the highest of all 
components at 75.48. 
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Table 27. Decomposed Segregation for 30 Selected Metropolitan Areas - Theil 
   Between 
Central City, 
Suburban 
Places, and 
Fringe 
Between 
Suburban 
Places 
Within 
Central 
City 
Within 
Suburban 
Places 
Within 
Fringe 
Area 
   
  Metropolitan Area 
Total 
(H) 
Small 
Cheyenne, WY MSA 30.09 3.73 8.99 30.48 10.84 31.62 
Enid, OK MSA 36.45 3.29 7.98 33.40 46.53 72.15 
Flagstaff, AZ MSA 33.93 2.47 14.64 28.33 51.53 33.90 
Jonesboro, AR MSA 42.22 9.45 16.40 35.71 50.02 44.31 
Las Cruces, NM MSA 32.07 1.05 18.89 27.76 26.49 40.18 
McAllen, TX MSA 60.35 5.45 5.58 39.49 59.69 69.18 
Pittsfield, MA MSA 34.78 5.22 . 29.60 . 38.32 
San Angelo, TX MSA 39.46 3.26 . 37.07 . 45.54 
Victoria, TX MSA 42.33 3.43 . 38.81 . 47.06 
Yuma, AZ MSA 32.56 6.64 15.67 26.12 24.62 35.53 
 Mean 38.42 4.40 12.59 32.68 38.53 45.78 
Moderate 
Allentown, PA MSA 41.05 7.80 16.02 31.43 39.67 36.56 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 46.58 0.36 35.83 21.51 57.71 51.85 
Charleston, SC MSA 46.07 0.19 18.97 54.74 44.44 43.54 
Gary, IN PMSA 80.21 46.10 34.32 59.25 64.34 64.37 
Little Rock, AR MSA 55.71 10.03 16.00 51.07 45.72 62.67 
Mobile, AL MSA 64.58 12.03 43.26 53.85 73.83 55.66 
Sarasota, FL MSA 62.90 4.83 14.33 62.97 67.94 57.00 
Toledo, OH MSA 60.25 17.94 6.01 53.88 27.22 42.33 
Tucson, AZ MSA 27.38 5.08 7.55 22.62 27.43 26.14 
Wilmington, DE PMSA 46.87 13.88 6.16 52.56 31.06 35.60 
 Mean 53.16 11.82 19.85 46.39 47.94 47.57 
Large 
Atlanta, GA MSA 56.63 4.54 23.73 72.62 47.36 53.79 
Boston, MA PMSA 57.70 20.76 9.96 62.70 32.12 36.81 
Chicago, IL PMSA 75.48 18.72 43.15 78.81 62.15 54.57 
Detroit, MI PMSA 77.24 50.38 40.66 45.64 60.86 43.61 
Houston, TX PMSA 59.57 9.26 25.80 63.91 53.65 42.37 
Los Angeles, CA PMSA 59.10 0.81 33.76 62.34 53.81 67.47 
Minneapolis, MN MSA 47.29 10.74 14.57 42.91 40.06 42.35 
New York, NY PMSA 72.50 4.44 22.32 73.42 54.98 51.30 
Philadelphia, PA PMSA 66.57 18.00 40.58 69.60 58.95 45.82 
Washington, DC PMSA 52.35 6.54 21.10 68.79 40.15 47.38 
 Mean 62.44 14.42 27.56 64.07 50.41 48.55 
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Table 28. Decomposed Segregation for 30 Selected Metropolitan Areas - Hutchens 
   
Between 
Central City, 
Suburban 
Places, and 
Fringe 
Between 
Suburban 
Places 
Within 
Central 
City 
Within 
Suburban 
Places 
Within 
Fringe 
Area 
   
  Metropolitan Area 
Total 
(R) 
Small 
Cheyenne, WY MSA 67.30 21.00 36.37 66.72 41.42 73.57 
Enid, OK MSA 68.52 21.92 42.36 64.39 85.63 93.82 
Flagstaff, AZ MSA 70.28 18.39 47.49 62.43 84.35 75.11 
Jonesboro, AR MSA 69.25 34.51 53.10 61.29 84.72 84.78 
Las Cruces, NM MSA 66.01 10.83 48.77 60.51 62.44 74.23 
McAllen, TX MSA 84.12 24.30 27.17 73.72 86.50 86.69 
Pittsfield, MA MSA 70.08 26.57 . 62.82 . 77.79 
San Angelo, TX MSA 68.99 20.45 . 65.82 . 83.77 
Victoria, TX MSA 67.38 18.30 . 63.27 . 74.54 
Yuma, AZ MSA 65.81 26.97 38.04 57.77 55.24 73.86 
 Mean 69.77 22.32 41.90 63.87 71.47 79.82 
Moderate 
Allentown, PA MSA 74.31 29.35 43.83 60.79 73.40 76.04 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 71.80 5.74 61.35 46.69 77.66 76.43 
Charleston, SC MSA 63.64 3.72 38.76 69.16 62.46 62.04 
Gary, IN PMSA 87.57 58.69 56.30 75.23 80.90 85.60 
Little Rock, AR MSA 72.24 27.83 38.60 66.75 66.46 80.04 
Mobile, AL MSA 77.36 30.36 58.02 69.20 83.19 74.64 
Sarasota, FL MSA 80.02 21.01 41.26 77.06 82.24 78.06 
Toledo, OH MSA 76.51 42.27 31.79 69.72 69.45 74.95 
Tucson, AZ MSA 59.01 24.21 28.28 51.33 62.61 63.82 
Wilmington, DE PMSA 65.58 31.42 23.98 67.41 56.69 59.60 
 Mean 72.80 27.46 42.22 65.34 71.51 73.12 
Large 
Atlanta, GA MSA 70.02 17.74 42.47 80.46 63.82 68.26 
Boston, MA PMSA 75.78 42.74 32.70 74.09 61.76 71.28 
Chicago, IL PMSA 84.18 37.76 60.48 85.18 78.14 80.17 
Detroit, MI PMSA 84.84 61.66 58.66 65.97 77.88 72.63 
Houston, TX PMSA 73.18 26.23 47.15 75.41 71.89 63.22 
Los Angeles, CA PMSA 72.75 7.85 52.35 74.02 70.12 78.15 
Minneapolis, MN MSA 72.01 32.30 40.34 61.94 69.19 84.93 
New York, NY PMSA 80.20 18.81 43.10 80.52 70.68 72.50 
Philadelphia, PA PMSA 78.44 37.34 57.77 79.28 74.41 69.27 
Washington, DC PMSA 67.18 21.31 40.60 77.89 59.34 63.95 
 Mean 75.86 30.37 47.56 75.48 69.72 72.44 
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The pattern remains consistent across each measure of segregation.  Small MSAs 
have higher degrees of segregation within suburban places and within fringe areas.  
Moderate MSAs being to shift their highest degree of segregation to the within central city 
component but still have most of their highest scores at the within suburban places and 
within fringe area components.  Large MSAs shift almost all of their highest segregation 
scores to the within central city component.  Large MSAs not only shift their highest 
segregation score to a single component, they have moderate to high degrees of 
segregation across almost all components. 
To aid in interpreting the process by which segregation coalesces at various macro 
place components, we can revert back to figure 26 thru figure 28 which were utilized in 
the visual analysis of McAllen, TX, Gary, IN, and Detroit, MI MSAs.  All measures find 
higher degrees of segregation in the within fringe area component of McAllen, TX.  This 
is likely due to the large underbounded black community in the northern part of the 
unincorporated territory.  The within central city, within suburban places, and within 
fringe area components have moderately strong segregation scores in Gary, IN.  The black 
population in Gary, IN is considerable in size to the point where the majority reside in the 
central city, Gary, as well as in suburban places such as East Chicago, Hammond, and 
Merrillville.  The black population in the Detroit, MI MSA is also considerable in size that 
non-Hispanic blacks are heavily concentrated in the central city, as well as several 
suburban cities.  Thus Detroit, MI MSA components with the higher segregation scores 
are the within suburban places component and the between central city, suburban places, 
and fringe area component.  Detroit, MI differs from Gary, IN in that the central city for 
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Gary, IN is spatially large enough to have a high concentration of the black population as 
well as a small portion of the white population even though the two groups have a spatial 
buffer in between them.  Detroit, MI MSA central city is almost entirely black including 
several of the suburban cities such as Grosse Pointe Park which would explain the higher 
segregation score in the between component. 
Discussion 
The preceding analyses investigate the empirical relationship between residential 
segregation and political fragmentation by decomposing segregation to examine whether 
segregation in cities aligns with fragmentation.  Utilizing a simple method of 
decomposition, I analyzed segregation between and within nested and non-nested Census 
units.  If the analyses had found that segregation crystallizes along fragment boundaries, 
I may have greater confidence in concluding that fragmentation matters.  I then 
implemented the spatial level contribution scores in a decomposition regression.  Finally, 
I decomposed segregation into macro and micro place components. 
There are several findings in the decomposition analyses.  First, scale choice 
matters.  Although the most common unit used in segregation research are census tracts, 
researchers are better served using census blocks when possible.  Blocks capture similar 
amounts of segregation for moderate and large MSAs as census tracts.  Blocks capture 
segregation better than tracts for small MSAs since tracts were likelier to mask the true 
distribution of population groups.   
Second, segregation coalesces around place boundaries and this crystallization 
becomes more apparent as the size of the MSA increases.  Upon further review, place 
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boundaries are less influential for small MSAs because of less population density.  Thus 
a greater spatial area buffer exist between blacks and whites regardless if they live in the 
same place boundary or not.  Segregation coalescing around place boundaries becomes 
more apparent in moderate and large MSAs.  For moderate and large MSAs, high 
concentrations of black residents mostly follow place boundaries. 
Finally, the macro decomposition analysis finds that segregation matters within 
suburban places and within fringe areas in small MSAs.  This is due to smaller MSAs 
having suburban places and fringe areas where blacks and whites reside together but 
spatially far apart.  As the size of the MSA population increases, segregation becomes 
more apparent within the central city and, in some cases, the between central city, 
suburban places, and fringe area component.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
ANALYSIS COMPARING SEGREGATION FROM OBSERVED AND 
ARBITRARY FRAGMENTS 
 
This chapter examines the empirical relationship between residential segregation 
and political fragmentation across the U.S. by calculating measures of segregation for each 
city using arbitrarily drawn boundaries and then examining their covariation with 
observed boundaries.  The preceding analyses attempt to measure the relationship between 
political fragmentation and residential segregation but cannot attest to how the relationship 
stands up to arbitrarily drawn boundaries.  Here I address my hypothesis that segregation 
coalesces more around observed boundaries than arbitrarily drawn boundaries.  Observed 
boundaries have greater sociological meaning than arbitrarily drawn boundaries since they 
are affected by social and political forces.  Thus I argue that arbitrarily drawn boundaries 
will not capture segregation equally as well as geographic boundaries shaped by social 
and political processes.  The following sections will briefly review the data, methods, and 
measures which are also used in previous chapter analyses. 
Arbitrary Fragment Data, Methods, and Measures 
I begin by using Census 2000 block level data for the entire U.S.  Using STATA, 
I then randomly assign each block unit population to a new location within the MSA.  With 
each census block now having a randomly assigned population, I recalculate dissimilarity, 
separation, Theil, and Hutchens segregation scores at each nested spatial unit and examine 
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their covariation with segregation scores calculated with their observed spatial unit 
counterpart. 
Initially this dissertation study had proposed developing arbitrarily drawn place 
boundaries using GIS tools.  During pre-analyses I attempted to develop arbitrarily drawn 
place boundaries using Voronoi Diagrams which would draw new place boundaries based 
on randomly dropped points.  Empirically, metropolitan areas have large central cities 
with smaller cities on the periphery.  The arbitrary polygons created with the Voronoi 
diagram were smaller and spatially clustered in the center and larger in the periphery.  The 
arbitrary polygons created with the Voronoi diagram would have created spurious findings 
since spatially smaller fragments will capture greater degrees of segregation also known 
as scale effect.  An arbitrarily drawn fragment in GIS would have produced contiguous 
blocks but randomly aggregating block populations in STATA achieves the same result 
since the measures of segregation are aspatial and block contiguity is irrelevant.  
Arbitrary Fragment Analyses 
First, I begin by examining summary statistics for segregation scores calculated 
for observed and arbitrary fragments.  I then measure how different arbitrary segregation 
scores are from their observed counterparts.  I conclude with a review of correlation 
statistics between observed and arbitrary segregation scores.  Table 29 reports the 
summary statistics by measure of segregation and then by spatial unit.  For all measures 
of segregation, the mean scores for arbitrary block groups, tracts, and places are lower 
than the segregation scores for their observed counterparts.  
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Table 29. Summary Statistics - Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Scores 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dissimilarity 
Block 311 0.7070 0.0801 0.4139 0.8968 
Arbitrary Block Group 311 0.2785 0.0712 0.1404 0.6948 
Observed Block Group 311 0.5782 0.1192 0.3051 0.8699 
Arbitrary Tract 311 0.1870 0.0676 0.0872 0.6746 
Observed Tract 311 0.5388 0.1296 0.2436 0.8552 
Arbitrary Place 311 0.0580 0.0530 0.0000 0.4201 
Observed Place 311 0.3664 0.1586 0.0000 0.8366 
Separation 
Block 311 0.3940 0.1926 0.0404 0.8193 
Arbitrary Block Group 311 0.0583 0.0424 0.0025 0.2996 
Observed Block Group 311 0.2952 0.1893 0.0043 0.7794 
Arbitrary Tract 311 0.0267 0.0244 0.0010 0.2193 
Observed Tract 311 0.2593 0.1832 0.0021 0.7604 
Arbitrary Place 311 0.0042 0.0069 0.0000 0.0554 
Observed Place 311 0.0932 0.1039 0.0000 0.6904 
Theil 
Block 311 0.4621 0.1267 0.1967 0.8021 
Arbitrary Block Group 311 0.0792 0.0449 0.0220 0.3948 
Observed Block Group 311 0.3254 0.1486 0.0542 0.7427 
Arbitrary Tract 311 0.0380 0.0330 0.0097 0.3034 
Observed Tract 311 0.2852 0.1481 0.0354 0.7145 
Arbitrary Place 311 0.0074 0.0150 0.0000 0.1326 
Observed Place 311 0.1190 0.0960 0.0000 0.6203 
Hutchens 
Block 311 0.7040 0.0711 0.4503 0.8757 
Arbitrary Block Group 311 0.2712 0.0685 0.1315 0.6197 
Observed Block Group 311 0.5386 0.1063 0.2995 0.8065 
Arbitrary Tract 311 0.1810 0.0615 0.0863 0.5577 
Observed Tract 311 0.4947 0.1161 0.2318 0.7857 
Arbitrary Place 311 0.0701 0.0503 0.0000 0.3820 
Observed Place 311 0.3156 0.1199 0.0000 0.7059 
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Table 30 reports the summary statistics for the measure of segregation calculated 
differences between arbitrary and observed at each spatial unit level.  The dissimilarity 
index calculated at the block group level is on average .2997 points lower for arbitrary 
units than observed units.  The dissimilarity index calculated at the tract level is on average 
.3518 points lower for arbitrary units than observed units.  The dissimilarity index 
calculated at the place level is on average .3084 points lower for arbitrary units than 
observed units.   
The Separation index calculated at the block group level is on average .2369 points 
lower for arbitrary units than observed units.  The Separation index calculated at the tract 
level is on average .2329 points lower for arbitrary units than observed units.  The 
Separation index calculated at the place level is on average .0889 points lower for arbitrary 
units than observed units. 
The Theil index calculated at the block group level is on average .2462 points 
lower for arbitrary units than observed units.  The Theil index calculated at the tract level 
is on average .2472 points lower for arbitrary units than observed units.  The Theil index 
calculated at the place level is on average .1116 points lower for arbitrary units than 
observed units. 
The Hutchens index calculated at the block group level is on average .2674 points 
lower for arbitrary units than observed units.  The Hutchens index calculated at the tract 
level is on average .3136 points lower for arbitrary units than observed units.  The 
Hutchens index calculated at the place level is on average .2455 points lower for arbitrary 
units than observed units.
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Table 30. Summary Statistics - Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Score Differences 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dissimilarity 
Difference 
Block Group 311 0.2997 0.1092 0.0201 0.5907 
Tract 311 0.3518 0.1284 0.0186 0.6870 
Place 311 0.3084 0.1675 -0.1783 0.8033 
Separation 
Difference 
Block Group 311 0.2369 0.1642 -0.0049 0.6930 
Tract 311 0.2326 0.1734 -0.0397 0.7248 
Place 311 0.0889 0.1038 -0.0511 0.6877 
Theil 
Difference 
Block Group 311 0.2462 0.1363 0.0109 0.6601 
Tract 311 0.2472 0.1449 0.0107 0.6830 
Place 311 0.1116 0.0980 -0.0860 0.6179 
Hutchens 
Difference 
Block Group 311 0.2674 0.1021 0.0216 0.5477 
Tract 311 0.3137 0.1172 0.0375 0.6279 
Place 311 0.2455 0.1239 -0.1462 0.6625 
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Review of the correlations reported in Tables 31 thru 34 shows that some of the 
relationships significantly differ from zero (i.e., |r| > 0.12).  Highlighted cells in the tables 
are relationships I am most concerned with which is that between arbitrary and observed 
units of similar spatial unit size.  In all measures of segregation, the block group and tract 
spatial unit relationship between arbitrary and observed units is positive and statistically 
significant.  The relationship is negative between arbitrary and observed place units 
although statistically insignificant for Dissimilarity and Theil measures of segregation.  
The relationship is positive between arbitrary and observed place units for Separation and 
Hutchens measures of segregation although only statistically significant with the 
Huthchens index. 
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Table 31. Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Correlation - Dissimilarity 
  Observed Arbitrary 
    Block Block Group Tract Place Block Group Tract Place 
Observed 
Block 1.0000       
Block Group 0.7767 1.0000      
Tract 0.7341 0.9892 1.0000     
Place 0.6431 0.7819 0.7931 1.0000    
Arbitrary 
Block Group 0.5629 0.4340 0.4167 0.2999 1.0000   
Tract 0.4053 0.2853 0.2794 0.1310 0.9342 1.0000  
Place 0.3017 0.0761 0.0561 -0.0062 0.6902 0.7755 1.0000 
N = 311; Correlations with absolute values above 0.12 are statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
Table 32. Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Correlation - Theil 
  Observed Arbitrary 
    Block Block Group Tract Place Block Group Tract Place 
Observed 
Block 1.0000       
Block Group 0.9532 1.0000      
Tract 0.9243 0.9920 1.0000     
Place 0.7012 0.7733 0.7964 1.0000    
Arbitrary 
Block Group 0.4119 0.4133 0.3869 0.1919 1.0000   
Tract 0.2494 0.2306 0.2065 0.0155 0.9433 1.0000  
Place 0.1110 0.0433 0.0138 -0.0564 0.6845 0.7562 1.0000 
N = 311; Correlations with absolute values above 0.12 are statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
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Table 33. Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Correlation - Separation 
  Observed Arbitrary 
    Block Block Group Tract Place Block Group Tract Place 
Observed 
Block 1.0000       
Block Group 0.9733 1.0000      
Tract 0.9470 0.9921 1.0000     
Place 0.7350 0.7944 0.8157 1.0000    
Arbitrary 
Block Group 0.6552 0.6650 0.6389 0.4206 1.0000   
Tract 0.4794 0.4777 0.4564 0.2465 0.9142 1.0000  
Place 0.1598 0.1198 0.0878 0.0488 0.4979 0.5647 1.0000 
N = 311; Correlations with absolute values above 0.12 are statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
Table 34. Observed and Arbitrary Segregation Correlation - Hutchens 
  Observed Arbitrary 
    Block Block Group Tract Place Block Group Tract Place 
Observed 
Block 1.0000       
Block Group 0.7721 1.0000      
Tract 0.7047 0.9879 1.0000     
Place 0.6234 0.7675 0.7746 1.0000    
Arbitrary 
Block Group 0.5586 0.3822 0.3266 0.2525 1.0000   
Tract 0.4247 0.2834 0.2437 0.1152 0.9362 1.0000  
Place 0.4034 0.1958 0.1464 0.1288 0.7287 0.8035 1.0000 
N = 311; Correlations with absolute values above 0.12 are statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
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Discussion 
In this chapter, I investigated whether segregation coalesces more around observed 
boundaries than arbitrarily drawn boundaries.  Randomly assigning non-Hispanic white 
and non-Hispanic black populations to census blocks, I calculate segregation and 
compared the results to observed boundaries.  The results show that observed boundaries 
do have higher segregation scores than arbitrarily aggregated boundaries.  In the 
correlation analysis, arbitrarily aggregated places had statistically significant and positive 
relationships when residential segregation is measured by the Hutchens index.  Thus, it 
seems that observed boundaries do have greater sociological meaning than arbitrarily 
aggregated boundaries. 
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CHAPTER IV  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation study examined the effect political fragments have on the 
residential segregation of minority groups within the U.S.  I began with the hypothesis 
that political boundaries have greater sociological impact because of their ability to restrict 
population movement.  Since scale is an important issue in segregation studies, i.e. more 
fragmentation in an MSA means greater amounts of segregation captured at the place 
boundary, I aimed to rule out any chance of spuriousness by incorporating alternative 
measures and alternative analyses, each one designed to test the extent to which two 
groups are segregated as a result of MSA fragmentation. 
Summary 
First, examining the covariation between residential segregation and political 
fragmentation I find that in most cases fragmentation measures are positively related with 
residential segregation and statistically significant.  On further examination in the 
regression analysis, I find that fragmentation mostly has a weak, but positive and 
statistically significant, relationship with residential segregation although the relationship 
was not definitive enough to conclude that segregation coalesced around place boundaries. 
Before moving to the subsequent analyses, I reviewed two approaches to 
decomposing segregation, the formal calculation and the simple calculation.  I show that 
when all one wants to know is the between and within component segregation scores there 
is a much more efficient method to obtain them, the simple calculation method.  
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Decomposing segregation at the block, block group, tract, and place level I find that scale 
choice matters and that census blocks, when available, should be used to measure 
segregation in the U.S.  This is due to Census tracts potentially masking true population 
distributions in an area, especially small MSAs. 
Analyzing each unit’s contribution to the total segregation score, I find that 
segregation coalesces around places boundaries for moderate to large MSAs.  For small 
MSAs, due to larger spatial buffers between population groups, I find that blacks and 
whites reside in smaller pockets which are captured better using census blocks and 
minimally captured using place boundaries.   
I implement the contribution scores in a decomposition regression analyses and 
find that the relationship between political fragmentation and residential segregation is 
indeed there and that place boundaries matter most in cities with large populations.  I 
follow this up with a macro-micro place decomposition analysis which finds that 
segregation becomes more apparent within central cities and, sometimes, between central 
city, suburban places, and fringe areas in moderate to large MSAs.  I conclude with an 
analysis comparing segregation captured for observed and arbitrary boundaries and find 
that segregation coalesces more around observed boundaries than arbitrarily drawn 
boundaries.   
Conclusion 
This dissertation analysis finds that a relationship exists between political 
fragmentation and residential segregation.  The relationship varies with the size of the 
metropolitan area being studied but its impact is greatest at the largest and most 
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meaningful cities in the U.S.  Ultimately, place boundaries in the U.S. do have an impact 
on the movement of non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black population groups. 
The number of alternative analyses incorporated in this dissertation study 
addresses limitations in previous research that examines the relationship between political 
fragmentation and residential segregation.  Previous research has found relationships 
between political fragmentation and residential segregation but has failed conclude 
whether the relationships were spurious or not due to the nature of more fragmentation 
automatically capturing greater degrees of segregation.  I address these limitations by 
determining at which levels segregation occurs most and testing whether empirical results 
perform better than arbitrarily drawn places. 
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Table 35. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA Population - Separation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities per 1m Population -0.074 0.139 -0.088 -0.094 -0.139 -0.067 0.177 0.029 
 (0.103) (0.086) (0.102) (0.103) (0.106) (0.103) (0.109) (0.102) 
% White  -0.051***       
  (0.004)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.024*      
   (0.011)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.028***     
    (0.007)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.008*    
     (0.003)    
Suburbanization      0.001   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.353***  
       (0.040)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.524*** 
        (0.144) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.301* 
        (0.135) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.127 
        (0.170) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.289 
        (0.152) 
Constant -0.394*** 3.916*** -0.582*** -0.348*** 0.038 -0.438*** -5.005*** -0.595*** 
 (0.073) (0.344) (0.112) (0.076) (0.198) (0.117) (0.543) (0.133) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 35. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities per 1m Population 0.087 0.184* 0.157* 0.246** 0.139 0.071 0.127 0.127 
 (0.111) (0.077) (0.080) (0.077) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) 
% White  -0.054*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.055***  0.051*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
 (0.013)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.013 -0.051***  -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.007 -0.009** -0.016***  -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suburbanization -0.004 -0.003 -0.005** -0.005**  0.000 -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.387*** 0.253*** 0.351*** 0.246*** 0.255***  0.283*** 0.319*** 
 (0.061) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040)  (0.030) (0.044) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.027 -0.233 -0.223 0.079 -0.047 0.410***  -0.203 
 (0.200) (0.144) (0.144) (0.132) (0.129) (0.112)  (0.137) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.045 -0.181 -0.124 -0.023 0.019 0.246*  -0.111 
 (0.156) (0.118) (0.116) (0.107) (0.102) (0.101)  (0.109) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.042 -0.132 -0.076 -0.061 0.058 0.167  -0.038 
 (0.181) (0.132) (0.134) (0.123) (0.120) (0.117)  (0.122) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.169 -0.261* -0.161 -0.254* -0.075 -0.104  -0.122 
 (0.158) (0.121) (0.116) (0.108) (0.108) (0.113)  (0.109) 
Constant -5.271*** 1.805** 0.113 0.746 1.394* 4.445*** 1.122 0.855 
 (0.718) (0.661) (0.662) (0.677) (0.634) (0.424) (0.592) (0.638) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 36. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 Million MSA Population - Separation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities 2500+ per 1m 
Population 0.328 1.359*** 0.228 0.187 0.128 0.308 0.628 0.562 
 (0.372) (0.289) (0.380) (0.377) (0.390) (0.375) (0.360) (0.389) 
% White  -0.053***       
  (0.004)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.022*      
   (0.011)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.026***     
    (0.007)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.006*    
     (0.003)    
Suburbanization      0.001   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.338***  
       (0.039)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.550*** 
        (0.145) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.337* 
        (0.139) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.177 
        (0.173) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.264 
        (0.155) 
Constant -0.498*** 3.874*** -0.665*** -0.436*** -0.122 -0.535*** -4.855*** -0.724*** 
 (0.090) (0.338) (0.115) (0.095) (0.212) (0.116) (0.516) (0.158) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 36. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities 2500+ per 1m 
Population 0.273 1.088*** 0.973** 1.214*** 0.660* 0.821** 0.752* 0.753* 
 (0.421) (0.284) (0.312) (0.285) (0.311) (0.316) (0.299) (0.305) 
% White  -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.054***  0.048*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 
 (0.014)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.013 -0.048***  -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.056*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.007 -0.008** -0.015***  -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suburbanization -0.004* -0.004* -0.006*** -0.006***  -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.380*** 0.237*** 0.332*** 0.230*** 0.233***  0.277*** 0.305*** 
 (0.061) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040)  (0.029) (0.044) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.023 -0.186 -0.179 0.094 -0.008 0.438***  -0.172 
 (0.205) (0.143) (0.147) (0.133) (0.135) (0.112)  (0.140) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.052 -0.136 -0.084 0.009 0.056 0.274**  -0.083 
 (0.161) (0.116) (0.118) (0.110) (0.107) (0.102)  (0.112) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.044 -0.091 -0.039 -0.026 0.085 0.201  -0.014 
 (0.185) (0.133) (0.134) (0.124) (0.124) (0.118)  (0.125) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.165 -0.245* -0.151 -0.232* -0.065 -0.099  -0.117 
 (0.159) (0.119) (0.115) (0.108) (0.108) (0.113)  (0.108) 
Constant -5.184*** 1.871** 0.248 0.950 1.583* 4.304*** 1.148* 0.941 
 (0.690) (0.641) (0.646) (0.659) (0.629) (0.421) (0.581) (0.627) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 37. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 Million MSA Population - Separation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1m 
Population -0.249 0.764 -0.352 -0.338 -0.331 -0.352 0.710 1.445 
 (1.050) (0.782) (1.066) (1.043) (1.015) (1.075) (0.958) (1.011) 
% White  -0.050***       
  (0.004)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.023*      
   (0.011)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.026***     
    (0.007)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.007*    
     (0.003)    
Suburbanization      0.001   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.335***  
       (0.039)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.569*** 
        (0.148) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.359* 
        (0.142) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.196 
        (0.173) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.277 
        (0.154) 
Constant -0.404*** 3.858*** -0.587*** -0.361*** -0.041 -0.441*** -4.750*** -0.762*** 
 (0.109) (0.341) (0.129) (0.109) (0.188) (0.128) (0.536) (0.169) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 37. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities 10000+ per 1m 
Population 1.385 1.331 1.587* 2.034** 1.086 1.507* 1.336* 1.383* 
 (0.948) (0.686) (0.676) (0.668) (0.661) (0.669) (0.624) (0.648) 
% White  -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.056***  0.053*** 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 (0.013)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.012 -0.051***  -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.007* -0.010*** -0.017***  -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suburbanization -0.005* -0.003* -0.006*** -0.006***  -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.379*** 0.235*** 0.336*** 0.221*** 0.235***  0.281*** 0.307*** 
 (0.060) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043) (0.040)  (0.029) (0.043) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier 0.013 -0.216 -0.186 0.130 -0.010 0.444***  -0.170 
 (0.206) (0.148) (0.147) (0.136) (0.133) (0.112)  (0.139) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.092 -0.154 -0.078 0.033 0.062 0.290**  -0.071 
 (0.162) (0.121) (0.120) (0.113) (0.107) (0.103)  (0.113) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.086 -0.126 -0.042 -0.041 0.080 0.204  -0.013 
 (0.187) (0.136) (0.138) (0.129) (0.126) (0.120)  (0.126) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.166 -0.265* -0.160 -0.258* -0.069 -0.104  -0.122 
 (0.160) (0.120) (0.116) (0.109) (0.109) (0.113)  (0.109) 
Constant -5.263*** 2.023** 0.229 0.960 1.589* 4.303*** 1.124 0.927 
 (0.682) (0.644) (0.649) (0.662) (0.631) (0.423) (0.587) (0.627) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 38. Residential Segregation and Total Population Share Residing Outside Largest City - Separation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MSA Population Share Residing Outside Largest 
City 0.765** 1.082*** 0.685** 0.708** 0.738** 1.260*** 0.274 0.647** 
 (0.236) (0.186) (0.243) (0.238) (0.232) (0.353) (0.225) (0.240) 
% White  -0.051***       
  (0.004)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.018      
   (0.010)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.022**     
    (0.007)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.006*    
     (0.003)    
Suburbanization      -0.007*   
      (0.003)   
Total Population (log)       0.316***  
       (0.041)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.548*** 
        (0.142) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.378** 
        (0.138) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.223 
        (0.166) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.195 
        (0.156) 
Constant -0.938*** 3.326*** -1.037*** -0.873*** -0.602* -1.012*** -4.620*** -1.070*** 
 (0.166) (0.340) (0.169) (0.171) (0.234) (0.176) (0.505) (0.215) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
208 
 
Table 38. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.381 1.570*** 1.452*** 1.533*** 0.378* 1.440*** 1.251*** 1.264*** 
 (0.323) (0.289) (0.309) (0.283) (0.186) (0.291) (0.270) (0.280) 
% White  -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.053***  0.044*** 0.034*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 (0.014)  (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.011 -0.044***  -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.007 -0.008** -0.014***  -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suburbanization -0.007* -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014***  -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.373*** 0.208*** 0.295*** 0.198*** 0.203***  0.229*** 0.274*** 
 (0.061) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044)  (0.029) (0.041) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.037 -0.241 -0.225 0.023 0.005 0.331**  -0.208 
 (0.198) (0.129) (0.129) (0.124) (0.133) (0.105)  (0.124) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.050 -0.139 -0.088 -0.010 0.079 0.236*  -0.081 
 (0.156) (0.109) (0.110) (0.105) (0.109) (0.095)  (0.104) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.048 -0.072 -0.020 -0.024 0.096 0.200  0.005 
 (0.181) (0.128) (0.132) (0.123) (0.123) (0.118)  (0.122) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.150 -0.166 -0.085 -0.164 -0.032 -0.036  -0.062 
 (0.160) (0.115) (0.114) (0.107) (0.111) (0.110)  (0.107) 
Constant -5.204*** 1.928** 0.452 1.120 1.916** 4.046*** 1.431* 1.059 
 (0.686) (0.612) (0.609) (0.624) (0.638) (0.403) (0.560) (0.599) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 39. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration of Fragmentation - Separation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gini Place Concentration Score 1.608** 2.105*** 1.752** 1.469* 1.416* 1.592* -0.620 0.172 
 (0.621) (0.613) (0.627) (0.613) (0.611) (0.626) (0.607) (0.583) 
% White  -0.051***       
  (0.004)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.026*      
   (0.011)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.023**     
    (0.007)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.005    
     (0.003)    
Suburbanization      0.001   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.356***  
       (0.045)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.505*** 
        (0.146) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.289* 
        (0.134) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.119 
        (0.166) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.288 
        (0.152) 
Constant -0.293*** 4.158*** -0.495*** -0.275*** -0.041 -0.321** -5.002*** -0.558*** 
 (0.068) (0.319) (0.111) (0.068) (0.166) (0.115) (0.603) (0.125) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 39. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Gini Place Concentration Score -1.275* 0.162 -0.137 0.219 -0.151 0.812 -0.148 -0.157 
 (0.609) (0.559) (0.525) (0.508) (0.477) (0.510) (0.481) (0.483) 
% White  -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.057***  0.053*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 (0.013)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.015* -0.052***  -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.059*** -0.054*** -0.053*** 
 (0.007) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.009** -0.011*** -0.018***  -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suburbanization -0.004* -0.003 -0.005** -0.005**  -0.001 -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.431*** 0.232*** 0.347*** 0.209*** 0.249***  0.273*** 0.317*** 
 (0.063) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.045)  (0.036) (0.048) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.048 -0.272 -0.255 0.069 -0.070 0.322**  -0.229 
 (0.198) (0.146) (0.145) (0.135) (0.130) (0.115)  (0.137) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.044 -0.208 -0.142 -0.044 0.008 0.188  -0.125 
 (0.156) (0.120) (0.118) (0.112) (0.103) (0.102)  (0.111) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.000 -0.170 -0.111 -0.113 0.030 0.139  -0.067 
 (0.175) (0.133) (0.134) (0.124) (0.122) (0.119)  (0.122) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.179 -0.262* -0.161 -0.267* -0.073 -0.099  -0.122 
 (0.158) (0.122) (0.117) (0.109) (0.109) (0.113)  (0.110) 
Constant -5.789*** 2.280** 0.306 1.364 1.573* 4.683*** 1.317* 0.990 
 (0.734) (0.742) (0.730) (0.749) (0.703) (0.433) (0.672) (0.704) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 40. Residential Segregation and the Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA Attending Different School Districts - Separation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Likelihood of Two Students in MSA Attending 
Different Districts -0.661 -1.746** -0.756 -0.638 -0.509 -0.654 1.121 0.438 
 (0.645) (0.542) (0.634) (0.643) (0.640) (0.645) (0.692) (0.676) 
% White  -0.051***       
  (0.004)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.024*      
   (0.010)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.027***     
    (0.007)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.006*    
     (0.003)    
Suburbanization      0.001   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.362***  
       (0.043)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.547*** 
        (0.150) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.309* 
        (0.133) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.125 
        (0.165) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.287 
        (0.151) 
Constant -0.380*** 4.178*** -0.571*** -0.348*** -0.061 -0.426*** -5.110*** -0.622*** 
 (0.065) (0.338) (0.114) (0.066) (0.167) (0.109) (0.577) (0.127) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 40. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Likelihood of Two Students in MSA 
Attending Different Districts 1.457* -0.678 -0.144 -0.531 -0.501 -1.151* -0.348 -0.419 
 (0.682) (0.565) (0.550) (0.534) (0.528) (0.524) (0.527) (0.532) 
% White  -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.057***  0.052*** 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
 (0.014)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.013 -0.054***  -0.060*** -0.055*** -0.061*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
 (0.007) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.009* -0.011*** -0.018***  -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suburbanization -0.005* -0.003 -0.005** -0.005**  -0.000 -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.423*** 0.218*** 0.337*** 0.201*** 0.229***  0.255*** 0.297*** 
 (0.063) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043)  (0.033) (0.048) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.027 -0.284 -0.257 0.059 -0.083 0.295*  -0.236 
 (0.199) (0.147) (0.145) (0.135) (0.130) (0.115)  (0.138) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.031 -0.207 -0.143 -0.043 0.003 0.189  -0.127 
 (0.152) (0.120) (0.119) (0.113) (0.104) (0.102)  (0.111) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.020 -0.173 -0.109 -0.118 0.030 0.124  -0.064 
 (0.174) (0.133) (0.134) (0.127) (0.122) (0.119)  (0.124) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.157 -0.269* -0.161 -0.274* -0.078 -0.117  -0.125 
 (0.155) (0.121) (0.116) (0.110) (0.109) (0.115)  (0.110) 
Constant -5.712*** 2.567*** 0.478 1.540* 1.956** 4.811*** 1.632* 1.343 
 (0.735) (0.731) (0.755) (0.773) (0.711) (0.440) (0.674) (0.725) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 41. Residential Segregation and Total Number of School Districts per 1 Million MSA Students Enrolled - Separation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of School Districts per 1m MSA 
Students Enrolled 0.051** 0.068*** 0.050** 0.046** 0.045* 0.055*** 0.049** 0.028 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
% White  -0.051***       
  (0.004)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.022*      
   (0.010)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.020**     
    (0.008)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.003    
     (0.003)    
Suburbanization      0.003   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.328***  
       (0.038)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.486*** 
        (0.142) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.290* 
        (0.134) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.122 
        (0.164) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.265 
        (0.152) 
Constant -1.139*** 3.093*** -1.309*** -1.044*** -0.892* -1.289*** -5.268*** -0.958*** 
 (0.230) (0.368) (0.242) (0.240) (0.366) (0.253) (0.513) (0.259) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 41. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of School Districts per 1m MSA 
Enrolled 0.019 0.033* 0.024 0.037** 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
% White  -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.053***  0.049*** 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
 (0.014)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.012 -0.049***  -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.006 -0.009** -0.016***  -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suburbanization -0.004 -0.003 -0.005** -0.005**  0.000 -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.379*** 0.243*** 0.338*** 0.230*** 0.245***  0.265*** 0.309*** 
 (0.061) (0.048) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040)  (0.029) (0.044) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.051 -0.280 -0.263 0.006 -0.083 0.381***  -0.233 
 (0.200) (0.149) (0.147) (0.139) (0.130) (0.109)  (0.139) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.033 -0.204 -0.146 -0.060 -0.002 0.229*  -0.128 
 (0.157) (0.120) (0.119) (0.111) (0.103) (0.100)  (0.111) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.016 -0.181 -0.119 -0.126 0.020 0.142  -0.071 
 (0.179) (0.132) (0.133) (0.125) (0.122) (0.116)  (0.124) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.165 -0.251* -0.158 -0.244* -0.074 -0.103  -0.120 
 (0.158) (0.119) (0.115) (0.107) (0.108) (0.113)  (0.109) 
Constant -5.403*** 1.504* 0.020 0.579 1.371* 4.283*** 1.222 0.886 
 (0.702) (0.756) (0.702) (0.688) (0.677) (0.513) (0.627) (0.687) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 42. Residential Segregation and Share of Population Residing Outside Largest School District - Separation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Share of Population Residing 
Outside Largest District 0.277 0.679*** 0.417* 0.207 0.141 0.267 -0.304 -0.217 
 (0.184) (0.158) (0.194) (0.186) (0.199) (0.188) (0.181) (0.199) 
% White  -0.052***       
  (0.004)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.029*      
   (0.012)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.024**     
    (0.007)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.006    
     (0.003)    
Suburbanization      0.001   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.361***  
       (0.042)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.554*** 
        (0.149) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.303* 
        (0.133) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.097 
        (0.163) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.317* 
        (0.149) 
Constant -0.579*** 3.757*** -0.894*** -0.511*** -0.209 -0.594*** -4.855*** -0.462** 
 (0.111) (0.327) (0.174) (0.116) (0.239) (0.127) (0.517) (0.143) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 42. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Share of Population Residing 
Outside Largest District -0.447* -0.082 0.131 0.373* -0.049 0.288 0.080 0.076 
 (0.211) (0.189) (0.186) (0.165) (0.162) (0.166) (0.170) (0.174) 
% White  -0.054*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.053***  0.053*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 (0.013)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.017* -0.053***  -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
 (0.008) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011** -0.011*** -0.017***  -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suburbanization -0.003 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.007***  -0.001 -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.411*** 0.245*** 0.331*** 0.204*** 0.249***  0.260*** 0.304*** 
 (0.061) (0.053) (0.051) (0.044) (0.046)  (0.034) (0.048) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.054 -0.273 -0.251 0.034 -0.075 0.349**  -0.227 
 (0.200) (0.148) (0.143) (0.132) (0.132) (0.114)  (0.136) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.023 -0.208 -0.140 -0.048 0.002 0.213*  -0.125 
 (0.156) (0.121) (0.117) (0.109) (0.104) (0.102)  (0.110) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.014 -0.180 -0.097 -0.081 0.026 0.158  -0.058 
 (0.180) (0.134) (0.134) (0.125) (0.123) (0.118)  (0.124) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.194 -0.268* -0.151 -0.225* -0.077 -0.085  -0.115 
 (0.158) (0.122) (0.117) (0.110) (0.110) (0.114)  (0.111) 
Constant -5.093*** 2.134** 0.456 1.336 1.636* 4.409*** 1.455* 1.124 
 (0.681) (0.681) (0.683) (0.693) (0.651) (0.426) (0.611) (0.656) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 43. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA Population - Dissimilarity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities per 1m Population 0.256*** 0.259*** 0.252*** 0.219*** 0.163** 0.251*** 0.349*** 0.294*** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.050) (0.051) (0.057) (0.054) (0.053) 
% White  -0.001       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.006      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.046***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.010***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.134***  
       (0.021)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.305*** 
        (0.062) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.099 
        (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.041 
        (0.079) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.099 
Constant 0.755*** 0.822*** 0.709*** 0.839*** 1.362*** 0.785*** -0.981*** 0.676*** 
 (0.034) (0.172) (0.047) (0.032) (0.083) (0.059) (0.277) (0.059) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 43. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities per 1m Population 0.181*** 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.274*** 0.188*** 0.163*** 0.192*** 0.181*** 
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) 
% White  -0.004** -0.000 -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.030***  0.028*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.039*** -0.040***  -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.013***  -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002  0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.136*** 0.093*** 0.159*** 0.077** 0.109***  0.113*** 0.131*** 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022)  (0.017) (0.025) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.020 -0.044 -0.048 0.183* 0.021 0.220***  -0.035 
 (0.070) (0.081) (0.078) (0.071) (0.062) (0.052)  (0.070) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.025 -0.073 -0.049 0.035 0.008 0.112*  -0.039 
 (0.060) (0.068) (0.067) (0.062) (0.051) (0.052)  (0.059) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.033 -0.087 -0.069 -0.049 -0.003 0.049  -0.040 
 (0.067) (0.072) (0.081) (0.067) (0.061) (0.060)  (0.066) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.039 -0.032 0.010 -0.046 0.063 0.056  0.044 
Constant -0.462 0.549 -0.652 -0.095 0.172 1.452*** 0.123 -0.009 
 (0.275) (0.330) (0.361) (0.361) (0.310) (0.182) (0.288) (0.319) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 44. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2,500+ per 1 Million MSA Population - Dissimilarity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities 2500+ per 1m 
Population 1.386*** 1.420*** 1.371*** 1.115*** 1.099*** 1.426*** 1.476*** 1.476*** 
 (0.179) (0.179) (0.182) (0.155) (0.165) (0.179) (0.173) (0.174) 
% White  -0.002       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.004      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.042***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.010***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.002*   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.108***  
       (0.020)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.324*** 
        (0.063) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.154* 
        (0.062) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.021 
        (0.075) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.055 
        (0.066) 
Constant 0.601*** 0.765*** 0.574*** 0.716*** 1.176*** 0.678*** -0.779** 0.485*** 
 (0.043) (0.164) (0.052) (0.037) (0.087) (0.056) (0.257) (0.068) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 44. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities 2500+ per 1m 
Population 0.874*** 1.082*** 1.133*** 1.250*** 0.873*** 0.944*** 0.940*** 0.911*** 
 (0.149) (0.150) (0.172) (0.150) (0.149) (0.152) (0.148) (0.149) 
% White  -0.005*** -0.001 -0.003* -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.028***  0.025*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.036*** -0.037***  -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.011***  -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002** -0.002 -0.003** -0.003**  -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.120*** 0.076** 0.137*** 0.057* 0.081***  0.104*** 0.113*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.022)  (0.016) (0.023) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier 0.012 -0.005 -0.003 0.205** 0.076 0.227***  -0.002 
 (0.067) (0.076) (0.074) (0.068) (0.061) (0.049)  (0.067) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.008 -0.032 -0.005 0.072 0.060 0.131**  -0.005 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062) (0.052) (0.051)  (0.058) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.008 -0.052 -0.032 -0.015 0.038 0.071  -0.014 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.076) (0.064) (0.059) (0.058)  (0.063) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.046 -0.016 0.021 -0.027 0.081 0.063  0.052 
 (0.053) (0.063) (0.062) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055)  (0.054) 
Constant -0.376 0.676* -0.447 0.160 0.441 1.390*** 0.230 0.148 
 (0.259) (0.308) (0.339) (0.343) (0.295) (0.173) (0.274) (0.304) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 45. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10k per 1 Million MSA Population - Dissimilarity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities 10000+ per 1m 
Population 1.095* 1.091* 1.068* 0.922* 0.974* 1.279** 1.393** 1.719*** 
 (0.486) (0.488) (0.492) (0.416) (0.417) (0.483) (0.464) (0.477) 
% White  0.000       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.007      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.047***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.012***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.002   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.100***  
       (0.022)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.301*** 
        (0.067) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.124 
        (0.067) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.043 
        (0.082) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.104 
        (0.071) 
Constant 0.773*** 0.754*** 0.720*** 0.857*** 1.407*** 0.841*** -0.519 0.646*** 
 (0.053) (0.172) (0.060) (0.045) (0.086) (0.062) (0.293) (0.079) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 45. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities 10000+ per 1m 
Population 1.188** 1.153** 1.428*** 1.693*** 1.034** 1.215** 1.307*** 1.199*** 
 (0.365) (0.382) (0.429) (0.390) (0.365) (0.375) (0.343) (0.358) 
% White  -0.004** -0.000 -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.032***  0.030*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.039*** -0.040***  -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.014***  -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.003** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003**  -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.125*** 0.077** 0.146*** 0.052 0.086***  0.106*** 0.120*** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022)  (0.017) (0.023) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.013 -0.045 -0.038 0.219** 0.049 0.212***  -0.027 
 (0.070) (0.083) (0.078) (0.075) (0.064) (0.052)  (0.070) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.003 -0.058 -0.021 0.075 0.047 0.126*  -0.016 
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.068) (0.067) (0.054) (0.053)  (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.019 -0.086 -0.048 -0.045 0.022 0.062  -0.026 
 (0.068) (0.073) (0.082) (0.069) (0.063) (0.061)  (0.066) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.041 -0.034 0.012 -0.059 0.076 0.057  0.046 
 (0.055) (0.065) (0.064) (0.057) (0.054) (0.057)  (0.056) 
Constant -0.286 0.839* -0.451 0.185 0.478 1.480*** 0.274 0.163 
 (0.269) (0.328) (0.352) (0.364) (0.304) (0.177) (0.291) (0.310) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 46. Residential Segregation and Total Population Share Residing Outside Largest City - Dissimilarity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MSA Population Share Residing 
Outside Largest City 0.615*** 0.616*** 0.603*** 0.478*** 0.573*** 1.416*** 0.521*** 0.531*** 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.120) (0.103) (0.102) (0.210) (0.127) (0.116) 
% White  -0.000       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.003      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.044***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.011***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.010***   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.061*  
       (0.025)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.266*** 
        (0.065) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.119 
        (0.066) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.039 
        (0.082) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.039 
        (0.070) 
Constant 0.478*** 0.493** 0.462*** 0.631*** 1.111*** 0.361*** -0.227 0.460*** 
 (0.080) (0.190) (0.081) (0.071) (0.104) (0.087) (0.288) (0.100) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 46. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.667*** 0.923*** 0.943*** 0.973*** 0.275** 0.811*** 0.727*** 0.738*** 
 (0.168) (0.183) (0.209) (0.191) (0.096) (0.179) (0.171) (0.171) 
% White  -0.006*** -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.028***  0.024*** 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.036*** -0.037***  -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.012***  -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008***  -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.108*** 0.058* 0.117*** 0.032 0.064*  0.067*** 0.098*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025)  (0.017) (0.024) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.044 -0.070 -0.077 0.141 0.049 0.131**  -0.061 
 (0.067) (0.076) (0.074) (0.072) (0.068) (0.050)  (0.067) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.020 -0.057 -0.038 0.036 0.047 0.082  -0.034 
 (0.059) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.058) (0.049)  (0.058) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.027 -0.063 -0.050 -0.046 0.020 0.043  -0.031 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.083) (0.074) (0.067) (0.064)  (0.070) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.071 0.027 0.059 0.000 0.102 0.093  0.080 
 (0.053) (0.059) (0.061) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054)  (0.053) 
Constant -0.280 0.856** -0.222 0.395 0.741* 1.377*** 0.590* 0.317 
 (0.265) (0.303) (0.330) (0.342) (0.319) (0.176) (0.265) (0.294) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 47. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration of Fragmentation - Dissimilarity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gini Place Concentration Score 1.310*** 1.308*** 1.356*** 1.038*** 0.946*** 1.356*** 1.025** 0.815** 
 (0.285) (0.285) (0.284) (0.245) (0.253) (0.287) (0.320) (0.283) 
% White  0.000       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.009*      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.045***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.011***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.002   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.049  
       (0.026)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.181** 
        (0.065) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.016 
        (0.065) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.125 
        (0.081) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.107 
        (0.069) 
Constant 0.998*** 0.980*** 0.924*** 1.038*** 1.533*** 1.077*** 0.350 0.954*** 
 (0.032) (0.162) (0.046) (0.028) (0.078) (0.056) (0.348) (0.060) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 47. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Gini Place Concentration Score 0.367 0.598* 0.479 0.712** 0.460* 0.738*** 0.446 0.455 
 (0.237) (0.281) (0.271) (0.260) (0.233) (0.223) (0.228) (0.237) 
% White  -0.005*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.031***  0.029*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.040*** -0.041***  -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.014***  -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.002*  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.112*** 0.054 0.129*** 0.020 0.075**  0.071*** 0.102*** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.025)  (0.021) (0.028) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.061 -0.091 -0.098 0.159* -0.012 0.103  -0.077 
 (0.071) (0.083) (0.080) (0.078) (0.063) (0.054)  (0.071) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.054 -0.108 -0.083 0.003 -0.014 0.035  -0.069 
 (0.062) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.052) (0.053)  (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.063 -0.121 -0.105 -0.098 -0.026 0.001  -0.069 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.084) (0.071) (0.063) (0.062)  (0.068) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.043 -0.027 0.014 -0.056 0.072 0.060  0.049 
 (0.055) (0.065) (0.064) (0.057) (0.054) (0.056)  (0.056) 
Constant 0.065 1.358*** 0.020 0.883* 0.848* 1.794*** 0.867* 0.614 
 (0.316) (0.396) (0.426) (0.429) (0.349) (0.184) (0.338) (0.366) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 48. Residential Segregation and the Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA Attending Different School Districts - Dissimilarity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Likelihood of Two Students in MSA Attending 
Different Districts -0.405 -0.400 -0.436 -0.352 -0.132 -0.412 0.033 0.100 
 (0.278) (0.282) (0.279) (0.241) (0.266) (0.278) (0.289) (0.281) 
% White  0.000       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.008      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.047***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.012***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.092***  
       (0.024)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.247*** 
        (0.066) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.053 
        (0.065) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.126 
        (0.080) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.119 
        (0.071) 
Constant 0.912*** 0.890*** 0.852*** 0.976*** 1.510*** 0.969*** -0.288 0.853*** 
 (0.032) (0.176) (0.044) (0.029) (0.077) (0.055) (0.312) (0.059) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 48. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Likelihood of Two Students in MSA Attending 
Different Districts 0.344 0.060 0.448 0.103 0.195 -0.062 0.207 0.228 
 (0.225) (0.256) (0.268) (0.252) (0.228) (0.232) (0.235) (0.232) 
% White  -0.004** 0.000 -0.002 -0.003* -0.004** -0.003* -0.004* 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.032***  0.031*** 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.040*** -0.041***  -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.015***  -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002* -0.001 -0.003* -0.002*  -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.137*** 0.080** 0.163*** 0.050 0.100***  0.097*** 0.128*** 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023)  (0.019) (0.026) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.058 -0.091 -0.091 0.170* -0.006 0.160**  -0.073 
 (0.071) (0.083) (0.079) (0.077) (0.063) (0.053)  (0.071) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.052 -0.104 -0.078 0.012 -0.008 0.076  -0.065 
 (0.061) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.052) (0.052)  (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.072 -0.134 -0.114 -0.113 -0.033 0.008  -0.078 
 (0.068) (0.073) (0.081) (0.071) (0.062) (0.060)  (0.067) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.044 -0.033 0.015 -0.066 0.071 0.056  0.047 
 (0.055) (0.065) (0.063) (0.058) (0.054) (0.057)  (0.056) 
Constant -0.287 0.946* -0.556 0.350 0.434 1.660*** 0.436 0.175 
 (0.290) (0.369) (0.403) (0.409) (0.329) (0.187) (0.322) (0.347) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 49. Residential Segregation and Total Number of School Districts Relative to MSA Enrollment - Dissimilarity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of School Districts per 1m MSA 
Enrolled 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.016 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
% White  0.000       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.007      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.044***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.010***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.000   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.087***  
       (0.021)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.206*** 
        (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.043 
        (0.063) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.124 
        (0.077) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.091 
        (0.069) 
Constant 0.337** 0.328 0.287* 0.576*** 1.216*** 0.363** -0.747* 0.455*** 
 (0.120) (0.205) (0.115) (0.108) (0.190) (0.137) (0.297) (0.127) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 49. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of School Districts per 1m MSA 
Enrolled -0.005 0.007 0.005 0.017* -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
% White  -0.004** -0.000 -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.004** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.033***  0.029*** 0.019*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.040*** -0.041***  -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.014***  -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.002  -0.000 -0.002 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.128*** 0.078** 0.149*** 0.053 0.094***  0.092*** 0.122*** 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.022)  (0.017) (0.025) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.062 -0.092 -0.099 0.139 -0.009 0.167**  -0.076 
 (0.071) (0.084) (0.081) (0.078) (0.064) (0.052)  (0.071) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.052 -0.103 -0.080 0.003 -0.009 0.079  -0.065 
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.071) (0.068) (0.053) (0.053)  (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.069 -0.134 -0.116 -0.115 -0.031 0.012  -0.076 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.082) (0.070) (0.063) (0.061)  (0.067) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.040 -0.030 0.011 -0.052 0.069 0.056  0.044 
 (0.055) (0.065) (0.064) (0.058) (0.054) (0.057)  (0.056) 
Constant -0.069 0.844* -0.377 0.114 0.611 1.724*** 0.662* 0.400 
 (0.299) (0.405) (0.400) (0.390) (0.341) (0.235) (0.321) (0.352) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 50. Residential Segregation and Share of Population Residing Outside Largest School District - Dissimilarity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Share of Population Residing 
Outside Largest District 0.472*** 0.479*** 0.548*** 0.328*** 0.229* 0.517*** 0.392*** 0.301** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.081) (0.096) (0.097) (0.103) (0.099) 
% White  -0.001       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.015***      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.043***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.010***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.003*   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.052*  
       (0.025)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.189** 
        (0.068) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.042 
        (0.066) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.097 
        (0.081) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.084 
        (0.069) 
Constant 0.633*** 0.718*** 0.467*** 0.770*** 1.297*** 0.714*** 0.018 0.705*** 
 (0.055) (0.170) (0.073) (0.048) (0.109) (0.063) (0.296) (0.072) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central 
cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 50. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Share of Population Residing Outside 
Largest District 0.127 0.066 0.222* 0.379*** 0.112 0.241** 0.163 0.168 
 (0.088) (0.099) (0.104) (0.090) (0.085) (0.084) (0.087) (0.086) 
% White  -0.005** -0.001 -0.003* -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.033***  0.032*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.039*** -0.041***  -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.013***  -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002* -0.001 -0.003** -0.003**  -0.001 -0.002* -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.118*** 0.073* 0.133*** 0.032 0.082***  0.077*** 0.109*** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.024)  (0.019) (0.026) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.059 -0.091 -0.096 0.134 0.001 0.133*  -0.074 
 (0.070) (0.083) (0.077) (0.074) (0.064) (0.053)  (0.070) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.047 -0.103 -0.074 0.009 0.002 0.063  -0.061 
 (0.061) (0.071) (0.068) (0.067) (0.054) (0.052)  (0.060) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.059 -0.129 -0.095 -0.075 -0.017 0.018  -0.063 
 (0.069) (0.074) (0.082) (0.071) (0.064) (0.063)  (0.068) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.048 -0.031 0.025 -0.024 0.080 0.071  0.056 
 (0.055) (0.066) (0.064) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057)  (0.056) 
Constant -0.140 1.014** -0.209 0.544 0.626* 1.546*** 0.638* 0.376 
 (0.277) (0.356) (0.370) (0.388) (0.319) (0.186) (0.298) (0.328) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 51. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA Population - Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities per 1m Population 0.107 0.200*** 0.098 0.078 0.028 0.107 0.271*** 0.176** 
 (0.065) (0.061) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) (0.066) (0.066) (0.060) 
% White  -0.022***       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.016*      
   (0.006)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.041***     
    (0.006)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.009***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.000   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.233***  
       (0.027)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.391*** 
        (0.087) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.186* 
        (0.082) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.037 
        (0.106) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.196* 
        (0.088) 
Constant -0.206*** 1.707*** -0.330*** -0.138** 0.321** -0.205** -3.239*** -0.335*** 
 (0.047) (0.219) (0.069) (0.047) (0.123) (0.076) (0.351) (0.078) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 51. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities per 1m 
Population 0.140* 0.198*** 0.182*** 0.255*** 0.164*** 0.120* 0.159*** 0.154*** 
 (0.059) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) 
% White  -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.043***  0.039*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.030*** -0.047***  -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.014***  -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.003* -0.002 -0.004** -0.003**  0.000 -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.253*** 0.162*** 0.244*** 0.154*** 0.172***  0.187*** 0.213*** 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.026)  (0.020) (0.029) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.041 -0.138 -0.136 0.115 -0.016 0.290***  -0.119 
 (0.110) (0.097) (0.094) (0.084) (0.078) (0.069)  (0.086) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.002 -0.122 -0.083 0.002 0.015 0.166*  -0.071 
 (0.090) (0.082) (0.079) (0.071) (0.064) (0.065)  (0.072) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.006 -0.102 -0.067 -0.052 0.034 0.106  -0.033 
 (0.107) (0.092) (0.096) (0.084) (0.079) (0.077)  (0.083) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.064 -0.144 -0.067 -0.149* -0.004 -0.023  -0.038 
 (0.085) (0.082) (0.078) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073)  (0.070) 
Constant -3.114*** 0.595 -0.842 -0.260 0.191 2.252*** 0.036 -0.160 
 (0.409) (0.421) (0.432) (0.440) (0.397) (0.253) (0.373) (0.400) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 52. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2,500+ per 1 Million MSA Population - Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities 2500+ per 1m 
Population 0.909*** 1.361*** 0.849*** 0.703** 0.654** 0.925*** 1.096*** 1.064*** 
 (0.227) (0.199) (0.232) (0.222) (0.228) (0.230) (0.215) (0.232) 
% White  -0.024***       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.014*      
   (0.006)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.038***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.008***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.211***  
       (0.025)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.412*** 
        (0.089) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.234** 
        (0.086) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.095 
        (0.107) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.157 
        (0.090) 
Constant -0.340*** 1.657*** -0.442*** -0.249*** 0.145 -0.310*** -3.057*** -0.499*** 
 (0.057) (0.212) (0.070) (0.057) (0.129) (0.073) (0.332) (0.096) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 52. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities 2500+ per 1m 
Population 0.606* 1.076*** 1.037*** 1.212*** 0.765*** 0.875*** 0.841*** 0.831*** 
 (0.235) (0.181) (0.201) (0.182) (0.192) (0.197) (0.182) (0.188) 
% White  -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.041***  0.036*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.029*** -0.044***  -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.012***  -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.004** -0.003* -0.004*** -0.004***  -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.241*** 0.146*** 0.223*** 0.136*** 0.147***  0.180*** 0.198*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.028) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.022 -0.094 -0.092 0.134 0.031 0.306***  -0.087 
 (0.113) (0.093) (0.093) (0.083) (0.082) (0.069)  (0.086) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.023 -0.078 -0.041 0.038 0.060 0.189**  -0.040 
 (0.093) (0.080) (0.080) (0.073) (0.068) (0.066)  (0.073) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.021 -0.064 -0.030 -0.017 0.067 0.132  -0.007 
 (0.110) (0.092) (0.095) (0.083) (0.081) (0.077)  (0.084) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.058 -0.127 -0.055 -0.126 0.011 -0.016  -0.030 
 (0.086) (0.079) (0.076) (0.068) (0.068) (0.072)  (0.069) 
Constant -3.027*** 0.692 -0.670 -0.038 0.422 2.153*** 0.103 -0.039 
 (0.391) (0.403) (0.417) (0.425) (0.394) (0.248) (0.367) (0.391) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 53. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10k+ per 1 Million MSA Population - Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities 10000+ per 1m 
Population 0.501 0.940 0.435 0.368 0.390 0.564 1.098 1.611* 
 (0.669) (0.571) (0.680) (0.644) (0.614) (0.682) (0.606) (0.636) 
% White  -0.022***       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.016*      
   (0.006)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.041***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.009***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.205***  
       (0.027)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.408*** 
        (0.092) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.227* 
        (0.090) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.066 
        (0.110) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.192* 
        (0.092) 
Constant -0.200** 1.640*** -0.326*** -0.135* 0.309** -0.178* -2.860*** -0.426*** 
 (0.070) (0.216) (0.081) (0.068) (0.117) (0.082) (0.359) (0.106) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central 
cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 53. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities 10000+ per 1m 
Population 1.328* 1.270** 1.539** 1.882*** 1.104* 1.389** 1.354*** 1.340** 
 (0.555) (0.465) (0.470) (0.458) (0.437) (0.450) (0.399) (0.424) 
% White  -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.044***  0.041*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.030*** -0.048***  -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.015***  -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.004** -0.002* -0.005*** -0.005***  -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.242*** 0.145*** 0.229*** 0.129*** 0.150***  0.182*** 0.201*** 
 (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026)  (0.020) (0.028) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.015 -0.127 -0.109 0.162 0.019 0.304***  -0.094 
 (0.113) (0.101) (0.096) (0.088) (0.083) (0.071)  (0.087) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.038 -0.098 -0.042 0.054 0.059 0.197**  -0.035 
 (0.094) (0.086) (0.082) (0.077) (0.070) (0.068)  (0.075) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.034 -0.099 -0.037 -0.038 0.058 0.129  -0.011 
 (0.111) (0.095) (0.099) (0.088) (0.084) (0.080)  (0.086) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.061 -0.147 -0.064 -0.155* 0.006 -0.022  -0.036 
 (0.087) (0.082) (0.078) (0.071) (0.069) (0.073)  (0.070) 
Constant -3.007*** 0.846* -0.689 -0.023 0.437 2.189*** 0.105 -0.044 
 (0.394) (0.414) (0.425) (0.438) (0.398) (0.250) (0.377) (0.394) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 54. Residential Segregation and Total Population Share Residing Outside Largest City - Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MSA Population Share Residing 
Outside Largest City 0.692*** 0.804*** 0.642*** 0.593*** 0.653*** 1.357*** 0.419** 0.591*** 
 (0.152) (0.132) (0.156) (0.148) (0.142) (0.250) (0.151) (0.151) 
% White  -0.022***       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.012      
   (0.006)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.037***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.009***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.009***   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.175***  
       (0.029)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.379*** 
        (0.088) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.232** 
        (0.087) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.081 
        (0.106) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.119 
        (0.091) 
Constant -0.609*** 1.267*** -0.672*** -0.496*** -0.112 -0.708*** -2.643*** -0.670*** 
 (0.105) (0.224) (0.107) (0.105) (0.146) (0.114) (0.345) (0.132) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 54. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
MSA Population Share Residing 
Outside Largest City 0.549** 1.185*** 1.132*** 1.185*** 0.302** 1.065*** 0.929*** 0.945*** 
 (0.200) (0.203) (0.223) (0.202) (0.114) (0.200) (0.181) (0.188) 
% White  -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.041***  0.034*** 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
 (0.008)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.028*** -0.042***  -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.013***  -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011***  -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Total Population (log) 0.231*** 0.123*** 0.196*** 0.108*** 0.126***  0.139*** 0.176*** 
 (0.036) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.020) (0.026) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.059 -0.156 -0.152 0.071 0.019 0.207**  -0.135 
 (0.108) (0.087) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.065)  (0.077) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 0.006 -0.097 -0.063 0.009 0.060 0.145*  -0.056 
 (0.090) (0.075) (0.074) (0.072) (0.071) (0.061)  (0.068) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.011 -0.064 -0.033 -0.035 0.059 0.115  -0.010 
 (0.109) (0.091) (0.097) (0.087) (0.084) (0.080)  (0.085) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.036 -0.069 -0.007 -0.083 0.035 0.028  0.010 
 (0.086) (0.075) (0.075) (0.067) (0.071) (0.069)  (0.068) 
Constant -2.985*** 0.825* -0.452 0.177 0.725 2.038*** 0.433 0.114 
 (0.395) (0.384) (0.393) (0.406) (0.411) (0.239) (0.351) (0.371) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 55. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration of Fragmentation - Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gini Place Concentration 
Score 1.463*** 1.620*** 1.563*** 1.243** 1.164** 1.483*** 0.329 0.550 
 (0.409) (0.412) (0.409) (0.386) (0.387) (0.415) (0.398) (0.371) 
% White  -0.022***       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.019**      
   (0.007)      
% of Population in Armed 
Forces    -0.039***     
    (0.006)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.008***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.185***  
       (0.031)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.311*** 
        (0.090) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.134 
        (0.085) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.014 
        (0.108) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.199* 
        (0.090) 
Constant -0.025 1.892*** -0.170* 0.005 0.380*** 0.009 -2.470*** -0.159* 
 (0.044) (0.201) (0.070) (0.042) (0.106) (0.075) (0.407) (0.078) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central 
cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 55. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Gini Place Concentration Score -0.350 0.405 0.208 0.482 0.183 0.748* 0.174 0.180 
 (0.353) (0.378) (0.354) (0.341) (0.310) (0.319) (0.311) (0.315) 
% White  -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.044***  0.040*** 0.029*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.032*** -0.049***  -0.054*** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.016***  -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.003* -0.002 -0.004** -0.004**  -0.001 -0.003** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.258*** 0.131*** 0.224*** 0.107** 0.151***  0.160*** 0.196*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.030)  (0.025) (0.033) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.071 -0.179 -0.174 0.099 -0.042 0.190**  -0.151 
 (0.111) (0.100) (0.096) (0.090) (0.081) (0.073)  (0.087) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.014 -0.151 -0.107 -0.022 -0.001 0.102  -0.091 
 (0.091) (0.085) (0.083) (0.078) (0.067) (0.067)  (0.074) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.029 -0.137 -0.101 -0.101 0.009 0.068  -0.061 
 (0.107) (0.095) (0.098) (0.087) (0.082) (0.081)  (0.085) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.064 -0.140 -0.063 -0.158* 0.003 -0.017  -0.034 
 (0.086) (0.083) (0.078) (0.070) (0.069) (0.072)  (0.071) 
Constant -3.033*** 1.254* -0.386 0.540 0.640 2.535*** 0.523 0.242 
 (0.440) (0.501) (0.509) (0.518) (0.458) (0.261) (0.442) (0.465) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 56. Residential Segregation and the Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA Attending Different School Districts - Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Likelihood of Two Students in MSA 
Attending Different Districts -0.598 -1.017** -0.665 -0.564 -0.376 -0.600 0.418 0.153 
 (0.394) (0.359) (0.386) (0.382) (0.386) (0.394) (0.407) (0.400) 
% White  -0.022***       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.017**      
   (0.006)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.042***     
    (0.006)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.009***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.000   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.210***  
       (0.029)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.361*** 
        (0.092) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.161 
        (0.084) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.013 
        (0.106) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.206* 
        (0.090) 
Constant -0.106* 1.856*** -0.240*** -0.055 0.362*** -0.091 -2.842*** -0.236** 
 (0.042) (0.215) (0.069) (0.042) (0.105) (0.071) (0.379) (0.078) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central 
cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 56. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Likelihood of Two Students in 
MSA Attending Different Districts 
0.724 -0.320 0.123 -0.243 -0.178 -0.599 -0.099 -0.124 
(0.376) (0.349) (0.344) (0.330) (0.311) (0.311) (0.314) (0.315) 
% White  -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.045***  0.040*** 0.029*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.009)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.031*** -0.050***  -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.016***  -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.003** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.004**  -0.000 -0.003** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.265*** 0.138*** 0.237*** 0.117*** 0.153***  0.164*** 0.199*** 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028)  (0.022) (0.031) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.061 -0.185 -0.172 0.100 -0.047 0.202**  -0.153 
 (0.111) (0.101) (0.095) (0.090) (0.081) (0.071)  (0.087) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.017 -0.149 -0.105 -0.017 -0.001 0.120  -0.090 
 (0.089) (0.085) (0.082) (0.078) (0.067) (0.066)  (0.074) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.024 -0.145 -0.104 -0.111 0.005 0.063  -0.064 
 (0.105) (0.093) (0.097) (0.088) (0.082) (0.079)  (0.085) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.055 -0.147 -0.063 -0.167* -0.001 -0.029  -0.036 
 (0.084) (0.082) (0.078) (0.072) (0.069) (0.073)  (0.071) 
Constant -3.145*** 1.181* -0.592 0.371 0.621 2.534*** 0.467 0.198 
 (0.425) (0.468) (0.496) (0.508) (0.440) (0.260) (0.427) (0.453) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central 
cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 57. Residential Segregation and Total Number of School Districts Relative to MSA Enrollment - Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of School Districts per 1m 
MSA Enrolled 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.031* 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.030** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
% White  -0.022***       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.015*      
   (0.006)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.036***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.007**    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.195***  
       (0.026)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.316*** 
        (0.087) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.150 
        (0.084) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.012 
        (0.104) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.179* 
        (0.089) 
Constant -0.791*** 1.060*** -0.908*** -0.619*** -0.207 -0.840*** -3.230*** -0.637*** 
 (0.144) (0.244) (0.144) (0.145) (0.249) (0.158) (0.344) (0.161) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central 
cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 57. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of School Districts per 1m 
MSA Enrolled 0.007 0.019 0.013 0.025** 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
% White  -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.043***  0.039*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.009)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.031*** -0.047***  -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.054*** -0.050*** -0.049*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.015***  -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.003* -0.002 -0.004** -0.003**  -0.000 -0.003** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.243*** 0.149*** 0.231*** 0.133*** 0.159***  0.167*** 0.203*** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.029) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.072 -0.183 -0.177 0.062 -0.046 0.248***  -0.151 
 (0.112) (0.102) (0.098) (0.092) (0.082) (0.070)  (0.088) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.016 -0.147 -0.106 -0.028 -0.002 0.142*  -0.090 
 (0.092) (0.085) (0.083) (0.077) (0.067) (0.066)  (0.074) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.025 -0.149 -0.109 -0.115 0.001 0.074  -0.065 
 (0.108) (0.093) (0.097) (0.087) (0.082) (0.078)  (0.085) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.060 -0.136 -0.062 -0.144* 0.001 -0.021  -0.035 
 (0.086) (0.081) (0.078) (0.071) (0.069) (0.073)  (0.071) 
Constant -2.951*** 0.621 -0.721 -0.218 0.422 2.319*** 0.371 0.083 
 (0.421) (0.520) (0.482) (0.465) (0.443) (0.321) (0.416) (0.452) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 58. Residential Segregation and Share of Population Residing Outside Largest School District - Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Share of Population Residing 
Outside Largest District 0.379** 0.546*** 0.491*** 0.270* 0.182 0.405** 0.075 0.064 
 (0.124) (0.113) (0.126) (0.119) (0.128) (0.130) (0.127) (0.130) 
% White  -0.023***       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.023**      
   (0.007)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.038***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.008***    
     (0.002)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.191***  
       (0.030)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.340*** 
        (0.094) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.155 
        (0.086) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.009 
        (0.106) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.200* 
        (0.089) 
Constant -0.354*** 1.578*** -0.604*** -0.247*** 0.183 -0.314*** -2.610*** -0.254** 
 (0.074) (0.209) (0.109) (0.073) (0.147) (0.082) (0.353) (0.092) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 58. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Share of Population Residing Outside 
Largest District -0.132 -0.003 0.172 0.361** 0.028 0.250* 0.115 0.117 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.128) (0.111) (0.108) (0.108) (0.112) (0.113) 
% White  -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.043***  0.041*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.032*** -0.049***  -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.015***  -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Suburbanization -0.003* -0.002 -0.004*** -0.005***  -0.001 -0.003** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.253*** 0.147*** 0.220*** 0.111*** 0.155***  0.158*** 0.195*** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)  (0.023) (0.031) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.073 -0.180 -0.172 0.071 -0.039 0.217**  -0.149 
 (0.112) (0.101) (0.093) (0.086) (0.082) (0.072)  (0.086) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.019 -0.149 -0.101 -0.020 0.004 0.128  -0.087 
 (0.092) (0.086) (0.081) (0.075) (0.068) (0.067)  (0.073) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.033 -0.146 -0.090 -0.075 0.010 0.084  -0.054 
 (0.108) (0.094) (0.098) (0.087) (0.083) (0.080)  (0.086) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later -0.069 -0.145 -0.053 -0.124 0.004 -0.007  -0.028 
 (0.086) (0.083) (0.078) (0.071) (0.070) (0.073)  (0.072) 
Constant -2.841*** 0.998* -0.443 0.347 0.541 2.289*** 0.461 0.171 
 (0.402) (0.452) (0.457) (0.469) (0.419) (0.258) (0.398) (0.422) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 59. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million MSA Population - Hutchens 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities per 1m Population 0.244*** 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.211*** 0.168*** 0.239*** 0.317*** 0.275*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044) 
% White  0.001       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.007      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.040***     
    (0.004)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.009***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.105***  
       (0.019)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.231*** 
        (0.055) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.070 
        (0.055) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.030 
        (0.071) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.093 
        (0.061) 
Constant 0.746*** 0.674*** 0.689*** 0.819*** 1.245*** 0.778*** -0.621* 0.690*** 
 (0.030) (0.148) (0.040) (0.027) (0.072) (0.050) (0.243) (0.052) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 59. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities per 1m Population 0.173*** 0.204*** 0.200*** 0.251*** 0.180*** 0.157*** 0.181*** 0.173*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) 
% White  -0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.028***  0.026*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.035*** -0.035***  -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.010***  -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.002*  0.000 -0.001* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.115*** 0.077** 0.137*** 0.068** 0.091***  0.094*** 0.112*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020)  (0.015) (0.022) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.040 -0.056 -0.059 0.134* 0.009 0.172***  -0.047 
 (0.063) (0.073) (0.070) (0.063) (0.055) (0.046)  (0.063) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.033 -0.071 -0.047 0.022 0.008 0.090  -0.038 
 (0.054) (0.062) (0.061) (0.056) (0.046) (0.047)  (0.054) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.020 -0.067 -0.048 -0.031 0.015 0.054  -0.023 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.074) (0.062) (0.056) (0.055)  (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.029 -0.039 0.002 -0.044 0.051 0.042  0.031 
 (0.050) (0.058) (0.058) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052)  (0.051) 
Constant -0.266 0.453 -0.619 -0.146 0.115 1.193*** 0.075 -0.065 
 (0.242) (0.301) (0.324) (0.320) (0.282) (0.162) (0.262) (0.290) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 60. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2,500+ per 1 Million MSA Population - Hutchens 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities 2500+ per 1m 
Population 1.285*** 1.288*** 1.264*** 1.049*** 1.048*** 1.324*** 1.353*** 1.359*** 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.157) (0.133) (0.143) (0.155) (0.150) (0.152) 
% White  -0.000       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.005      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.037***     
    (0.004)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.008***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.002*   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.082***  
       (0.017)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.247*** 
        (0.056) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.120* 
        (0.056) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        0.026 
        (0.069) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.052 
        (0.060) 
Constant 0.606*** 0.622*** 0.567*** 0.706*** 1.077*** 0.682*** -0.440* 0.516*** 
 (0.038) (0.140) (0.045) (0.032) (0.075) (0.047) (0.224) (0.061) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 60. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities 2500+ per 1m 
Population 0.837*** 1.018*** 1.048*** 1.138*** 0.818*** 0.884*** 0.878*** 0.857*** 
 (0.131) (0.133) (0.150) (0.132) (0.131) (0.134) (0.131) (0.131) 
% White  -0.003* 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.026***  0.024*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.032*** -0.032***  -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.034*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.009***  -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002** -0.002* -0.003** -0.003***  -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.100*** 0.062** 0.116*** 0.050* 0.064***  0.085*** 0.096*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.021) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.010 -0.020 -0.018 0.154* 0.059 0.177***  -0.016 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.066) (0.060) (0.054) (0.044)  (0.060) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.001 -0.033 -0.007 0.055 0.056 0.107*  -0.008 
 (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055) (0.047) (0.046)  (0.053) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 0.004 -0.034 -0.014 -0.001 0.051 0.072  0.001 
 (0.060) (0.065) (0.070) (0.060) (0.055) (0.054)  (0.059) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.036 -0.024 0.012 -0.027 0.067 0.048  0.039 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.056) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050)  (0.049) 
Constant -0.185 0.578* -0.422 0.088 0.373 1.139*** 0.181 0.087 
 (0.225) (0.280) (0.303) (0.303) (0.269) (0.154) (0.251) (0.275) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 61. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10k+ per 1 Million MSA Population - Hutchens 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of Cities 10000+ per 1m Population 1.130** 1.095* 1.097* 0.976** 1.027** 1.312** 1.354*** 1.635*** 
 (0.424) (0.430) (0.430) (0.363) (0.370) (0.420) (0.411) (0.424) 
% White  0.002       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.008*      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.041***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.010***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.002*   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.075***  
       (0.019)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.228*** 
        (0.060) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.095 
        (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.034 
        (0.075) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.097 
        (0.064) 
Constant 0.755*** 0.606*** 0.692*** 0.828*** 1.286*** 0.822*** -0.222 0.658*** 
 (0.047) (0.147) (0.053) (0.039) (0.075) (0.054) (0.258) (0.072) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 61. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of Cities 10000+ per 1m 
Population 1.199*** 1.162*** 1.404*** 1.619*** 1.043** 1.218*** 1.278*** 1.203*** 
 (0.323) (0.345) (0.380) (0.348) (0.329) (0.335) (0.307) (0.321) 
% White  -0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.030***  0.029*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.035*** -0.035***  -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.012***  -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.003** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003**  -0.001 -0.002*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.104*** 0.062* 0.124*** 0.045 0.069***  0.087*** 0.101*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019)  (0.015) (0.021) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.030 -0.054 -0.046 0.169** 0.038 0.167***  -0.036 
 (0.062) (0.074) (0.070) (0.066) (0.057) (0.047)  (0.062) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.008 -0.054 -0.018 0.061 0.048 0.106*  -0.013 
 (0.055) (0.064) (0.062) (0.060) (0.049) (0.048)  (0.055) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.007 -0.066 -0.028 -0.027 0.037 0.064  -0.010 
 (0.063) (0.068) (0.075) (0.063) (0.059) (0.057)  (0.062) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.031 -0.042 0.003 -0.055 0.062 0.042  0.033 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.058) (0.051) (0.049) (0.052)  (0.051) 
Constant -0.107 0.720* -0.438 0.099 0.397 1.209*** 0.206 0.091 
 (0.236) (0.298) (0.317) (0.323) (0.278) (0.158) (0.267) (0.283) 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 62. Residential Segregation and Total Population Share Residing Outside Largest City - Hutchens 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.533*** 0.527*** 0.513*** 0.412*** 0.496*** 1.252*** 0.472*** 0.466*** 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.105) (0.091) (0.089) (0.175) (0.110) (0.102) 
% White  0.001       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.005      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.039***     
    (0.004)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.010***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.009***   
      (0.002)   
Total Population (log)       0.039  
       (0.021)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.193*** 
        (0.058) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.085 
        (0.060) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.033 
        (0.075) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.042 
        (0.063) 
Constant 0.516*** 0.393* 0.490*** 0.652*** 1.049*** 0.411*** 0.063 0.512*** 
 (0.070) (0.163) (0.072) (0.063) (0.091) (0.075) (0.251) (0.088) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 62. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.624*** 0.837*** 0.841*** 0.862*** 0.234** 0.725*** 0.651*** 0.665*** 
 (0.138) (0.154) (0.175) (0.158) (0.084) (0.148) (0.141) (0.142) 
% White  -0.004** -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003* -0.003* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.026***  0.023*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.032*** -0.032***  -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.034*** 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.010***  -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008***  -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.088*** 0.045 0.099*** 0.027 0.051*  0.052*** 0.083*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022)  (0.015) (0.021) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.064 -0.083 -0.088 0.096 0.029 0.089*  -0.074 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.066) (0.064) (0.060) (0.045)  (0.060) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.028 -0.059 -0.040 0.022 0.039 0.061  -0.036 
 (0.053) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.052) (0.044)  (0.052) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.015 -0.047 -0.034 -0.031 0.030 0.045  -0.017 
 (0.065) (0.069) (0.075) (0.067) (0.062) (0.059)  (0.064) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.059 0.014 0.046 -0.004 0.084 0.075  0.064 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.056) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049)  (0.048) 
Constant -0.092 0.749** -0.222 0.299 0.635* 1.138*** 0.513* 0.243 
 (0.231) (0.276) (0.296) (0.303) (0.291) (0.153) (0.242) (0.268) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 63. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration of Fragmentation - Hutchens 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gini Place Concentration Score 1.096*** 1.086*** 1.146*** 0.852*** 0.785** 1.140*** 0.928** 0.727** 
 (0.267) (0.265) (0.266) (0.232) (0.241) (0.269) (0.308) (0.273) 
% White  0.002       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.010**      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.040***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.009***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.002   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.029  
       (0.023)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.118* 
        (0.059) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        -0.006 
        (0.059) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.108 
        (0.074) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.101 
        (0.063) 
Constant 0.963*** 0.806*** 0.883*** 0.999*** 1.414*** 1.040*** 0.586 0.946*** 
 (0.029) (0.142) (0.042) (0.026) (0.068) (0.049) (0.309) (0.055) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 63. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Gini Place Concentration Score 0.360 0.538* 0.426 0.620* 0.407 0.644** 0.389 0.403 
 (0.228) (0.269) (0.258) (0.251) (0.225) (0.217) (0.223) (0.229) 
% White  -0.003* 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.029***  0.027*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.036*** -0.036***  -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.012***  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.002*  -0.001 -0.001* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.091*** 0.042 0.109*** 0.018 0.060**  0.055** 0.086*** 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.022)  (0.019) (0.025) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.079 -0.101 -0.105 0.113 -0.023 0.065  -0.086 
 (0.065) (0.075) (0.073) (0.069) (0.056) (0.049)  (0.065) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.059 -0.104 -0.079 -0.007 -0.013 0.021  -0.066 
 (0.057) (0.065) (0.065) (0.062) (0.048) (0.049)  (0.057) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.048 -0.100 -0.082 -0.077 -0.008 0.008  -0.051 
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.076) (0.065) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.063) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.033 -0.035 0.005 -0.054 0.059 0.045  0.036 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.058) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051)  (0.051) 
Constant 0.244 1.203*** -0.001 0.725 0.738* 1.506*** 0.755* 0.509 
 (0.281) (0.358) (0.384) (0.382) (0.317) (0.164) (0.306) (0.332) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that never 
reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 64. Residential Segregation and the Likelihood of Two Students in an MSA Attending Different School Districts - Hutchens 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Likelihood of Two Students in MSA 
Attending Different Districts -0.336 -0.301 -0.372 -0.289 -0.105 -0.344 -0.020 0.047 
 (0.252) (0.253) (0.252) (0.220) (0.244) (0.252) (0.265) (0.258) 
% White  0.002       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.009*      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.042***     
    (0.005)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.010***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.066**  
       (0.021)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.174** 
        (0.059) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.026 
        (0.059) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.110 
        (0.073) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.112 
        (0.064) 
Constant 0.892*** 0.727*** 0.822*** 0.948*** 1.395*** 0.950*** 0.031 0.860*** 
 (0.028) (0.152) (0.039) (0.025) (0.067) (0.048) (0.275) (0.053) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 64. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Likelihood of Two Students in MSA 
Attending Different Districts 0.243 0.043 0.388 0.091 0.165 -0.051 0.187 0.197 
 (0.212) (0.235) (0.247) (0.231) (0.212) (0.213) (0.217) (0.215) 
% White  -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.030***  0.029*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.036*** -0.036***  -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.013***  -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.002*  -0.000 -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.112*** 0.064* 0.139*** 0.044 0.081***  0.079*** 0.109*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021)  (0.017) (0.024) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.077 -0.101 -0.098 0.123 -0.018 0.115*  -0.083 
 (0.064) (0.076) (0.072) (0.069) (0.057) (0.047)  (0.065) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.058 -0.100 -0.074 0.001 -0.007 0.056  -0.062 
 (0.056) (0.065) (0.064) (0.062) (0.048) (0.047)  (0.056) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.056 -0.111 -0.090 -0.090 -0.015 0.014  -0.058 
 (0.062) (0.068) (0.074) (0.065) (0.057) (0.056)  (0.062) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.033 -0.041 0.006 -0.063 0.058 0.042  0.034 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.057) (0.051) (0.049) (0.052)  (0.051) 
Constant -0.059 0.840* -0.507 0.261 0.377 1.389*** 0.375 0.125 
 (0.259) (0.335) (0.364) (0.364) (0.300) (0.167) (0.293) (0.316) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities 
that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 65. Residential Segregation and Total Number of School Districts Relative to MSA Enrollment - Hutchens 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of School Districts per 
1m MSA Enrolled 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.015 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
% White  0.002       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.008*      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.039***     
    (0.004)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.009***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.063***  
       (0.019)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.140* 
        (0.055) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.018 
        (0.057) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.108 
        (0.070) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.086 
        (0.063) 
Constant 0.394*** 0.249 0.333** 0.604*** 1.125*** 0.428*** -0.391 0.496*** 
 (0.106) (0.177) (0.101) (0.095) (0.169) (0.122) (0.260) (0.114) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central 
cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 65. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Number of School Districts per 
1m MSA Enrolled -0.004 0.007 0.004 0.014* -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% White  -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.030***  0.027*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.036*** -0.036***  -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.012***  -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.002*  -0.000 -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.106*** 0.063* 0.126*** 0.046 0.076***  0.073*** 0.103*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.020)  (0.015) (0.023) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.079 -0.102 -0.106 0.096 -0.020 0.121**  -0.086 
 (0.065) (0.077) (0.074) (0.069) (0.057) (0.047)  (0.065) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.057 -0.099 -0.076 -0.006 -0.008 0.059  -0.063 
 (0.056) (0.065) (0.065) (0.061) (0.048) (0.048)  (0.056) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.054 -0.112 -0.092 -0.092 -0.014 0.017  -0.057 
 (0.063) (0.068) (0.075) (0.064) (0.058) (0.056)  (0.062) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.030 -0.037 0.003 -0.050 0.056 0.042  0.032 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.058) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052)  (0.051) 
Constant 0.110 0.728* -0.354 0.060 0.521 1.443*** 0.572* 0.317 
 (0.264) (0.366) (0.356) (0.344) (0.307) (0.211) (0.290) (0.318) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 66. Residential Segregation and Share of Population Residing Outside Largest School District - Hutchens 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Share of Population Residing 
Outside Largest District 0.394*** 0.388*** 0.470*** 0.266*** 0.187* 0.436*** 0.343*** 0.264** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.072) (0.084) (0.086) (0.091) (0.088) 
% White  0.001       
  (0.002)       
% Housing Units Vacant   0.015***      
   (0.004)      
% of Population in Armed Forces    -0.039***     
    (0.004)     
% of Housing Built Post-FHA     -0.008***    
     (0.001)    
Suburbanization      -0.003**   
      (0.001)   
Total Population (log)       0.032  
       (0.022)  
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier        0.126* 
        (0.061) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940        0.017 
        (0.060) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960        -0.084 
        (0.074) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later        -0.080 
        (0.062) 
Constant 0.659*** 0.591*** 0.492*** 0.781*** 1.221*** 0.734*** 0.277 0.726*** 
 (0.048) (0.147) (0.065) (0.042) (0.094) (0.055) (0.256) (0.064) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central 
cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 66. Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Share of Population Residing Outside 
Largest District 0.132 0.058 0.200* 0.331*** 0.098 0.214** 0.146 0.153 
 (0.078) (0.090) (0.094) (0.080) (0.077) (0.076) (0.079) (0.078) 
% White  -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Housing Units Vacant 0.031***  0.030*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Population in Armed Forces -0.035*** -0.036***  -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% of Housing Built Post-FHA -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.011***  -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Suburbanization -0.002** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003***  -0.001 -0.002* -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Population (log) 0.097*** 0.058* 0.113*** 0.028 0.066**  0.061*** 0.092*** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022)  (0.017) (0.023) 
Age of the MSA 1900 & earlier -0.077 -0.101 -0.103 0.091 -0.011 0.091  -0.084 
 (0.063) (0.075) (0.070) (0.066) (0.057) (0.048)  (0.063) 
Age of the MSA 1910 to 1940 -0.053 -0.099 -0.071 -0.002 0.001 0.045  -0.059 
 (0.056) (0.065) (0.062) (0.059) (0.049) (0.048)  (0.055) 
Age of the MSA 1950 to 1960 -0.044 -0.107 -0.073 -0.057 -0.001 0.023  -0.045 
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.075) (0.065) (0.059) (0.058)  (0.063) 
Age of the MSA 1970 & later 0.039 -0.038 0.015 -0.026 0.066 0.055  0.042 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.058) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)  (0.051) 
Constant 0.043 0.894** -0.205 0.430 0.541 1.289*** 0.557* 0.299 
 (0.243) (0.324) (0.333) (0.345) (0.292) (0.166) (0.273) (0.299) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Age of the MSA is a dummy variable with multiple categories. Central cities that 
never reached 50k are the reference group. Fragmentation coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
*p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
 
